


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I Solemnly Swear

Take your hat off when you write about the Inaugural. It means that democracy has come through another test. The ceremony is an American invention combining dignified and undignified things in a typical American package—parades, bands, floats, strutting majorettes clothed mostly in their own gooseflesh. It is incongruous because America is incongruous. The Inaugural is America's middle way between a coronation and a *coup d'état*.

It has two big events—the ceremonial ride up Pennsylvania Avenue of the incoming and outgoing Presidents forced to sit in one vehicle—though they may hate each other. And the second event—the two minutes of awed silence when the President-elect comes out on the high platform before the nation and repeats the words, "I, James Earl Carter, do solemnly swear . . ." It takes a very dull person indeed not to understand the almost mystical meaning of this. It is part of the thing that governs us and that makes us governable: before the words this familiar figure up there was an individual and we either liked him or didn't; but now he is President.

The words are the words that Washington repeated; the President-elect is standing before the same building where Lincoln twice appeared (with the dome unfinished). More often than not the address he delivers immediately thereafter is eminently forgettable but, on the other hand, it may not be the words but who delivers them that is important. The office has a tendency to lift even little men up.

You get an album of America in those speeches: Ulysses S. Grant, for example, (anticipating Jerry Ford on Puerto Rico) proposing to make Santo Domingo a

state in 1873. Or Hoover, unconscious that he was already destroyed, boasting of prosperity eight months before the Crash. And FDR telling us we had nothing to fear, and Kennedy giving his "Ask not" phrase.

Every Inaugural has its own mood and flavor. Robert Sherwood, the poet, caught the essence of 1933:

*Plodding feet
Tramp-tramp
The Grand Old Party's
Breaking camp.
Blare of bugles
Din-din
The New Deal is moving in.*

Twenty years later came the Republican restoration. That was a joyous but vindictive triumph. Suspicion of outgoing Democrats ran so high that incoming Treasury Secretary Humphrey's first order of business was to count the gold at Fort Knox. There was a protocol flap when Ike wouldn't go past the White House portico to make his ceremonial call on Truman. Jobholders quaked. Fear of the spoilsman was so intense that stores bought full-page advertisements in Washington newspapers reassuring government workers that their credit was still good. Buy now and make no payment till March, one pleaded: "We're not worried, why should *you* be?" A clothing ad said, "Bond's has complete confidence in the continued employment of present government personnel."


Let's come down another 20 years. In 1973 there was a surly undertone to the Nixon Washington festival. Antiwar protestors staged a counter-Inaugural. People thought Nixon might make some big announcement. Everything was ready. The Roost-No-More Co. had gone down the plane trees on the Avenue spraying them to keep starlings off. There was no spray for dissidents.

For no good reason I found myself up in a radio perch under the ceiling of the Capitol, in a small closet on stilts holding four people; I was supposed to feed lines to the commentator. I had never looked down on the crowd before and seen it as the President did, stretching out by the acre and resembling the underside of a tapestry. You wondered what design was on the other side. Alabama's Gov. George Wallace was wheeled in, just below, and the Agnews and Nixons greeted him warmly.

That was four years ago; some flags still at half mast for Truman and a bitter

(continued on page 86)

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


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THE NEW REPUBLIC



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The Staff


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No Laurel Wreaths Yet

It is no longer bright morning for Jimmy Carter: the mantle of power is now upon him, and it cannot be as comfortable as he imagined it. Up to now the going has been easy, or relatively so. He has been choosing among supplicants, eyes popping with ambition, talents far less meaningful in the sweepstakes than the interests they would serve. And there has been something for just about everyone, particularly for the arbiters of what is reassuring in America. The entourage which Carter has gathered is not exactly drawn from Madame Tussaud's. But neither will it make the country feel young again or joyous. Perhaps nothing could, and the sooner we face that the better.

In any case, no comparison with Franklin Roosevelt will wash. It is, of course, precisely that comparison which Carter tried to evoke in launching the fall campaign from Warm Springs. But, as one Washington wag put it, that's where FDR died, not where he and the experiments he fostered came alive. Reread Arthur Schlesinger's *The Coming of the New Deal* to grasp the contrast between the two beginnings. Roosevelt collected around him curmudgeons and idealists, pirates and gentle souls, irrepressible adventurers and brooding pessimists. And it worked. Maybe, as one observer noted, because they were "chain talkers." Who in the ascendancy today, so many of them in second appearances, will play the role of Harold Ickes? Of Frances Perkins? Of Felix Frankfurter?

Are we judging too early? The hundred days have barely begun. Ray Marshall, for example, designated as



Secretary of Labor, is a humane and inventive man. The career of Dr. Sidney Harman, who is to be undersecretary at Commerce, shows that a sensitive intelligence can be applied equally to entrepreneurship and the problems of man and society. And there are others, decent, energetic, wise even, some of them. Moreover, it is surely unfair to assume that none of the younger folk now descending on Washington, as unknown as those who came here 44 years ago, will be remembered a generation hence with nostalgia for brilliance, courage, selflessness—or, for that matter, principled stiffneckedness. Maybe, after all, that will happen, and more. But if it does, Jimmy Carter will have had to demonstrate that he is prepared to offend the conventional and the entrenched, even to court enmity, at home and yes, when necessary, abroad. It is not

advice ordinarily found in political chapbooks. But it might just help us off the debilitating course leading from hope to frustrated hope.

Lord Bryce said in wonder at the turn of the century that "Divine Providence has under its special protection children, idiots and the United States of America." That umbrella of peculiar fortune has been removed, not to be restored, and it would be folly to think the nuclear umbrella adequate as a substitute. Though we have adversaries, and seriously determined ones at that—which fact many liberals now are inclined to overlook—the American crisis is not foreign in origin. The malaise is everywhere around us: though OPEC or the Russians have here and there exacerbated our problems, what is taken to be a failure of American nerve is really a failure of American institutions and American imagination.

Of course, this is also a function of the failure of the American economy. If not quite accurately and certainly unevenly, the economy once had the appearance and some reality of being a particularly heady version of climbing Jacob's ladder. For generations, waves of immigrants succeeded in pushing the country westward and their children upward. Blacks constituted the most stunning but not the only exception. Now the great success story seems to have ground to a halt, perhaps even to have reversed itself. It may be the first time in our history, depressions aside, when middle-class Americans can reasonably anticipate for their children the long-range prospect of downward mobility. The middle class may not be a precise term; some sociologists think it evades more than it illumines. But many people who work at jobs, that is who do not operate businesses or practice professions, also think of themselves as middle class. In very substantial ways they are. This is, in fact, the distinctive achievement of the labor movement.

So it is a serious political crisis when the American middle class—an inchoate group straddling a broad range of incomes and life-styles—feels itself strapped and is so. Unwanted like most revolutions, this revolution of declining expectations cannot be seen as just, and will not be seen as inevitable by those who experience it. They may not save or spend prudently; they may want automobiles too large both for their needs and the society's resources; the media they rely on for information may not be reliable, and what they prefer as entertainment sometimes seems violent or vulgar or both. Nonetheless, in the modern economy the middle class is not a privileged class, and it should not be treated as if it were.

It is a cliché and true, then, that ours is largely a middle-class society. To the extent that the society is to behave tolerantly and liberally, the vast middle class must not be inordinately squeezed between the poles of poverty, modified and institutionalized by a costly dole, and that of indulgent riches, modified by almost nothing. But it should also be a *sine qua non* of civilized

life that the enormous gap between those who are sated at the banquet of life and those who are hungry cannot be tolerated. This means that the religion of greed, which is always at the expense of others, must not be enshrined, by indifference or deliberation, in law and social policy.

The creation of jobs much more numerous and at more varied skill levels than envisioned in Carter's first economic program is an imperative for several reasons, most of them obvious. Jobs give people incomes with dignity and lift them out of hopelessness. They also lift people off the shoulders of others and do so more quickly than tax cuts or any other indirect form of aid. It is unhealthy and threatening to the civility of a society when ever more of its members are unproductive and out of the tax system. It is, in fact, a near guarantee of a bitter politics of resentment if people who work hard and whose rewards seem to be declining know there are more and more individuals who do not work at all. The employed, unhappily, are not as a group likely to make the distinction between those who can't work and those who won't. Moreover, it is simply irrational for work to go undone when so much needs to be done. Economics, politics, ethics for once fit neatly: jobs must be found not only for those who need them but also because of those who already have them.

Tax reform is one of those complicated battles often fought in the name of the middle class. Charles Schultze, who has always been sensitive to the ethical component in public policy, has, as the prospective chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, presented a tax package aimed at stimulating the languishing economy. The corporations will get their break, and that should not provoke too much squalling. Something has to be done to induce more investment. There is a one-time tax rebate, and then a proposal for an increased standard deduction which Schultze says is "tangible evidence to the American people that we mean business about tax reform." The problem with that one is that no material benefits would accrue to families with adjusted gross incomes of more than \$17,500 annually. What is the justification for that cut-off line? Are families who have incomes of \$20,000 or even \$30,000 not to be thought of as meriting tax relief? Or needing it?

These are not simple matters. Using the income tax as a redistributive device wholly without reference to permanent wealth may, in any event, be an exercise in futility, and magnify inequities rather than reduce them. But the mixed reception Carter's well motivated but all-too-modest dose of economic revival has received just hints at how difficult the task is, at how much we may have to depart from the accepted formulae of progressive thinking in economics to get progressive results.

Carter has struck deep responsive chords in the population with his pledge to restore a moral perspec-

(continued on page 10)

Correspondence

Around in Circles

To the editors:

Eight years ago, as an undergraduate at Cornell, I participated in projects similar to those described by Robert Coles and Tom Davey in *The New Republic* (Working with Migrants"). Called the Cornell Migrant Labor Project, it led to a book designed in part to inform the general public about the conditions in which migrants live and work.

What is sad about the situation reported by Coles and Davey is not that the Duke undergraduates believe they are starting a tradition rather than continuing one, but that the conditions for migrants should be so unchanged.

One cannot help questioning Coles and Davey's optimism—will a change in federal administration really have a significant effect on the lives of migrants? I hope so, but would not be surprised to find future generations of college students rediscovering migrant farmworkers.

Lillian Trager
Kenosha, Wisconsin

Means and Ends

To the editors:

Robert Coles and Tom Davey ("Defending the Land") tell of a Montana driver who points out the land where his grandfather had homesteaded a long time ago.

My grandfather, too, homesteaded a long time ago in neighboring South Dakota. My father farmed that land and, later, so did I. Those on the land now have better roads to get their produce to market, and their lives and work load are made easier by electricity—produced by the burning of coal. The coal is needed by our people as much as the food is, and that is why the coal is being mined—not just so the "large corporations (can)... sell it for a big profit."

The coal is mined by one of the "big companies" and supplies a user-owned rural-electric cooperative. This coal- (or lignite-) produced electricity is vital to

the well being of us all and to the economic well-being of our nation.

I should state that I am involved in a cooperative coal supply organization, nonprofit, for the rural electric cooperative generators and distributors of electricity as well as some municipally operated electric utilities.

In several years of work in this field, I have confirmed for myself what should be obvious to all—that we are not producing enough fuels in this country to meet our energy needs. We are importing more than 40 percent of the petroleum products we use and are at the mercy of the whims of the OPEC nations. Our domestic reserves of oil and natural gas are no longer adequate to meet our needs; other available and readily usable sources of energy have reached a peak of efficient production


(hydro-electric) or have to overcome continual harassment in order to be put to use (coal and nuclear).

"There are so many ways to get the energy we need without destroying the West," Coles and Davey state, without naming any. Coal can be mined and used to supply the energy we need, and the mined areas can (and will) be restored to useful contours, *without destroying the West*.

The old days are gone if, in fact, they were ever here, and no one—mining company or not—today can operate without paying what the state asks in royalties and taxes. If the mining is done in Montana, for example, the state collects a 30 percent royalty on every lump of coal mined—a cost which in the end must be borne by the users of the coal and the electricity it produces, not by the companies that mine it or the state which sets the royalties and levies the taxes.


Ken Holum
Washington, DC

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
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"One day's delay could leave you short several hundred thousand barrels."



you may be short several hundred thousand barrels of crude. The whole process depends on an uninterrupted supply. So you have to talk to the transportation and supply people to make other arrangements for crude oil delivery.

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People vs the elements


"There's an enormous investment in hardware here at Alliance, but even more valuable are the

people who make it all happen. Bad weather is just one of the challenges our people meet. But every day, all year long, we maintain the crude supply to produce 200,000 barrels of products.

"It's a real challenge—but that's the job: meeting the challenge, and doing it right."



**Gulf people:
meeting the challenge.**



"You have to refine different crudes different ways to get the same product."

Gulf Oil Corporation

tive to foreign policy. There is some evidence that the Chilean junta, among our more unsavory allies, will at least try to appear responsive to the fact that the White House may care about political prisoners and torture. It's a beginning, but it will take more than words to make the change meaningful.

Carter's moral critique of foreign policy weighed heavily for him in the campaign, particularly among his more liberal supporters. In *The New York Times*, Anthony Lewis justifiably made it the bedrock of his enthusiasm. In a column last week Lewis quoted approvingly from an eloquent speech delivered by Sen. Dick Clark to a South African audience: "You are not responsible to us in any way but we are responsible for our own actions and that includes how we react to you. . . . We must not give strength and comfort to a government and society which is an anathema to our own. . . ." It is a view that Americans will rightly share, particularly inasmuch as nearly everyone now shares the shame of Vietnam. But a people that is willing to relearn moral considerations in foreign policy will not want them applied selectively. They will begin to wonder and become cynical if ethical reservations and prohibitions in trade and aid are to be suspended in our dealings with third world and Communist tyrannies. There are among them regimes as systematically cruel as any in the world. Anyone who has read Hedrick Smith's memoir of his stay among *The Russians* will know why a society with all the benefits of advancement remains "an anathema to our own." And Soviet cruelty may be more discriminating than that of others. How are we to make our moral and intellectual ends meet on the Carter promise, repeated by Cyrus Vance at his confirmation hearing, of a bias for freedom in our foreign policy? In an editorial on January 11, the *Times* seems to argue that concern by government for "human needs" might in our eyes compensate for, or neutralize, their violations of "human rights." That would be a bizarre calculus, but a list of the regimes that trample on both is depressingly long.

Carter's tough problems have only just begun. We welcome his coming, with the usual cautionary note, one appropriate to independent journalism. We are not inclined to place laurel wreaths on anyone's head; in a way, we think it our obligation not to do so. And we expect no laurel wreaths ourselves. Skepticism is our vocation. We hope that skepticism serves Jimmy Carter well.

Black January

On Friday, January 7, Abu Daoud, a PLO terrorist, leader of Black September, who has publicly boasted of his role in the Munich massacre, among other murderous episodes, was arrested in Paris by French security police. On Tuesday, January 11, with extradi-

tion requests pending from West Germany and Israel, Abu Daoud was released by a French court, hastily convened at the instigation of the prosecution which desperately wanted to dump its captive, and flown (first class) to Algeria. It's not quite accurate to say that the French bowed to Arab pressure when they freed their prisoner, for they seem by now permanently stooped, unable to bend much lower. But this latest concession had to be arranged with special speed, since President Giscard d'Estaing is due to leave next week on a state visit to Saudi Arabia, and he no doubt hopes to tell his countrymen on his return that they will live warmly ever after. The only price is national honor, and at that price, Giscard must think, combustion is cheap. In fact it is not cheap, not for France, not for Europe, not for any of us. Slowly and painfully over the last months, the countries of Western Europe have been pulling themselves together for the fight against terrorism. It's the Germans who have taken the lead, but even in France, Interior Minister Michel Poniatowski has spoken bravely. The trouble is that's not how he or his government has behaved.


An anti-terrorist treaty is soon to be ratified by all the Common Market nations, and that treaty, many people hoped, would mark the beginning of a general European recovery from the hysteria and cowardice provoked by the oil embargo. But the French government is hysterical and cowardly still, and it has scuttled those hopes. In Paris right now, it's Black January.

White House Watch Farewell and Hail


The impending inauguration of Jimmy Carter and departure of Gerald Ford are occasion for another report on how the new President's White House establishment is shaping up and for a farewell to the outgoing President and his people. The farewell is kinder and, in my opinion, fairer than the editorial snarl of "good riddance" in this journal's previous issue. Much that was unkind was said over the years in this space about Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Henry Kissinger, Elliot Richardson, Alexander Haig and the rest of them. But they never were and never will be collectively dismissed by me as "clods, malefactors, narrow-minded reactionary zealots, egomaniacs, flunkies, lame-brains." To all of those departing, I say so long and thanks for what you told and taught me about the follies, burdens and rewards of presidential service.

Now to current business, in this instance the President-elect's notions of how to use his Vice President. Carter said in Georgia and in a televised interview that Vice President Mondale was to be "my


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
Roosevelt and Churchill 1939-1941: The Partnership That Saved the West. By Joseph P. Lash. \$12.95/\$8.95




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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top staff person" and that everybody on the Carter staff had been told by Carter to regard the Vice President as their boss. In view of the fact that Carter had not then and at this writing still had not named most of his senior White House staff, it was a silly statement and it invited distortions. So wise and experienced a commentator as James Reston of *The New York Times* understood that Mondale was to be chief of the White House staff. Carter's spokesman, Jody Powell, had to say that the President-elect didn't say or mean that; he'd repeatedly said and meant that he wasn't going to have a chief of staff. What Carter meant, Powell explained, was that Carter assistants were to regard any order coming to them from the Vice President as if it came from the President. Incumbents at the Ford White House, including some who thought that President Ford could and should have used Vice President Nelson Rockefeller more effectively than he did, concluded two weekends before the inauguration that Jimmy Carter was either extraordinarily naïve or talking through his hat about the substantive responsibilities he intended to vest in his Vice President when he announced that in the very first week of the Carter administration he was sending Mondale to Western Europe and Japan to apprise our principal allies of the new President's foreign policy goals. The incumbents' reasoning, naturally not prejudiced in Carter's favor, was that anybody who was really intended to be the

new President's "top staff person" would not have been detached from the White House scene and sent abroad during the first and formative days of the new administration.

Presidential and other staff assistants, outgoing or incoming, assume that the valid measure of standing with the boss is the location of the assistant's office. During the first months of the Nixon presidency, the measure was proximity: H. R. Haldeman occupied a small office next door to the President's Oval Office and Vice President Agnew had the biggest office in the West Wing, at a corner four doors down a corridor from the President's office. Everybody including Agnew understood that Haldeman mattered and Agnew didn't. After a few months of isolation and boredom in the corner office, Agnew had an elaborate suite, including a dining room and toilet, put together for him on the second floor of the Executive Office Building across West Executive Avenue from the West Wing. Haldeman moved into the corner office and successor staff chiefs—Alexander Haig, Donald Rumsfeld, Richard Cheney—have occupied it and identified it as the White House office second only to the Oval Office. It was understood at the Ford White House just before the Inaugural and departure that Hamilton Jordan, the Carter assistant who will not initially be acknowledged to be the new President's chief of staff, will have the corner office. Vice President Mondale was expected to



John Osborne with Gerald Ford on his last Air Force One trip.


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have the EOB suite created for Agnew, and in addition, for token purposes, the West Wing office occupied recently by the departing President's friend and chief speech writer, Robert Hartmann. It's a nice office, with a splendid view of West Executive Avenue and the windows of the Vice President's working office in the EOB. But it ain't that corner office.

New Presidents never learn, or anyhow pretend not to learn, from past Presidents' experience with their Vice Presidents. This is not to say that President Carter cannot possibly break the pattern of history and use Vice President Mondale in ways that literally no President has ever proven able or willing to use his Vice President. I do suggest that it will be very difficult. Bromley K. Smith, a friend who was a national security assistant to Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson and was one of the few people on the Kennedy staff who tried to be courteous to Vice President Lyndon Johnson, defined the problem more succinctly than anybody else has to my knowledge, orally or in print. Smith said that Presidents simply don't have the time to spend with Vice Presidents that they'd have to spend if they kept their public pledges of total confidence and collaboration. Harry Truman, who was Franklin Roosevelt's Vice President for 82 days before he succeeded to the presidency, tried in his memoirs to explain the arms-length relationship that he had in his elected term with his dear and admired friend, former Senator Alben Barkley (the first Vice President to be called "the Veep"). Although Truman dealt with a broad problem in his usual sharp and narrow terms, his main point of fundamental and constitutional distance comes across from language that in the halcyon atmosphere of Carter's advent may seem parochial and out-dated:

No Vice President is ever properly prepared to take over the presidency because of the nature of our presidential, or executive, office. The President is the man who decides every major domestic policy, and he is the man who makes foreign policy and negotiates treaties. In doing these things it would be very difficult for him to take the second man in the government—the Vice President—completely into his confidence. The President, by necessity, builds his own staff, and the Vice President remains an outsider, no matter how friendly the two may be. There are many reasons for this, but an important one is the fact that both the President and the Vice President are, or should be, astute politicians, and neither can take the other completely into his confidence. The Vice President, as President of the Senate, associates continually with the shrewdest politicians in the country. . . . The President cannot afford to have his confidential matters discussed in Senate cloakrooms. . . . That is . . . one of the reasons why it is very difficult for a President to take the Vice President completely into his confidence.

Vice Presidents nowadays don't associate all that continually with senators, who anyhow tend to distrust Vice Presidents, whether or not they are former

senators, even more than Truman thought Presidents must distrust them. But one assumes that Jimmy Carter would concede that Harry Truman in retirement knew more about the presidency and its complexities than Carter knows at the start of his and our great adventure.

John Osborne

Inventory Of Improbables

Fear of inflation haunted the Republican White House for many years, and now it seems to have settled in and put a chill on Jimmy Carter's administration. Even if the President-elect were to launch no new social programs in 1977, he would inherit a budget deficit from Jerry Ford of \$50-\$60 billion. It is an intimidating figure. Ford's warnings about the relationship between deficits and inflation have had an impact, and as Carter steps into the White House he steps into an atmosphere charged with fear. It will require some courage to defy the logic and economic policies of the outgoing administration, and at this writing it is not at all clear that Carter intends to do so.

The President-elect has said that he's willing to increase the deficit by about \$15 billion this year and by another \$15 billion next year to pay for some quick tax cuts and public service jobs that he hopes will stimulate the economy. But beyond that, he will be cautious. His aides have given out a long list of reform projects he intends to submit to Congress this year, but their exact nature remains uncertain.

Putting the unemployed to work is the first item on every politician's agenda, and the approach that Carter takes may provoke the first contest between him and Congress. There are two types of employment projects under discussion—the long and the short-term variety—and thus far Carter has addressed only the second. He has not shown much enthusiasm for the Democrats' comprehensive scheme—the Humphrey-Hawkins plan to guarantee every American the "right to work" and set a legislated goal of lowering the unemployment rate to three percent by 1981. (It is now about eight percent.) Last week, Charles Schultze, who will be Carter's chief economist, endorsed the Humphrey-Hawkins idea in principle, and Stuart Eizenstat, Carter's domestic policy spokesman, told the press that there was a plan "on the agenda for 1977" to set up a national youth service corps to put young people to work. The details were not available. But in any case, these promises do not become official unless Carter voices them himself.

The one package Carter has endorsed—the short-

term stimulus composed of tax cuts and public-sector jobs—has been judged inadequate by labor economists. They believe it is too timid. Woodrow Ginsburg, director of research for the Center for Community Change, pointed out that in 1964, when the economy was in far better shape than it is today, the President cut taxes by \$33 billion (in current dollars), more than Carter has risked in the middle of a recession. Carter's two-year, \$30-billion plan is "pitifully too small," according to Ginsburg, and will have little impact. He also believes it is too heavily slanted in favor of tax relief, which accounts for two-thirds of the cost. He would have preferred more money for jobs. Organized labor feels the same way. The AFL-CIO is so unhappy with the program that it has accused Carter of "retreating" from his campaign commitments. George Meany will not support Carter's legislation, but will ask Congress to create \$30 billion worth of jobs, not the \$7 billion worth Carter has offered. The battle has begun.

Another monster of social planning that could come up for review this year if the conditions are right is federal welfare. This broad category includes programs that give cash and food, housing or health subsidies to the blind and disabled, to fatherless families and some categories of "working poor" families. The system, as Jimmy Carter often said during the campaign, is incoherent, degrading, unmanageable—a mess. The trouble with trying to make sense of these programs is that no one agrees what the sense should be. The last attempt to forge a unified system fell apart in 1971 when the Democrats in Congress failed to come to terms with Richard Nixon and his "Family Assistance Plan," designed for the White House by Daniel Patrick Moynihan. The proposal disintegrated two years in succession when liberals on the Senate Finance Committee refused to accept, in return for a guaranteed minimum income for all Americans, a stringent system of "work incentives" and fraud preventives. The conservative view of welfare seems even better dug in today than it was then, and the likelihood of compromise remote.

The President-elect has said that he will give his new welfare plan to Congress this year, but that it may take two years before he gets it running. No details are available, but the general outline has been sketched in. Though it may change radically between now and the day it is presented, the most frequently described plan would work as follows. Welfare recipients would be divided into two groups, the able-bodied and the disabled; the former would come under the jurisdiction of the Labor Department, and the latter under HEW. The estimated 10 percent who could work would be given an opportunity to do so; if they refused they would be dropped from the rolls. The rest would receive cash support under a fully federalized, uniform, national minimum income plan. State and city governments would no longer pay any share of the cost. That is what Carter proposed during the

campaign. But he may opt for something less ambitious if the cost proves to be what some believe it will be—about twice the cost of federal welfare today.

National health insurance is a third social project that has been promised by several Presidents, most recently by Jimmy Carter, but not yet delivered. Early in the campaign, Carter said that he would put into effect a mandatory, universal, tax-financed health plan—code words that suggested to the specialists in this field that he would enact the most generous form of health insurance, the kind advocated by United Auto Workers president Leonard Woodcock. The UAW plan would nationalize the health insurance industry, create a coherent federal system and set limits on fees charged by doctors and hospitals. Carter later said that what he really had in mind was something more modest—a plan that would include all citizens but leave the insurance industry in private hands; the government would be a rule-maker and fraud-preventer, as it is in the Medicare program. Some Carter-watchers now believe that even this plan will seem too generous when the President-elect begins to study the cost. A congressional expert on health budgeting estimated that to do a "decent job," meaning to put into effect a comprehensive health plan, the government would have to spend \$60 to \$80 billion in the first year. A minimal plan to ensure only catastrophic health problems—the kind that drive families into bankruptcy—would cost \$10 to \$12 billion. Carter is not likely to approve either of these in his first or even his second year in office, unless the economy is doing very well. More likely, the public health expert said, the new administration will clamp down on federal costs and launch a campaign to end fraud by doctors and patients.




Eliot Marshall

Free Advice to Mr. Carter

Your Diplomacy

As a governor and then presidential candidate, you seem to have believed, like the majority of American politicians, that foreign policy is somehow very different from the commotions of domestic politics and administration. The common view is that a new President can change our international relations for the better pretty much by saying the right things—aloud in public or whispered in the ears of foreign diplomats—on the advice of a well traveled establishment elite who understand the peculiar mysteries of world affairs. Most of the briefings and policy papers sifted up to the

From Jamie Wyeth's Sketch Book



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White House further that fiction, largely because Presidents don't know better, and the bureaucrats do. Eventually, of course, your predecessors found out the hard way that the reality is both less simple and more banal.

In a mixture of suspicion, shrewdness and sheer megalomania, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger saw all this eight years ago. Their answer was a veritable *coup d'état* which seized foreign policy power for the two of them. Some of the results, the China breakthrough and SALT, were statesmanship. More often the means corrupted the end, and their cure was as bad as the disease. In any case, after all the drama and tumult, you're getting back the old system intact. The only remedy is open and authentic reform. There are five main areas where you can begin: *People, Money, Secrecy, Morality* and *Power*. Each deserves the same attention and urgency you're giving tax or welfare reform. Here's a quick outline of what you should consider.

- *People*. The distasteful human issue no one wants to face. There are simply far too many to conduct good foreign policy. The foreign service is a bloated career guild that long ago ran out of meaningful jobs, independence, candor and fresh thinking—not to mention, as you will soon discover, readable English. The CIA is 16,000 slightly more animative bureaucrats in search of a mission, and by their very existence bound to find one whatever the executive or legislative charters. Both are deliberately and dreadfully isolated from the country they are supposed to serve and reflect. Their ranks should be cut in half, with provision for the remaining positions to be turned over with fresh talent at regular intervals. While you're at it, you should also provide yourself with a revolving group of informal outside advisers in foreign policy who have never been in government and don't want to be, just to balance the institutional bias and distortions that are sure to survive even the most radical bureaucratic surgery.

- *Money*. Though none of your advisers or their memos will ever acknowledge it, this is the national interest of US foreign policy short of the country's survival. Given your own enthusiasm for the Trilateral Commission, a club for the advancement of multinationals, we can safely assume you mostly share that view. But as a politician you can also reasonably ask that economic interests come under some measure of public control, abroad as well as at home. The fact is that unbridled corporate power now tyrannizes our foreign affairs much as it used to rule domestic affairs under the robber barons. You should start by removing the special tax incentives and shelters that allow US businesses to plunder labor and resources in foreign markets, primarily in the poor countries. You can also impose on American corporations some of the same standards of decency and justice abroad that we expect at home, to avoid the mockery of a President who

speaks of human rights in southern Africa or Latin America while US multinationals practice petty *apartheid* or run sweatshops and company countries (the successor to the company town). In the same spirit you should suspend the indiscriminate arms trade, the \$10-billion scandal that needlessly embroils us around the world and makes us literally the arsenal of dictatorship in a dozen places where whatever national interest we have is just the opposite. And when you have begun all that, you can turn to public policing and accounting of the vast energy and food empires that hold American consumers hostage at home while they govern much of our policy elsewhere in the world.

- *Secrecy*. The lubricant that makes the machine work—not only against the public and Congress, but ultimately against you. Nixon was the aberration in this respect; the bureaucracy can and does conceal far more from the White House than vice-versa. It is the most natural and dogged of bureaucratic drives: to hoard and manipulate information. So all of us would have a stake in reforms leading to genuine openness. You should restrict national security secrecy to all but the nuclear codes and military deployments affecting our survival, and to diplomatic secrets other nations insist we keep. The archives of our own policymaking should be automatically open after eight years, and current deliberations should be opened as much as possible (within the above restraints) to public and congressional monitoring. A reading of the history of the last two decades, from the *Pentagon Papers* to the CIA debacles, shows that the secrets have been kept from the American people and their elected representatives—not from foreigners, who have tended to know, after all, when they were being bombed, bribed, overthrown and otherwise attended to by American foreign policy.

- *Morality*. Your most promising campaign pledge—to restore a sense of principle to our foreign relations. But you can no more entrust the conscientious pursuit of human rights to a client-ridden foreign service than you would turn over urban renewal to slumlords, or mass transit funds to the highway lobby. The conflict of interest between US diplomats who depend on foreign regimes for their own worth and advancement and holding those same regimes to standards of human rights is just too much. You should initiate legislation to create the equivalent of an international legal services agency to represent the national concern for human rights, free of the evasion and double-talk with which the government approaches the subject. The same sort of independent agency should be created to deal with international disaster relief, which, like our position on human rights violations, has long been hostage to bureaucratic inertia and self-interest. And as you draft regulations to prevent conflicts of interest financially in your administration, you should consider a formal code of accountability for national security officialdom, a code that would make it a criminal offense to engage in

assassination plots, undeclared wars, illegal bombing and various other persistent habits of earlier regimes.

• *Power.* Here you can take specific steps to share the power that has been so exclusively and so disastrously the executive's since World War II. You should begin by taking an active interest in strengthening the hand of the Congress in foreign affairs, backing committee reform and staff revitalization in the now moribund foreign affairs committees. Even more novel and important, you should create a mechanism by which the nation's mayors and governors would review foreign affairs expenditures, especially the defense budget, to restore some sense of public priorities and participation in a process now dominated by huge corporate contractors and their bureaucratic colleagues. This opening of the system will come to benefit no one so much as you; it is Presidents who become encapsulated in the shrinking skin of the bureaucratic world, and who must pay the economic and political consequences at the next election.

Roger Morris

In Praise of Science and Technology

In the middle of the 19th century, the largely self-educated British physicist, Michael Faraday, was visited by his monarch, Queen Victoria. Among Faraday's many celebrated discoveries, some of obvious and immediate practical benefit, were more arcane findings involving electricity and magnetism, then little more than laboratory curiosities. In the traditional dialogue between heads of state and heads of laboratories, the queen asked Faraday of what use such studies were, to which he is said to have replied: "Madame, of what use is a baby?" Faraday had an idea that there might someday be something practical in electricity and magnetism.

At about the same time the Scottish physicist James Clerk Maxwell set down four mathematical equations, based on the work of Faraday and his experimental predecessors, relating electrical charges and currents with electric and magnetic fields. The equations exhibited a curious lack of symmetry, and this bothered Maxwell. To improve the symmetry Maxwell proposed that one of the equations should have an additional term which he called the displacement current. His argument was fundamentally intuitive; there was no experimental evidence of such a current. Maxwell's proposal had astonishing consequences. The corrected Maxwell equations implied the existence of electromagnetic radiation, encompassing gamma rays, x-rays, ultraviolet light, visible light, infrared and radio.

Faraday's laboratory work and Maxwell's theoretical work together have led, one century later, to a technical revolution on the planet Earth. Electric lights, telephones, phonographs, radio, television, refrigerator trains making fresh produce available far from the farm, cardiac pacemakers, hydroelectric power plants, automatic fire alarms and sprinkler systems, electric trolleys and subways and the electronic computer are a few devices in the direct evolutionary line from the arcane intellectual endeavors of Faraday and Maxwell. Few would argue that the net effect of these inventions has not been positive. Many who are profoundly disenchanted with Western technological civilization still retain a passionate fondness for certain aspects of high technology—for example high fidelity electronic music systems.

Some of these inventions have changed profoundly the character of our society. Ease of communication has deprovincialized many parts of the globe; but cultural diversity has been likewise diminished. The practical advantages of these inventions are recognized in virtually all human societies; it is remarkable how infrequently emerging nations are concerned with the negative effects of high technology (environmental pollution, for example); they clearly have decided that the benefits outweigh the risks. One of Lenin's aphorisms was that socialism plus electrification equals communism. But there has been no more vigorous or inventive pursuit of high technology than in the West. The resulting rate of change has been so rapid that many of us find it difficult to keep up. There are still people alive today, born before the first airplane, who have lived to see Viking land on Mars, and Pioneer 10 (the first interstellar spacecraft) be ejected from the solar system; or who were raised under a sexual code of Victorian severity, and now find themselves living under a regimen of sexual freedom brought about by widespread availability of effective contraceptives.

The rate of change has been disorienting for many, and it is easy to understand the nostalgic appeal of a return to an earlier and simpler existence. But the standard of living and conditions of work for most people in, say, Victorian England, were degrading and demoralizing compared to industrial societies today, and the life expectancy and infant mortality statistics were appalling. If science and technology are partly responsible for many of the problems which face us today, it is because public understanding of science and technology is desperately inadequate and because insufficient effort has been made to accommodate our society to these new technologies. Technology is a tool, not a panacea. Considering these facts, I find it remarkable that we have done as well as we have. Luddite alternatives can solve nothing. More than one billion people alive today owe the margin between starvation and barely adequate nutrition to high agricultural technology. Probably an equal

number have survived or avoided disfiguring, crippling or fatal diseases because of high medical technology. Were high technology to be abandoned, these people also would be abandoned. Science and technology may be the cause of some of our problems; but they are certainly essential to any solution for those same problems—both in this country and planet-wide.

Science and, particularly, technology have not been pursued with sufficient attention to their ultimate humane objectives. For example, it has gradually dawned on us that human activities can have an adverse effect not only on the local but also on the global environment. By accident a few research groups in atmospheric photochemistry discovered that halocarbon propellants from aerosol spray cans will reside for very long periods in the atmosphere, circulate to the stratosphere, partially destroy the ozone there, and let ultraviolet light from the sun leak down to the Earth's surface. Increased skin cancer for light-skinned people is the most widely advertised consequence (blacks are much more immune). Very little public attention has been given to the considerably more serious possibility that microorganisms, occupying the base of an elaborate food pyramid with man at the top, might also be destroyed by the increased ultraviolet light. Steps finally have been taken, although reluctantly, to ban halocarbons from spray cans (although nobody seems to be worrying about the same molecules used in refrigerators); as a result the immediate dangers probably are slight. What is most worrisome about this incident is how accidental was the discovery that the problem existed at all. One group approached this problem because it had written the appropriate computer programs, but in quite a different context: these scientists were concerned with the chemistry of the atmosphere of the planet Venus, which contains hydrochloric and hydrofluoric acids. A broad and diverse set of problems in pure science clearly is required for our survival. But what other problems, even more severe, exists that we do not know about, because no research group happens as yet to have stumbled on them? For each problem we have uncovered, such as the effect of halocarbons on the ozonosphere, might there not be another dozen lurking around the corner? It is astonishing that nowhere in the federal government, major universities or private research institutes is there a single highly competent, broadly empowered and adequately funded research group whose function is to seek out and defuse future catastrophes resulting from the development of new technologies.

The establishment of such organizations will require political courage. Technological societies have a tightly knit industrial ecology, an interwoven network of economic assumptions. It is too difficult to tug on one string in the network without causing the whole system to tremble. Any decision to halt a

technological development because it will have adverse human consequences will cost somebody money. For example the du Pont Company, the principal manufacturers of halocarbon propellants, took the curious position in public debates that all conclusions about halocarbons destroying the ozonosphere were "theoretical." Du Pont seemed to be saying that it would stop making halocarbons only after the conclusions were tested experimentally—that is, when the ozonosphere was destroyed. There are some problems where inferential evidence is all that we will have; where once the catastrophe arrives it is too late to deal with. A new Energy Research and Development Administration, or a new Department of Energy, can be effective only if it can maintain a distance from vested commercial interests. It must be free to pursue new options even if such options imply loss of profits for some industries. The same is true of pharmaceutical research, in the pursuit of alternatives to the internal combustion engine and on many other technological frontiers. Development of new technologies should not be left to those who control old technologies; the temptation to suppress the competition is too great. If organizations devoted to technological innovation are not challenging (and perhaps even offending) at least some powerful groups, they are not accomplishing their purpose.

Many practical technological developments are not being pursued for lack of government support. The government spends millions on cancer research. But as dreadful a disease as cancer is, I do not think it can be said that our civilization is threatened by it. If cancer were cured completely, the average life expectancy would be extended by only a few years, until some other disease, which does not now have its chance at cancer victims, takes over. On the other hand our civilization is fundamentally threatened by the lack of adequate fertility control. Exponential increases of population will dominate any arithmetic increases in the availability of food and resources (even those brought about by heroic technological initiatives), as Malthus long ago realized. Some industrial nations have approached zero population growth, but this is not the case for the world as a whole. Minor climatic fluctuations can destroy entire populations with marginal economies. In many societies where the technology is meager and reaching adulthood an uncertain prospect, having many children is the only possible hedge against a desperate and uncertain future. Such a society, in the grip of a consuming famine, for example, has little to lose. At a time when nuclear weapons are proliferating unconscionably, when an atomic device is almost a home handicraft industry, widespread famine and stark disparities in affluence pose serious dangers to both the developed and the underdeveloped parts of the world. The solution to such problems certainly requires better education and at least a degree of technological self-



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sufficiency. But it cries out for entirely adequate contraception—long-term, safe birth control pills, available for men as well as for women, perhaps to be taken once a month or over even longer intervals. Such a development also would be useful here at home, because of concern about the side effects of the conventional estrogen oral contraceptives. Why is there no major effort for such a development?

Many other technological initiatives deserve to be treated seriously. These proposals range from very cheap to extremely expensive. At one end is soft technology—for example, the development of closed ecological systems involving algae, shrimp and fish which could be maintained in rural ponds and provide nutritious and low-cost dietary supplements. At the other end of the economic scale is the proposal of Gerard O'Neill of Princeton University to construct large orbital cities which would be self-propagating. One city would be able to construct another using lunar and asteroidal materials. Such cities in Earth orbit might be able to convert sunlight into microwave energy and beam power down to Earth. The idea of independent cities in space—each perhaps built on differing social, economic or political assumptions, or having different ethnic antecedents—is appealing, an opportunity for those deeply disenchanted with terrestrial civilizations to strike out on their own somewhere else. In its earlier history America provided such an opportunity for the restless, ambitious and adventurous. Space cities would be a kind of America in the skies. They also would greatly enhance the potential for survival of the human species. The project would be expensive, costing at minimum about the same as one Vietnam war (in resources, not in lives).

Clearly, there are more technological projects now possible than we can possibly afford. Some of them may be extremely cost-effective, but may have such large start-up costs that they are impractical. In other cases a daring initial investment of resources may work a benevolent revolution in our society. We must consider our options carefully. The most prudent strategy calls for combining low risk/moderate yield and moderate risk/high yield endeavors.

In order for such technological initiatives to muster the support they need, improvements in public understanding of science and technology are essential. We are thinking beings. Our minds are our distinguishing characteristic as a species. We are not stronger or swifter than many other animals that share this planet with us. We are only smarter. In addition to the immense practical benefit of having a scientifically literate public, the contemplation of science and technology permits us to exercise our intellectual faculties to the limits of our capabilities. Science is an exploration of the intricate, subtle and awesome universe we inhabit. Those who practice it know, at least on occasion, a rare kind of exhilaration that Socrates said was the greatest of human pleasures. It is

a communicable pleasure. To allow informed public participation in technological decision-making, to decrease the alienation which too many citizens feel from our technological society, and for the sheer joy which comes from knowing a deep thing well, we need better science education, a superior communication of its powers and delights. One way to start is by reversing the self-destructive decline in federal scholarships and fellowships for science researchers and science teachers at the college, graduate and post-doctoral levels.

The most effective agents communicating science to the public are television, motion pictures and newspapers. But the science offerings in these media often are dreary, inaccurate, ponderous, grossly caricatured, or (as with much Saturday morning commercial television programming for children) openly hostile to science. There have been astonishing recent findings concerning the exploration of the planets, the role of small brain proteins in affecting our emotional lives, the collisions of continents, the evolution of the human species (and the extent to which our past prefigures our future), the ultimate structure of matter (and the question of whether there are elementary particles or an infinite regress of them), the attempt to communicate with civilizations on planets of other stars, the nature of the genetic code (which determines our heredity and makes us cousins to all the other plants and animals on our planet), and the ultimate questions of the origin, nature and fate of life, worlds and the universe as a whole. These are deep questions. Many of them have been asked for the entire history of our species. These developments can be understood by any intelligent person. Why are they so rarely discussed in the media, in schools, in everyday conversation?

Civilizations can be characterized by how they approach such questions of ultimate concern, how they nourish the mind as well as the body. The modern scientific pursuit of these questions represents an attempt to acquire a generally accepted view of our place in the cosmos; it requires open-minded creativity, tough-minded skepticism and a fresh sense of wonder. These questions are different from the practical issues which I discussed earlier; but they are connected with such issues and—as in the example of Faraday and Maxwell—the encouragement of pure research may be the most reliable guarantee available that we will have the intellectual and technical wherewithal to deal with the practical problems which face us.

Only a small fraction of the most able young people enter scientific careers. I am often amazed at how much more capability and enthusiasm for science there is among elementary school youngsters than among college students. Something happens in the school years to discourage interest in science and mathematics; it is important to understand and

circumvent this discouragement. No one can predict where the future leaders of science will come from. Albert Einstein as a teenager would today without a doubt be described as a hippie. It is clear that he became a scientist despite not because of his schooling. In his *Autobiography* Malcolm X describes a numbers runner who never wrote down a bet, but carried a lifetime of transactions perfectly in his head. What contributions would such a person have made to society, Malcolm asked, if society had given him adequate education and encouragement? The most brilliant youngsters are a national resource. They require special care and feeding. Many of the problems which are facing us may be soluble, but only if we are willing to embrace brilliant, daring and complex solutions. Such solutions require brilliant, daring and complex people. I believe that there are many more of them around—in every nation, ethnic group and degree of affluence—than we realize. The training of such young people must not, of course, be restricted to science and technology; indeed the compassionate application of new technology to human problems requires a deep understanding of human nature and human culture, a general education in the broadest sense.

We are at a crossroads in human history. We are the first species to have taken our evolution into our own hands. For the first time we possess the means for intentional or inadvertent self-destruction. We also have, I believe, the means for passing through this stage of technological adolescence into a long-lived, rich and fulfilling maturity for all the members of our species. There is not much time to determine down which fork of the road we are committing our children and our future.

Carl Sagan

Dr. Sagan is David Duncan Professor of astronomy and space sciences and director of the laboratory for Planetary Studies at Cornell.

Press and President

President-elect Carter got the advice from one who ought to know: "Don't ever try and shade it," said Joseph Califano, explaining that honesty is the best information policy. Reports from the holiday planning session at St. Simons Island have it that Carter murmured a second.

Everyone interested in effective government should hope that Carter and his assembled cabinet officers meant it. Califano, soon to take charge of HEW, already knows the importance of credible information practices. He was there, hunkering down in the Johnson

White House when secrecy, evasion and distortion destroyed that administration's effectiveness. So it is fitting that he sounded the alarm and comforting that the Right Man listened appreciatively. Still, our President-elect has had a way with words—a way that leaves many people wondering what he meant on the long road to the White House. And even though he has inveighed against secrecy in government, he has also favored laws to punish newspapers that publish classified material harmful to national security.

The point of harping here at the outset of The Carter Years is the continuing importance of the matter. We live in a calmer time than the Johnson and Nixon years, but public distrust remains high. There are all those polls and surveys reporting the folks out there don't believe much of what they hear from Washington; therefore, they aren't much interested and can't be moved easily. Such public apathy is quite an obstacle to an activist-minded President with a penchant for muscling a legislature by going over its head to the people.

There isn't need to read off the whole body count. It's enough to observe that the abuses ran the gamut of manipulative invention—hypered employment statistics; phony war reports; willful coverups of FBI, CIA and IRS outrages. The taint has stained not only the makers of news, but the carriers as well. Thus, not only Carter has a problem. So does the press.

A search for remedies should start with the new President himself. Carter can do the most to restore trust in information about public affairs—first, by making himself regularly available through press conferences, interviews and his proposed version of fireside chats. He has committed himself to 20 news conferences a year. If one can judge by his record as governor of Georgia, there is a good chance he will make good on the commitment. But if, like previous Chief Executives, he hides from scrutiny when things get tough, it ought not be accepted too casually or cynically. Rather, let's hear a big raspberry from public and press. There have been too many examples lately of the dangers embodied in Lord Halifax's maxim "that the People will ever suspect the remedies for the diseases of the State where they are *wholly* excluded from seeing how they are prepared."

But let us start by giving Carter the benefit of the doubt. There remains the question of how he uses his availability. President Nixon said we were a nation of children and treated us accordingly. Carter has spoken better of us. Now he can give his sentiments substance by explaining the problems of governance, the trade-offs and limits, as if adults were listening.

Carter fashions himself an innovative manager (reorganizing bureaucracies, searching for new solutions to old problems and the like). For example, he promises to make something of the vice presidency which other Presidents have not. This prompts a suggestion concerning communications: make

something of television which other Presidents have not. The temptation of this ultimate mass medium is to manipulate it willy-nilly. TV is to soft propaganda what *Playboy* is to soft pornography. The short-term advantages of such manipulation to a Chief Executive, pushing his legislation or his war, are tantalizing. But again, we now know too much about the long-term fallout—a disenchanted public which feels both helpless and alien to the distant deceiver on the home-size screen. Jimmy Carter might give more than passing thought to how he can become the first President to use television seriously, educating the country to accept his leadership on the basis of understanding, not imagery.

He can help defuse the dangerous myth that only the President does anything of significance in government, by letting his cabinet associates speak out on the activities of their departments. He can let them engage with the public, make some of the brownie-point announcements, take some of the heat and even squabble a bit among themselves.

He can see to it that the Congress is better informed by the executive branch and thus less able to plead unaccountability due to ignorance.

Still giving Carter the benefit of the doubt, what then should be expected of the press? After what we have been through, it would be negligent not to have the press's eye cocked, on the alert for renewed abuses. But perhaps we can exercise restraining judgment and not run off to war before any shots are fired. And perhaps we can avoid the debilitating exercise of fighting the last war.

If the Carter administration and the Congress under new leadership get this country moving in a responsible way, that is *the* story of significance and interest. There is a need for more information on how the processes of government work, and I believe there is a receptive audience for it. To provide this information will require of the press a more sophisticated, tempered conception of its adversary role. The press must engage in a balancing act—believing in governance while maintaining its skepticism. The latter, however, should not lead to easy dismissal of official actions. It should lead to further investigation of official claims. A diligent, digging press has ample opportunities to check within the competing branches of government, the array of private "accountability" organizations, and independent experts.

Most importantly, there is all that country beyond the gates of this capital. Top Washington correspondents know they must go into the provinces periodically to check the effects on average people of what the best and the brightest have cooked up.

Of late, editors and broadcast executives have been scrambling to find Washington reporters who know something about economics. The focus of attention is shifting somewhat from politics and misadventures. The timing, if anything, is belated. As Yale President Kingman Brewster pointed out in a recent speech, "The

tides of economic activity now seem to depend more on official decisions than they do on private buyers and sellers. To a large extent this pervasive federal 'money license,' like the concentration of private power, is inevitable. But it needs restraint and its abuse requires redress." And I would add exposure. Brewster added, "The real problem, however, is how to prevent the growing dependence upon government from corrupting the local institution, the private enterprise, the average citizen."

That is a reporting assignment worthy of the best correspondents. A related challenge is the increasing need to demonstrate the interdependence among various sectors of our domestic society and between this country and other nations. Such an approach might take the curse off what is too often labeled "foreign news" and, therefore, too easily dismissed as being of little interest or importance to general readers.

Knowing what to report is a large part of the battle. Knowing how to report it and present it with verve and relevance is the continuing challenge of journalism. This is a critical time for editors and producers, as well as correspondents, to think hard about such things.

The forms of journalism may need updating. We will pay a high price if, instead of taking on the hard job, we accede too easily to the tempting alternative of loading up the media with appealing trivia. As Lester Markel said in a recent article, only the press can supply "the kind of information without which informed public opinion—the *sine qua non* of democracy—cannot be achieved."

James Hoge

Mr. Hoge is Editor-in-Chief of the *Chicago Sun-Times* and *Daily News*.

Tempting the East

Ample Guilt, No Policy

Though this may appear surprising coming from a student of Soviet affairs, I am in agreement with those who maintain that it is the United States, rather than the Soviet Union, which presents the number one problem for American foreign policy. First of all, there is a great number of people in this country who do not see the need to have *any* foreign policy. I am not speaking here of anarchists and residual student rebels, but of members of what might be called the public opinion establishment: politicians, professors, journalists, etc. Most of them would dispute this charge, but consider some typical cases. There is the type who confuses moral indignation with foreign policy. He will protest, *e.g.*, the Soviet Union's treatment of Jews and dissenters and demand that the US government do

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something to make the Soviets mend their ways. Yet at the same time he will deny vehemently that the effectiveness of such protests has anything to do with this country's overall, including military, power. His opposite number demands that we cut out all this nonsense about *détente*, and get tough with the Russians, but fails to specify any ingredient of toughness beyond spending more money on armaments. To him weapons displace any need for foreign policy. Another, though dwindling, breed is that of the votaries of the UN. They would not admit that it can do no more than play a useful, though limited, role in the solution of minor international crises, and they insist that all our policies be but in fulfillment of the mandates of that chaotic areopagus.

It is difficult to decide whether those who demand that we "reorder our priorities" belong in our group or not. Certainly theirs is the more excusable error. At one time or another, all of us must wish that this country could turn its main attention to resources and to problems other than the seemingly intractable ones of world affairs. But then comes the realization that our most pressing domestic problems, whether social or economic, reflect pressures and events abroad: an intelligent foreign policy is our first domestic priority.

Some varieties of anti-foreign policy thinking have fortunately disappeared. At a time when most Americans allegedly believed in this country's omnipotence, there was still a group which proclaimed "better red than dead." One assumes that by now they realize that for our society to assume that coloration would not secure for it the goodwill of the original "reds"; if anything, the opposite would be the likely result—witness relations between China and the Soviet Union. No, they both prefer us to remain the way we are, and their leaders would be exceedingly alarmed if our policies and resources were controlled by people like themselves.

But even among those who accept that this country must have a foreign policy, there has been, and especially in the last 10 years, a great deal of uncertainty as to what its major premises ought to be. Now, it is unavoidable and probably desirable in a democracy that there should be disagreements and debate concerning goals and methods of a given policy, but it is troublesome when there is no agreement on the definition of the problem, in this case what constitutes foreign policy. Those who write and speak about the American role in international affairs seldom try to place it within the context of a realistic appraisal of the world situation and trends. Both critics and defenders of whatever happens to be Washington's policy at the moment tend to phrase their arguments in terms of what they regard as self-evident moral truths.

To many on the left, the present difficult position of the United States is a direct consequence of our expansionist practices in the past, and our neo-imperialist ways even now—secret diplomacy, power

politics, multinationals. The surest way of remedying our present unenviable position should be for the United States to perform repeated acts of penitence for these transgressions, to reassure and perhaps subsidize those regimes which fear and distrust us, and thus try to convince them of our change of heart. And, some add, to be really convincing the United States must change its own social system. Quite the reverse, would retort a critic on the right. Our troubles are indeed the result of our past transgressions, but the chief one has been to parley with and trust leaders of an inherently immoral political system.

When it does not take such extreme forms, the moralizing impulse masquerades as political sophistication, acceptance of the facts of life of the modern world. Foreign military intervention in the affairs of a sovereign state was once held as the most basic threat to the international order, and of course prohibited as such by the Charter of the UN. But even the State Department, and certainly the UN, now feels that it cannot condemn such intervention too vigorously if its alleged purpose is to right social or racial wrongs. Many of the proverbial "sober observers" of the world scene assert that "Euro-Communism" represents the wave of the future. It is not fitting for us to oppose this; in fact we should discreetly reassure Messrs. Berlinguer and Marchais that we wish them well.

Let us address ourselves to the latter argument. It is indeed quite possible that the Italian Communists will find themselves in power; also possible that once there they would practice what they've recently preached. Yet, what rational or moral argument could justify our preference for a party which has only recently proclaimed its adherence to political pluralism over one which for years has both believed in and practiced democracy? Won't our churlish distrust drive Berlinguer and his colleagues back into the arms of Moscow? One thing that can be said of the Communists with some assurance is that they never let sentiment get in the way of business and hence don't bear ideological grudges. Once in power, whether pluralistic and democratic or not, Berlinguer and his colleagues, if they need us, will quickly find ways of accommodation with the US. Witness Tito and Mao, or for that matter Stalin and Brezhnev.

The masochism which lurks beneath the surface of so many American attitudes on foreign affairs is even better illustrated by the quiet resignation with which the United States, along with other nations of the West, has accepted the extortion practiced by the OPEC countries. Here if such terms are to be properly used, one has no neo-, but rather the good old economic imperialism, except that it is being practiced on a scale undreamed of by the most rapacious imperial powers of old. Yet for most philosophers of international relations, this extortion has been yet another of those winds of change to which we must accommodate

ourselves. Some would push this moralizing one step further: in a way it is proper that it is the third world which is administering this lesson and retribution to the West. Too bad that the historical symbolism and irony of the situation is somewhat spoiled by the fact that most of the OPEC countries do not have the right kind of regimes—they are *old-fashioned* autocracies and feudal principalities.

Apart from such musings there has been relatively little discussion of how a situation so damaging and dangerous to the world's economy could have been allowed to develop, and why it has not been within the power of the world's most advanced industrial nations to do something about it. Don't the main perpetrators of this extortion depend on the West not only for their arms and industrial goods, but even more for the unspoken assumption that even in the post-Vietnam era the United States would not tolerate a threat to their independence? There are people in this country who have become deeply apprehensive about what the oil crisis might force the United States to do abroad, but no such fears seem to exist in places like Abu Dhabi or Qatar. It is a situation replete with irony, and rather unprecedented in the annals of history: a country with the enormous strength and resources of the United States which yet has been unable to translate them into effective power which would secure America's vital interests against encroachments, not only by its professed rivals, but even by those states whose very existence depends on its support.

Yet very little of this central problem of US foreign policy was touched on during the recent presidential campaign, perhaps because to discuss foreign policy in terms of the skill and realism with which it has or can be conducted, rather than in moralistic platitudes, smacks to many Americans of "power politics" with all the sinister, if somewhat unclear, connotations this term conveys.

This then gives us a perspective on the present and future of US-Soviet relations. The Soviet leaders might well feel that in view of what has been going on in the West—disunity, economic disarray, the obsession with guilt about the past—theirs has been a policy of restraint, bordering on magnanimity. Occasionally they have been presented with an irresistible temptation, e.g. Angola, but in general they have eschewed adventurist policies and aggressive rhetoric, and this restraint, as virtue does sometimes, has brought its own rewards. Western goods and technology (often supplied under very favorable conditions, even when the creditor itself, like Italy, is on the verge of bankruptcy) have helped the economy not only of the USSR but also of its East European dependents. Massive grain shipments, mostly from the US, have provided an insurance against food shortages, which can have, witness Poland, rather sticky political consequences. What Soviet diplomacy has striven for since 1955, legitimization of the *status quo* in Eastern

Europe, has been achieved. The only minor inconvenience of this new and peaceful image has been that the Soviet Union's internal policies have become much more the subject of outside scrutiny and criticism than could have been the case of old, when in view of the fiery rhetoric emanating from the Kremlin, the world was too fearful to worry about any Soviet dissenters. But all in all this policy of restraint, otherwise known as *détente*, has justified itself, and who knows, if the West perseveres in its present course, there may be more of those irresistible temptations.

But we must not conclude on an entirely pessimistic note. Let us keep in mind that the Soviet leadership confronts a number of problems ranging from China to the structural defects of the Russian economy, which in essence are more serious than those of the West. Theirs are inherent in their system, ours have their source in ill-formed and indecisive policies, or no policy at all. This in itself can hardly be reassuring as long as councils of the West remain divided, and the real problems of US foreign relations are shrouded in a moralistic haze. But those lamentable debilities are not foreordained. They have assumed dangerous proportions only in the last decade or so. Were the mood which produced them to dissipate, we would find that both our friends and rivals cost us less and respect us more. We would be doing a favor not only to ourselves, but to the Soviets. They would have more time and incentive to attend to their own troubles, rather than to gloat over (and occasionally to contribute to) those of the rest of the world. They might feel encouraged to liberalize their own system and to allow their protégés in Eastern Europe to liberalize theirs. They might even be able to convince the Chinese that they do not scheme to dominate the world. But can Americans think about the conduct of foreign policy without being preoccupied with our own sinfulness? Why don't we try.

Adam B. Ulam

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Lessons from History

To President-elect Carter the transition and inauguration must seem pleasant and full of possibilities. But the possibilities are not as unlimited as they now appear. No President can be all things to all people. Indeed, history teaches that the decisions now being made—on subordinates and policies—will irrevocably limit and define the possibilities of a Carter presidency. In fact, history has a number of sobering lessons that may be of interest in this critical period of definition—

**As long as you're here,
learn a little Hebrew.**

**Something new on a
tour. People.**

**Get a reception
you'll never forget.**

**Be guided by
the man who wrote
the book.**

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*applicable until March 14, 1977...higher thereafter. Based on \$571 econ.
class group fare to Israel; double occup.

lessons especially important to a man like Carter, whose ambitions extend beyond the satisfaction of simply being President to the hope of becoming a President regarded as great. Here are some of them.

1) *Our most admired Presidents began their terms by focussing on a few matters of the most urgent national concern, almost as if they had decided ahead of time what they wanted to be remembered for.*

When I interviewed Jimmy Carter last summer, I asked him how he'd like to be remembered in the history textbooks in 100 years. He paused and then smiled. "Oh," he said, "I can't say. It's too hard to know now what I'd single out as programs to be remembered by." I felt a little sad on hearing his answer. Still shaped by the first political experience I had ever known—the civil rights movement—I half expected, half imagined he would say that because of his unique background he would like to be remembered as the President who did more for racial justice than any since Abraham Lincoln.

But more than my particular preferences were at issue, for history suggests that presidential leadership requires above all a clear vision of the one or two goals that are most important and a willingness, despite intense controversy, to direct every ounce of presidential energy toward meeting them. Without a strong sense of inner purpose, the temptations to dissipate energy will triumph. There are dozens of ceremonial meetings to attend every week, and a presidential term of little more than 200 weeks is never long as it seems at the start.

Some of our Presidents have escaped the dangers of diffusion. Abraham Lincoln committed his entire presidency to the one goal of preserving the nation; Franklin Roosevelt committed his first two administrations to restoring the nation's economy; Lyndon Johnson committed his transition year to passing the programs of his slain predecessor. In each of these cases, the crisis of the moment—civil war, depression and assassination—helped to focus the energies of the White House.

Other Presidents have been less fortunate in terms of historical circumstance. Even Johnson himself, after his overwhelming victory in 1964, fell victim to the temptation of trying to do everything at once. His Great Society offered something to almost everyone: medicare for the old, educational assistance for the young, tax rebates for business, a higher minimum wage for labor, subsidies for farmers, vocational training for the unskilled, food for the hungry, housing for the homeless, poverty grants for the poor, clean highways for commuters, legal protection for blacks, improved schooling for the Indians, rehabilitation for the lame, higher benefits for the unemployed, reduced quotas for immigrants, auto safety for drivers, pensions for the retired, fair labeling for consumers, conservation for the hikers and campers and more and more. Johnson thought none of his fellow citizens'

desires were wholly beyond his ability to satisfy them. But however noble Johnson's hopes, his interests proved too varied, his energies too fragmented. Vietnam aside.

The structure of the modern White House contributes to the dispersion of presidential energy. Every day the President is besieged by individuals and groups imploring him to act on their behalf—zealous White House staffers and Cabinet members involved in particular projects, organized interests committed to specific pieces of legislation, members of Congress absorbed in regional concerns. A typical presidential week includes one hour on jet noise, two hours on the Middle East, a speech on world hunger, an afternoon devoted to improving the efficiency of HEW, 10 minutes on safety standards in mines, half an hour on pollution, etc. Add to these the obligatory meetings with heads of state, the trips and the ceremonies, and it is little wonder that few Presidents, short of crisis, have managed to commit their White House days to one or two overriding goals.

Ours is a time of mild difficulty and general good will compared to the confused, perilous, nation-shattering divisions that surrounded the accession of Lincoln and Roosevelt. Yet the lesson for Carter is to focus his mind and his staff as if a historical crisis were upon him, deciding the major things he wants to accomplish in his term of office, determining not so much which groups he wants to please in the short run but for what achievements he wants in the long run.

2. *The choices made during the early months of a presidency play a critical role in limiting or extending the possibilities of the entire administration.*

There is a natural temptation, upon first assuming office, to move slowly, to take the time to study the office and the issues, in the mistaken confidence that over four or eight years, after a period of consolidation, consensus and small achievements, the chance to act in pursuit of these larger understandings finally will come. The problem is that the first public impression of a President lasts for a long time; and the prevailing impression tends to set a tone and define the limits of what people in and out of Washington will do for him. Once a tone of caution or ambivalence is set, signals go out throughout the bureaucracy, the press, the Congress and the interest groups: "Go slow." Or even more damaging: "Let's push our own interests now, since he's not sure of what he wants."

When Truman first assumed office after FDR's death, he publicly defined his position as that of a little man desperately attempting to fill a big man's shoes. "Boys, if you ever pray, pray for me now" . . . "When they told me . . . what had happened, I felt like the moon, the stars and all the planets had fallen on me." The image created in Truman's first weeks of a decent but weak man, remained for months, draining substantial resources from Truman's reservoir of power.

Similarly, when Andrew Johnson took over after Lincoln's death, his first words and actions signalled his weakness to the Radical Republicans—a position from which he never recovered.

One month after Gerald Ford became President, he made a decision which probably cost him the 1976 election. By pardoning Richard Nixon before the system of justice had worked its will, Ford linked himself irrevocably to the style of behavior that had characterized the White House of Watergate. A wholly different instance: only one month after taking office, Abraham Lincoln determined, against the advice of his cabinet, to repossess Fort Sumter, an enclave of Northern authority in the South. This decision initiated the chain of events ending in the Civil War, and led to the judgment of history that has given the Lincoln presidency its preeminent place in public lore.

Jimmy Carter seems of two minds on whether he will move decisively early in his administration. "I'll never go slow," he told me when I asked him what importance he attached to moving quickly and boldly in his first few months. "I'm not fearful of political consequences, I'll move right ahead. I was reading Will Durant's book the other day on the lessons of history and it showed that under a system of freedom, the powerful will inevitably dominate. Our nation was founded on freedom but the concepts of freedom and equality were even then in conflict. For we were founded in slavery and our women didn't vote. So today, if equality is to be achieved, the state must step in. . . and I will." "Are you afraid of making mistakes?" I asked. "No," he responded, "you see, belief in the forgiveness of God gives me a freedom to take chances and make mistakes."

Yet the example he then offered suggested caution, not courage. "If I thought that this year I could contrive the new tax code I want to pass I would do it. You need the leverage of the White House and a comprehensive study to make it simple and fair. By including business in the decision-making process it will encourage them to accept changes that might be deleterious to them. If I don't do that, I'll lose. So I'll move when I'm ready." Carter is right, of course, in an academic sense, but on an issue as politically difficult as tax reform, the longer he waits, the more time there is for the opposition to build up, and the less likelihood there is of meaningful legislation.

3) *The impulses for both popular rule and governmental reorganization are meaningless when divorced from substantive goals.*

Carter has expressed repeatedly his desire to bring the government closer to the people. In his acceptance speech he called his first year "the year when we give the government of this country back to the people of this country." And he told me that "the generic concern which will guide me in all the decisions I make—on welfare, taxes, transportation, energy, or the regulatory agencies—is the desire to let the people have

a sense it's their government and to make that government, newly reorganized, a source of inspiration and pride."

Carter's language recalls the beliefs of the progressives at the turn of the century. The progressives believed that if only the popular conscience could be awakened—through a combination of mass education and the institution of such new political devices as the initiative, referendum and recall, reform could be accomplished and the nation redeemed. Appealing to personal responsibility and guilt, the progressives preached that until the individual citizens stiffened in their determination to end corruption and until they proved willing to transcend their selfish interests, nothing could be done. The progressive critique helped to reorganize and democratize the political system; but the progressives themselves were essentially moderate men who intended neither radical remedies nor social reform. While exhorting the American citizen to take personal responsibility for the ills of the day, the reformers enjoyed their positions in society too much to want to make any basic changes in the economic or social structure. What the reformers wanted above all was the feeling that political action was taking place, a sense that the moral tone was being improved. But in the absence of social goals, their political reforms became merely instruments, serving various sides at various times.

Like his progressive counterparts, Carter stands for responsibility, good government and efficiency. He too believes that political life in Washington should be run in accord with general principles and that once these principles are incorporated into a new organizational scheme, the incursions of nefarious interests on the welfare of the people will be checked. As Carter sees it, a government built in response to narrow pressure groups simply encourages the selfish interests of the citizen. The answer is to reorganize across these narrow lines, encouraging people to transcend their selfish concerns.

But here too, the twin desires for popular rule and governmental reorganization are of little meaning until Carter specifies the changes in society he hopes to bring about. In the absence of social goals, reorganization degenerates to mere reshuffling and administrative talent is wasted. The comparison between FDR and Hoover illustrates the point. Roosevelt had neither talent nor taste for administration. Indeed, he has often been charged with a disorderliness of administration and a love of chaos. By contrast, Hoover was a born organizer. Yet FDR's sloppy experimental style met the practical needs of the time—the New Deal fed the jobless, saved banks, built houses, rescued farmers and restored hope—whereas Hoover's very devotion to administrative tidiness caused him to fall short in the more fundamental aspects of his leadership task.

Nor is popular rule a sufficient goal in the absence of direction. This is particularly true in the area of foreign

policy where leadership is essential. Carter spoke to me with passion of his desire to democratize the making of foreign policy. "Every time we've made a serious mistake in recent years in our dealing with other nations, the American people have been excluded from the process of evolving and consummating foreign policy. Indeed, the mistakes have been because of the secrecy."

I interrupted to remind Carter that the polls in 1964 showed a large majority in favor of fighting communism in Vietnam, and suggested that if FDR had followed the popular will in 1939 we would not have prepared ourselves for World War II. "Well," he answered, "I won't talk of Vietnam because you're an expert on that, but I understand your point and if I knew I was right I would exercise judgment. When Truman initiated the Marshall Plan, that was not a decision made because of public pressure or approbation. And when he fired MacArthur it took extraordinary courage and I thought that he was right. In retrospect, he *was* right. I wouldn't hesitate if I had a close relation with the American people to make decisions contrary to public support if I knew I was right."

The comparison between Carter and the progressives suggests one final point. The progressives argued against the bosses and the insulation of machine politics; Carter too spent much of his campaign arguing against the establishment and the insulation of Washington politics. His candidacy promised new people and new ideas. And despite the widespread dissatisfaction with the establishment nature of the Cabinet he has chosen, Carter still insists that his administration will be different. He will go to the people and hear from the people—whether it means taking his breakfasts at McDonalds or spending his Sunday afternoons dialing random phone numbers.

Again, however, the problem of insulation is deeper than the discussion of mechanical devices suggests. The problem is nothing less than a habit of mind engendered by the political life in Washington. Washington is a collective town in which daily experience teaches that the highest virtue is to get along with others, to stand together. But the creative leader is often the one who refuses to go along, who stands alone. Washington teaches that it is a virtue to discuss programs and ideas with all sorts of interests at every stage; indeed, the approval of others soon becomes the primary motive of acting and thinking. But the most fundamental act of the President—the process of thinking out and then choosing his goals—must be performed by the President alone, for there is still no such thing as a creative collective thought.

Doris Kearns Goodwin

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Changing the UN Irrelevant Forum

One needn't be a disillusioned one-worlder, a reactionary isolationist, or a fervent Zionist to recommend to the Carter administration that the United Nations should play a modest role in the conduct of US foreign policy.

After a recent opportunity to observe Turtle Bay as a public member of the US delegation to the 31st UN General Assembly, I am reminded of the lone Democrat in a solidly Republican Vermont hamlet who, when asked why he bothers to vote, replies, "To keep my disgust fresh."

I had expected to find the General Assembly functioning as little more than a debating society. What did surprise me was the low caliber of discourse. During the September-through-December session I heard only three speeches that combined sense and eloquence. (Ambassador Scranton's on human rights was the most notable.) Our representatives make a substantial contribution to the dreariness of UN rhetoric. We seem to be a people who are ill at ease with dialectic. It is probably not coincidence that the two most articulate spokesmen we have had recently at the UN, Pat Moynihan and Bill Buckley, are Irish Catholics. Perhaps Andrew Young's most important qualification for his new post will turn out to be his theological training.

What is most discouraging is that the steady torrent of words at the UN this year did not contribute to the solution of a single world problem. Quite the contrary. Put aside the anti-Israeli talk that Ambassador Herzog claims consumes half the time of each General Assembly. Put aside the substantial chunk of time spent on bureaucratic maintenance. What remains is repeated expounding of the convenient demonology that merely serves as a carthartic for less developed countries. Thinking of the world today exclusively in terms of imperialist exploitation is so far off the mark that it seriously retards realistic economic and political solutions. Racism can explain southern African intransigence, but hardly the failure to make progress in disarmament, population control, narcotics traffic or environmental matters.

Once I was called upon to explain why the US voted against a traditional UN resolution that would ban foreign economic investment in non-self-governing territories. What made this resolution particularly ludicrous this time around was that it came up during the very week that a UN report on "The Future of the World Economy," by Wassily Leontief, called for such investment as the only possible hope in narrowing the gap between the developed and developing countries. The resolution was based on the simplistic premise that foreign investments *per se*—regardless of how they are handled—must impede national independence. As the

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



If we don't deal now with the energy problem in its entirety, we may soon be facing an even bigger problem—how to sustain our economy and our social structures when there's not enough energy to go around.



John R. Dolinger, manager of Cumberland EMC, Clarksville, Tenn., is president of the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, through which America's rural electric systems formulate and espouse policies on national issues.

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representative of an independent and capitalist country I could hardly agree that the two were mutually exclusive. (My clearance officer at the State Department, incidentally, objected to my use of the word "capitalism.") The ban on foreign investment was approved, 102 to 9.

You would think the General Assembly could deal sensibly with issues amenable to the majority's world view. But when faced with the most important decolonization question of the session—involving Namibia (Southwest Africa)—the peacekeeping organization was unable to pass a resolution without categorically supporting armed conflict. The vote was 107 to 6. (The losers: US, Belgium, Britain, France, West Germany and Luxembourg.)

If this reflected the thinking of the world, then the General Assembly would be no more pernicious than the sum of its parts. But my experience in New York caused me to suspect otherwise. I watched many nations with long-held democratic traditions abstain or vote with the majority. I think I was witnessing either a group dynamic that overheats world politics or a cynicism that discounts any serious role for the UN.

How then to correct an arrangement that distorts the world while claiming to reflect it? Anyone who ever has taken part in a faculty common room discussion on university governance will be familiar with a basic rule: the more powerless the participants, the more frivolous the discussion. If a sense of realism is to be injected into UN General Assembly debate, the body must be reconstituted to more accurately represent the true relationships between the nations of the world.

To reach this goal, the new US administration might consider endorsing an intriguing proposal for revising the UN Charter, urged by Richard Hudson in the November issue of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. Hudson calls his plan "NPP" (Nations/People/Power). He suggests that important General Assembly questions should be decided on the basis of a two-thirds vote; but that two-thirds would have to include "a simple majority of the population of the world and members representing two-thirds of the contributions to the regular Organization budget." This last part sounds undemocratic, but it is realistic: the financial assessment of UN members corresponds to their levels of technology and wealth. No UN proposal for dealing with the world's problems can work if it lacks the support of the advanced countries.

As for the United States' own role, we now fail to take advantage of the UN as a body dedicated to moral pronouncements. It is a matter of mechanical engineering, learning to take advantage of the UN's own weight to lift the debate. Yet we rarely attempt to adjust the fulcrum. Our policy this year was entirely reactive. There was no major US initiative. When I asked one State Department official what our grand strategy for the session was, he answered, "Damage limitation."

Take the South African debate, the premier item on the plenary agenda. The State Department already had announced (after considerable hesitation) that the US would not recognize the Transkei as an independent nation. But when the question came to a vote we were instructed to abstain (134-0-1). Our position was based on minor legal quibbles, the sort of points we could have announced in explanation of a positive vote. The General Assembly was the ideal platform for a ringing denunciation of apartheid. We simply refused to recognize moral opposition to apartheid as the overriding determinant. After rejecting three Washington-written drafts, the best I can claim for my speech is that it would not comfort the South African regime—neither did it burn bright in the cause of civil rights. Once we were thought of as the world's conscience; now we seemed to be the world's lawyer.

Even if the US rediscovers its moral fiber, Jimmy Carter would be well advised to reduce our presence at the UN because of its inability to play a central role on the world scene. One way to put the UN in proper perspective would have been to resist the temptation to make the US representative a member of the President's cabinet. The post should have been placed on a par with other embassies. The President has decided not to do this.

So Andrew Young's prestige now puts him in a very difficult position. There is a high symbolism in this appointment of a distinguished black American, but there are grave risks if he is forced into a posture of open dissatisfaction with government policies.

If Young agrees with all his voting instructions from the State Department there is no cause for concern. But this is unlikely. If he disagrees, Young either will accept directions from the Secretary of State (often coming from, or through, a third-echelon official, the Assistant Secretary for International Organizations), or appeal directly to the President.

It is improbable that two strong-willed individuals, both of Cabinet rank, will see eye-to-eye on every issue. But operating on two tiers at the same time can be a useful foreign policy technique. Kissinger and Moynihan briefly seemed to be following this strategy; it looked suspiciously like a technique long known to urban police departments as "the good cop and the bad cop" (and to lawyers as "Mutt and Jeff"). For example, while Moynihan was challenging the UN to do something about Soviet expansion in Africa, Kissinger was expressing optimism about the prospects of reaching a strategic arms limitation agreement with the Soviets. The bad cop administered a roundhouse to the suspect's stomach and the good cop said, "Shucks, Pat, you shouldn't have hit him." The approaches of Kissinger and Moynihan, when taken in tandem, were perfectly consistent with world realities and the interests of the United States. But this is a fragile arrangement, as the Moynihan experience illustrates. It must be carefully orchestrated and cannot survive for

very long if it is merely a result of happenstance. If Vance and Young adopt this technique, it will place them in what appear to be adversary roles. It would be important for them to maintain healthy personal relations and for each to believe strongly in the good faith of the other—no easy matter as media and bureaucratic spear carriers routinely transmit hints of bad vibrations between Turtle Bay and Foggy Bottom. Nor can this approach work if Washington continues to hold its outpost at the UN on such a tight leash. The US representative should be thought of as a field commander with the authority to adjust his tactics to fit the terrain. Unfortunately, the distance between New York and Washington is short, and the State Department is overstaffed—two preconditions for excessive interference.

Since I'm passing out free advice, let me address a little of it to those members of the secretariat and foreign diplomats who are leading the good life at Turtle Bay: citizens of your host country are increasingly treating your activities with massive indifference. In another incarnation last summer I was the editor-in-chief of the Republican platform and fully expected to be directed by the Resolutions Committee to write in strong language condemning the UN. The instructions never came. It simply was no longer worth the energy to take the UN seriously.

It appears that the Carter administration plans to take the UN seriously. This should not be a posture based on faith or ignorance. The organization and our policies must change. Otherwise meetings of the UN General Assembly will continue to be occasions for ego-tripping by a majority made up of developing nations that prefer to fight the battles of the 19th century; dogma from the Soviet block; legalistic rejoinders from US spokesmen; silence from Western Europe; and a barely concealed yawn from the American people.

Stephen Hess

Mr. Hess is the author of *Organizing the Presidency* (Brookings).

Losing Our Soul On the Altar of Oil

Foreign policy needs a guiding principle irrespective of region, and few would seriously quarrel with the proposition that it should be enlightened self-interest. I take "enlightened" to mean a just appreciation for the permanent and inclusive interests of the United States. Applied to the Middle East, this raises the question: what is our basic interest in this region, the crossways of cultural and strategic conflict since history began?

Above and beyond the flow of oil, the primary

American concern is the maintenance of a position from which to uphold our side in the ongoing struggle between the democratic and the totalitarian ways of life. A reliable base for that exercise can only be found in a politically and culturally compatible state.

At the moment, energy dominates every other consideration, creating a body of opinion that sees Israel as dispensable *vis-a-vis* the Arabs. We are perpetuating here a historic fallacy. It has been the great delusion of American policy that advantageous alliances can be formed with politically incompatible governments. The damage wrought by the partnership with South Vietnam needs no reminder. The value of Nationalist China as an ally was illusory, of Czarist Russia in the first world war ephemeral, and of Soviet Russia in the second, while essential during the fight, a prelude to antagonism. Experience should suggest some implications.

The Arab countries, whatever their nominal status, are authoritarian in one shape or another, except for unhappy Lebanon whose fate is not encouraging. Since none is a democracy in nature and structure, there is none on which we can rely with assurance that some new twist of inter-Arab rivalries or internal factions or Soviet allurements could not turn it around overnight. Israel, as a democracy, is necessarily on our side. It cannot swing one way or another because it has nowhere else to go. Since Israel does not have to be wooed, we tend to overlook its assets, which are political compatibility and—something even rarer among America's clients—military self-reliance, based on a defense force considered for its size the best in the world.

There is also the factor of linked cultural antecedents. These are less tangible than oil, but longer-lasting. Doubtless many Americans feel no natural affinity for a Jewish state; nevertheless, even the anti-Semites among us are molded by an ethic, through Old Testament and New, which derived from the Jews and which, to risk a prediction, will be operating when the oil wells are empty.

So much for even-handedness. We should not pretend to it and the Arabs should not expect it. On the outbreak of World War I, President Wilson ordered his countrymen to be "neutral in fact as well as name, impartial in thought as well as action." No such thing was possible, in others any more than in himself. Regardless of Irish and German-Americans, the commerce, investments, sentiments and above all, the inherent political nature of this country bent us toward the Allies, and in the predictable course of events we entered the war on their side. If impartiality was not possible then, no more is even-handedness now.

Hands will shoot up to raise the obvious objection—that commerce this time works contrary to political compatibility; that the necessity of oil draws us to the side of the Arabs. That is true up to the point that we allow it to be. The theory is that we must conciliate the

Arabs because we are dependent on them for oil. We must judiciously vote with them every now and then in the farce at the UN, and sell them large bundles of weaponry, in order to retain "credibility" for coming negotiations.

The credibility argument is so much gossamer. The word itself is flighty. Applied to Asia, it means persuading our clients that we will stand by our commitments; applied to the Middle East, it means being "fair" which in turn means conciliating the Arabs. Improving relations with the Arab states and opening channels of material communication is a sensible policy. Conciliation, however, tends to increase the other party's appetite—and why not? Our management of the oil crisis could hardly argue otherwise, having been notable, in the words of Edmund Burke, for "the irresistible operation of feeble councils." Not only feeble but short-term.

Credibility is established not by conciliation but by firm intention unmistakably demonstrated. President Carter's administration will become "credible" to the Arabs only when it arrives at a coherent energy policy that includes conservation and allows us to demonstrate convincingly the intention to reduce our dependence on foreign oil—if indeed we have that intention, which begins to look doubtful. It can be done: in the first instance by reducing profligate and wasteful use—which has been estimated at up to 40 percent of our total consumption—and ultimately by developing alternate resources. What stands in the way is the suspect role of the oil companies; they have no interest in conserving; tightening our refrigerator doors, as they advise, is no substitute for the kinds of creative readjustment that true conservation will require. Meanwhile, they are happy enough to let OPEC raise prices for them. Until the paralysis in energy policy is resolved, the US is not likely to play an effective role in advancing either its own long-term interest or the cause of peace of the Middle East.

I would suggest three other principles to be kept in mind during the search for an acceptable settlement.

First: relative equity. The major Arab states surrounding Israel, including Saudi Arabia and Iraq, have a territory of 1,618,000 square miles and a population of about 74 million; adding Libya, Algeria and all other members of the Arab League, the grand total is over five million square miles and 140,000,000 people. Israel, not counting the occupied territories, has a total of 8017 square miles (one-half of one percent of the major Arab countries; one-sixth of one percent of the Arab League) and a population of 3,330,000. One might be tempted to ask, what are the Arabs fussing about?

If the issue is the right of statehood, it should not be forgotten that the Palestinians would have had a state for the past 30 years if they had accepted the UN partition of 1947 instead of rejecting it in favor of war. Mistakes in history are difficult to undo.

Secondly: concerning guarantees by outside powers.

A solution propped up by these hollow pillars is pretense. They are valueless because they can be repudiated by successor regimes or, as in a classic case, violated by one of the guarantors on the excuse that the promise was a "scrap of paper." Israel cannot hope for absolute security, but she is under what Lord Milner, the late voice of British imperialism in the Middle East, called "the imperious necessity of acquiring defensible frontiers." The only assurance for which it would be worth returning the occupied territories, and the only reasonable solid basis for an overall settlement, would be *de jure* recognition of Israel by all parties to the negotiations. For the United States to press Israel into accepting anything less would be to set up a fraud whose potential for collapse would leave the situation as fragile as ever and therefore contrary to our own interest.

My last principle is a question: what is foreign policy for? In the Middle East, it is being conducted to assure a source of energy in quantities that are not essential but unstinted. It is being used, that is to say, for material ends which are basically short term. No matter what the oil companies and other business interests maintain about growth being built into the economics of our society, the energy problem inevitably will have to be solved—unless the sun and waves can be harnessed—by less use, not more. In business and labor circles that is considered a wild-eyed heresy, but like Galileo's it is true—*e pur si muove*.

Energy sustains our material way of life. But there is another and, I believe, a larger need: liberty. I do not think this must depend on unstinted material resources and unlimited GNP. For what is a nation profited if it shall gain a million barrels a day, and lose its soul?

Barbara W. Tuchman

Mrs. Tuchman is a historian who has twice won the Pulitzer Prize.

The Limits of Non-Proliferation

Like most years, 1976 was another "watershed" for nuclear proliferation. The number of nations acceding to the Non-Proliferation Treaty reached 100. The several referenda to obstruct nuclear power in western states were defeated. Both presidential candidates—Carter even before he had the nomination and Ford just before he lost the election—made statements that really looked as though at last a President was going to be concerned. Several congressional initiatives showed a determination to use the full weight of nuclear-export

policy and foreign-aid policy to bring discipline into world nuclear development.

But mainly 1976 was probably the year that it began to be undisguisedly apparent that the United States had no solution to the continued proliferation of either nuclear materials or nuclear technology.

The good news that 100 nations had already ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty was not only diluted by the arithmetic that a third that many countries still hadn't (including important ones like India and Pakistan, Argentina and Brazil, Israel and South Africa, Spain and Portugal) and furthermore were not about to—but even somewhat dissipated by the acknowledgment that even adherence to the NPT was no obstacle to the development of a “near-nuclear capability” by countries that wanted to get close to nuclear weapons.

What emerges from the Carter and Ford speeches is that there are vitally important things to do and not to do, and that they don't come close to an adequate response to the problem. For example, don't recycle plutonium. During the final week that Ford was still a possible President for the coming four years he declared a postponement of plutonium recycle. (He didn't quite declare it; he reached a conclusion, and then referred to a decision he had made, but was probably rhetorically inhibited by the statutory uncertainty about whether the President, or the independent Nuclear Regulatory Commission, gets to make that decision.) This was the right decision, and an important one. It will inhibit the reprocessing of spent fuel abroad for the extraction of plutonium (although the government of Pakistan has again declared itself uninhibited). It is hard to think of a more obviously correct decision that President Ford could have made; and if the decision is at all controversial, he has made it easier for Carter to reiterate the decision. Unfortunately for nuclear proliferation abroad, a right decision is not necessarily a powerful decision. This was a right decision.

The Carter and Ford statements have a ring of sincerity. And they ought to. What is depressing on second reading of what both candidates had to say is there are just not any ideas about what to do that are commensurate with the problem. This is not the fault of the candidates. Nobody has a solution. There are some big ideas that are not very good and some good ideas that are not very big.

The biggest idea is to shut down nuclear power in the United States. Much of the opposition to nuclear electric power in this country is really opposition to an industry that symbolizes nuclear bombs and that produces, as a by-product of electricity, deadly radioactive waste from which can be extracted plutonium, a material from which atomic bombs are made. A large nuclear-electric generating station produces enough plutonium in six months to make a dozen atomic bombs. Not only might the stuff be used by any country that had nuclear power reactors, but it might be stolen

or captured or secreted by employees or otherwise diverted, during transport or storage, to some nefarious use. The danger of abuse of such material by terrorist groups or irresponsible governments or undisciplined military forces is grave enough to ask, do we really want nuclear electric power so badly that we should risk these dangers for it?

The question is big, but the answer is small. It is that the danger will not be appreciably diminished if the United States foregoes nuclear power and prohibits further construction of reactors, or even dismantles those that exist. Like the gun that killed President Kennedy, terrorist plutonium doesn't have to be manufactured in the USA. Indeed, if it were, it might be smuggled *out* of the country to be fabricated into bombs that would then be resmuggled back *into* the country. Denying terrorists a source of plutonium within the United States would not deny them much. There is no magic gesture by which we can symbolically shut down nuclear reactors in this country and turn out the nuclear-powered electric lights that are beginning to glow all over the world.

Just how serious is the proliferation of nuclear-weapon capabilities? Divide this question into two parts: first, how likely is it that weapon capabilities will proliferate; second, how grave the dangers if they do?

Twenty or 30 countries, using their own materials and people, could assemble nuclear explosives within the next few years. The lead time for most of them is at least months and, in most cases, years. Few are believed to have programs to produce explosives, and a few are believed to have taken steps deliberately to shorten the lead times for weapon production. (Israel and South Africa are countries widely suspected to have done one or the other.)

A number of developing countries have nuclear power programs that are developing the technological base and providing some stimulus and some excuse for moving toward a short lead-time capability, or even ready explosives in small numbers, in the coming half dozen years. (Argentina and Brazil, South Korea and Taiwan, Pakistan and Iran are examples. India already has.)

In the 1990s the governments capable of assembling nuclear weapons on short notice will number between 50 and 75. The number will be smaller if Western allies deliberately abstain from shortening lead time; provocative events, on the other hand, might propel dozens of countries into a state of “near nuclear readiness.”

Most of this can happen without blatant violation of international nuclear safeguard arrangements or withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. A score of important countries are not and probably will not ever be NPT signatories, but most of them will acquire equipment and materials under the customary safeguards. Producing bombs would be a violation, shortening lead times—developing a nuclear mobiliza-

tion base—would probably not.

By the late 1980s many countries will credibly claim to possess nuclear explosives that they could deliver elsewhere. And the amounts of fissionable material that might have been diverted, lost or sold, or had otherwise disappeared from the international accounts, could be equivalent to hundreds or even thousands of bombs. Smuggling materials into the United States in explosive quantities may be no harder than smuggling heroin or, to be a little less dramatic, Havana cigars.

There are two points that need to be emphasized: one is that these dangers are beyond the control of the United States. The United States no longer has a monopoly on the technology or materials or fuels or people. Short of declaring war in advance on countries that develop nuclear power or refuse to submit to adequate safeguards, there is no way the United States can turn these developments around, and no way the United States can keep governments from shortening their nuclear-explosive lead times. Even the best behaved countries will be moving closer and closer to a nuclear-weapons capability as the years go by.

The second point, which sounds contradictory but is not, is that US policy, while not decisive, is terribly important.

Most governments ought to be scared to death of getting their own nuclear-explosive capability. The main activity of armed forces around the world is to fight each other within their own country, or to depose civilian governments. The main targets of terrorists who steal nuclear materials are likely to be their own governments. The custodians of nuclear weapons or of fissile materials in most countries will have to be extremely trustworthy, but will not be, and will be military targets as well as military resources. It ought to be possible to persuade many governments that the last thing they should want within their borders is the ingredients of a bomb that can be built to fit in the back seat of an automobile.

It is simultaneously important to understand that neither Ford nor Carter has a real grasp on the problem, but that the President deserves every encouragement for trying to do what can be done. Postponing indefinitely plutonium recycle in the United States does not prevent plutonium traffic abroad; but it can make a difference.

History is somewhat reassuring. C. P. Snow in 1960 warned of the "mathematical certainty" of nuclear holocaust before the decade was out; his estimate was pessimistic. A score of countries have been able, if they wished, to develop nuclear weapons out of their own resources within the past decade; almost none have done so, and the ones for whom it would be easiest seem least interested. US policy has made a difference, and the policy that has made the difference has usually not been "non-proliferation policy." A large part of American policy toward NATO, and especially toward West Germany, has been reducing, diluting or diver-

ting interest in national nuclear capabilities. Japan is officially uninterested in nuclear weapons, and its official position is closely bound up with US security policy. The inability of the US to deny nuclear materials and nuclear technology to an increasing number of countries around the world does not mean we can't help governments appreciate why they should not want to get close to nuclear weapons. But, as our relations with France, Germany and Japan indicate, it will be increasingly the broad sweep of our foreign policy, not nuclear export policy or "non-proliferation policy," that will determine the course of events. The prospect of South African nuclear weapons will be more affected by African events than by US export controls. Middle East proliferation will depend more on our Middle East policy than on our coercive use of foreign aid. Even the nuclear behavior of India and Pakistan will depend more on the relations of those two countries with each other and with others, than on what the United States can accomplish by export controls and discriminatory trade treatment of nuclear miscreants.

The problem will be peace, not proliferation.

T. C. Schelling

*Mr. Schelling is the author of *Strategy of Conflict* (Oxford).*

Reschooling Society

The last eight years were a time of towering indifference to what goes on in schools. When Presidents Nixon and Ford did busy themselves with education, their attentions were nearly always malign: they exploited the turmoil over desegregation for their own ends, and included education in their efforts to fuel a sour-bellied rancor against government in general. Often enough Washington acted out a national version of the increasingly familiar local drama in which the only chance voters get to express their frustration is to vote down the school bond issue. Because of inertia, its entrenched interests, and vigilant friends, education survived the Nixon years. But things are not good. Budget cuts, teacher layoffs, swelling class sizes, early school closings and the constant turmoil of racial tension have caused serious deterioration of some school systems. In several big cities, the situation approaches that of the Great Depression.

The Carter administration has to make the struggle for decent schools a major national priority once again. An essential first step is a reaffirmation of the federal government's commitment to school desegregation. An essential second step is restoration of the Johnson administration's financial commitment to the educa-

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tion of the children of minorities, the poor and the big cities.

Neither of these absolutely necessary steps will restore a Golden Age. Desegregation is a complex and often tragically inconclusive story, particularly in many of the Northern cities and some of the newly re-segregating Southern ones. But for all the puzzling variety of the local dilemmas, national policy for this multiracial society has got to be clear: there can be no retreat from desegregation. Indeed, it is only the current Northern climate of despair that keeps us from seeing that the desegregation of public education in the South is a momentous, historic triumph of our democracy. Likewise, funds and programs for the poor, for minorities, and for the schools of the ailing cities cannot be expected to work miracles. The record of reform is spotty. Decent schools are a social good; they ought to be every child's right. But schools should not be the focus of our hopes for a better society. Education is not an alternative to other kinds of social change. Indeed, one reform with major educational impact would be full employment, so that high school students, especially minority youngsters, would have a future to look forward to after graduation.

Consumerism has spread to the patrons of public services. The criticism of pathological educational bureaucracies has made telling points. The various schemes for community control of public schools and plans for educational voucher systems launched in the late 1960s were not the right answers; but their supporters were raising important questions about how schools work, especially in some of our largest systems. "Deschooling" is an absurd slogan: you can't beat a horse with no horse. But the critique of the essentially administrative and bureaucratic priorities of our schools has a very sharp point, which I take to be this: school professionals in many communities are remote from the people they are supposed to be serving, especially in poor and minority communities, and schools are generally reluctant to draw on the energies and talents of their surrounding communities.

The widespread indifference to education over the past eight years has been abetted by scholarship that allegedly has determined that schools can accomplish very little. Some of this was what the late R.H. Tawney used to call "creating a darkness and calling it research." The most sensible reading of the recent literature on schools is not that schools are powerless, but that they operate along with other very powerful educational institutions, notably the family. We need alternatives within our formal system of education; we also need support for adults to spend more time with the young in families, at work and in neighborhoods.

In education, the Carter administration thus encounters a fairly clear old agenda and a less clear new one. There is the old, unfinished struggle of America's strangers and outsiders for equality of opportunity, access to skills, credentials and jobs: the effort to

reduce the degree to which education participates in the systematic inequalities of American life. There is also a new agenda, listing items that will make life in schools and other places of learning more varied and rich.

The era of breathtaking increases in the numbers of students has been over now for some time. Schools and universities can face these demographic changes in several ways. They can cut back and try to continue business as usual, as many are doing. Or they can try to grow in new ways: to involve more adults in lifetime learning; to include many more preschoolers; and to draw in handicapped and institutionalized children, as well as the astonishing number of others still excluded from school.

In education, as in other areas, Mr. Carter's men will profit by borrowing a copy of *War and Peace*. They should above all study the skeptical passages where Tolstoy deals with the great leader's fundamentally uncertain control over events. It is remarkably difficult for the federal government to act in education. Many of the national forces that influence education—testing and accreditation, for example—are not now under democratic control. For better or worse, the federal role in education is indirect.

The most challenging task will be to find a way of helping education at the level where it matters most: teachers and students in classrooms. Here one can only repeat one of the main lessons of reform in the last decade: schemes that bypass the key practitioners in schools—the teachers and the principals—are bound to be futile. There is so much that cries out to be done. At some levels of our vast and muddled educational enterprise, the mind is suffering; at others the heart. Everywhere teachers and children are treated as though they were parts of a machine. A Tolstoyan general of such an army must appreciate both how little his will counts, and yet how powerful the demonstrations of his caring might be.

Joseph Featherstone

The Debts of the Poor: Preventing the Crash

In a spirit reminiscent of James Bond, the latest fictional treatment of the international financial scene propels the reader and the world through a great *Crash of '79*. Despite the gusto and voyeurism characteristic of a bestseller, there is just enough verisimilitude in Paul E. Erdman's tale to impel a close look at the real world of 1977, and the risks that may be accumulating there for the future of the international financial system. Any

useful look must take in not only the risks, of course, but also what is being done to contain them, and what more may be needed to avoid any drift toward possible crisis.

The starting point has to be the web of increasing international debts that have multiplied following the distortion of payments flows among countries precipitated by the oil price quadrupling of 1973-74. This was aggravated by the interrelated deficits incurred by country after country, whose exports faltered and whose import bills kept rising during the deep and wide recession of 1974-76. The most conspicuous case, that of Britain, has been amply covered by the press. Both the current and historical aspects of that unique situation seem already to be coming under control in the UK, as well as under the surveillance and support of the International Monetary Fund and the Bank for International Settlements. Somewhat comparable processes may be in process with respect to Italy. And for good measure, the leading industrial countries, who already have voted through their Group of 10 to supplement the IMF's resources for loans to their own members, may soon reconsider some version of the supplemental "safety net" that Secretary Kissinger unsuccessfully proposed in 1975. It is not, however, the scale of the debts and the size of the continuing payments gaps of the more industrialized countries that pose the greatest need for fresh thought and further action. Those dominant countries have already attracted, and necessarily will attract, the attention and support that their crucial place in world trade and payments should command. The debtor countries which are still vulnerable, though fortunately thus far adequately protected, are those developing nations whose payments deficits—normally, within fairly broad limits, a by-product inherent in the development process—have been stretched to worrisome extremes by the joint impacts of the oil price rise and recession in their foreign markets. It is the pattern of their indebtedness, and the likelihood that their debts must go on expanding at abnormal rates, that could become a center of danger for the world's monetary system—unless further, timely preparation for the future is given priority today.

The "Group of 77," less developed countries (LDCs) in the Committee for International Economic Cooperation (CIEC) and other groups of LDCs, are fully aware of the pressures on themselves, and have made three kinds of proposals: a general debt moratorium; agreements for indexing their commodity prices to the prices of the industrial goods they buy; and creation of a "common fund" to finance commodities they sell. All have serious shortcomings, but all deserve reasoned consideration as a basis for evolving new approaches that can be practicable for all concerned. For unless there is to be a new world boom of unprecedented proportions, the alternative to new

approaches of some kind, or at the very least the creative expansion of existing approaches, somewhere in the future, could be "seizing up" of the trading capabilities and a grinding reduction of living standards and potentials of many of the world's poorest countries, and indeed many of the not-so-poor—with grave repercussions, too, upon the economies and political health of the entire world community.

There would be no generalized problem, of course, if the trade deficits of each of the developing countries were about in line with the inflows of investment funds coming from such international organizations as the World Bank, or from long-term private investors. There would, to be sure, be the occasional country whose attempts at domestic expansion far outran its own resources and its ability to attract investment from outside, thereby creating conditions of accelerating inflation, a dampening of exports, an enlarging balance-of-payments gap, and a consequent delay or default in the servicing of external debts. Such individual instances, calling for temporary bridge-financing until the performance of the home economy could be brought back into line with its ability to sell goods and attract real investment on the world markets, would ordinarily be handled by the IMF. The Fund would advise such a country on the steps necessary to regain its health and would provide funds meanwhile for several years, either through ordinary Fund "drawings," or through special "compensatory financing" facilities.

But the position of many of the LDCs today is not attributable to temporary individual aberrations or excesses in domestic economic programs. Instead, the discrepancy between external receipts and external payments has been caused by the steep price rises for essential imports (notably oil) and the sluggishness of foreign markets for their exports—that is primarily by external conditions beyond their own direct control.

Under these circumstances, virtually all of the LDCs must look outward for additional financing; and they have. Moreover, the resilience of the Eurocurrency markets where bonds could be floated, the lending capacity of the large international banks, and the investing or lending capabilities of the multinational corporations, have thus far provided a remarkable example of the financial support that could be provided by private enterprise working through the normal credit markets. To be sure, reinforcing these private sources of financing there have been the traditional long-term loans of the World Bank and of various creditor governments, as well as the shorter-term facilities of the IMF. All in all, these have aggregated \$30 to \$40 billion of investments or loans for the LDCs during the troubled years of 1974 through 1976. And there are some observers who feel that this remarkable response of the private markets can continue indefinitely; that there is no serious case to be made for

moratoria, or indexing, or commodity price stabilization, or any other extraordinary new approaches.

Yet a question may well be asked as to whether the network of the private credits, at any rate, may not ultimately reach an elastic limit. Already there have been individual incidents of conspicuous payments lapses in Zaire, Peru, Indonesia and most recently even in Mexico. In some of these cases, renewed or enlarged private credits have, in the face of impending default, been mobilized to meet the present need; in others, only the supplemental assistance of the IMF has prevented outright default. But for virtually all of the LDCs, one may surely wonder whether the end is yet in sight. For many of them, more credits are still needed to help in servicing past credits. And one of the crucial criteria in judging any proposal for correction of these imbalances is to gauge its impact on the sustainability of this network of private credits upon which they must depend. For if the network were to collapse, if new loans were not available and old loans could not be serviced, there could be no alternative to severe contraction of the imports and the economic activity of many LDCs, while the outside investors or lenders would in turn be in danger of default or insolvency themselves as their LDC assets became illiquid or uncollectable.

It is in this context that the proposal for a generalized moratorium becomes troublesome. For the interest and amortization that is due on securities issues in the Eurocurrency markets, or on loans owing to multinational banking consortia, or to business corporations, all represent essential assets and earnings for the private firms that originally advanced the credits to the LDCs. Most of these concerns, in turn, are merely intermediaries, having obtained funds from others because of their own strong credit standing—including deposits or advances which they have attracted in very large quantities from the various OPEC countries. A generalized moratorium for LDC debts, unless matched by massive standby facilities from strong governments and international organizations, would consequently threaten the technical solvency, and would at the least drastically reduce the earnings of most of the major private financial institutions engaged in international finance (and thereby lessen their ability to borrow more, in order to lend more, and not only to LDCs).

That is why a general moratorium would be self-defeating. That is also why, instead, a case by case, or country by country, approach to the strengthening of debt servicing capacity has to be followed, in order to give each country adequate time to adjust its own performance in order to achieve an eventual sustainable balance between its foreign payments and receipts.

Similarly, the proposal for indexing the prices of LDC exports to the prices of their imports, reasonable

as it seems, is likely to cause new problems, rather than correcting old ones, if applied comprehensively on an overall basis. For no two LDCs have the same mix of import requirements; an index designed to satisfy all LDCs in the aggregate could only by the sheerest coincidence be appropriate for any one country taken singly. Nor can there be any practicable way of compelling all countries who produce any of the goods exported by LDCs (that is, both the LDCs and the other producing countries) to raise or lower their selling prices in unison, as dictated by the undulations of an abstract index. That is, unless the supply and price of each good was controlled by a producer cartel, in which all producing countries (regardless of the individual stage of development of each) had an agreed share in the output, this kind of indexing could have little chance of success.

The practicable complexity of indexing leads, however, to the third approach, which the LDCs have identified with the proposal for a "common fund" to finance the carry of commodities that are in temporary excess supply. On the assumption that the peaks and valleys of production and consumption differ among commodities, the proposal contemplates use of the proceeds from the sale of some, during slack periods of production, to finance the building of stockpiles of others when their output is expanding unusually rapidly.

The practicable obstacles are obviously formidable, too, to such a pooling of effort, and to the synthesizing of crucial decisions among so many widely differing producer and consumer countries. But it is in this area that the scope for useful experimentation seems most promising. Instead of starting with a pool for a dozen or more commodities, a firmer base might best be built by first working toward individual commodity agreements, which can take many forms depending on the nature of the product, its markets, and the diversity of its suppliers. Constructive innovation may include coordinated stockpiling, among particular consumer countries for some products, and among compatible producer countries for others. The results may appear as steadying the income sources for many LDCs, as well as limiting somewhat the violent gyrations of particular prices that contribute to instability throughout the world economy.

To be sure, one prerequisite for avoiding a "crash" must be a sturdy expansion of the world economy. That, with a positive program now emerging from the new leadership in Washington, may be on the way. But because the structure of the LDC debts has been so severely distorted, a careful appraisal of all the LDC proposals, and an earnest search for new ones, is clearly timely and important. There will still be an urgent need for further enlargement of the World Bank's capacity to lend for constructive investment in the LDCs, while the IMF must have increased resources (including

increased contributions from OPEC countries outside the usual quotas) in order to shore up and sustain the topheavy debt structure created by the developments of the past three years.

Robert V. Roosa

Mr. Roosa is a former Undersecretary of the Treasury for monetary affairs. He is now a partner in Brown Brothers, Harriman and Co.

Call it "Efficiency"

Answering OPEC

Three Western European officials, all of them concerned with energy, came to the United States in the last couple of months to see what was happening in American energy policy.

"A disaster area," was the reaction of the Briton. "The record is extremely poor, extremely poor," said the West German. "Hardly anything has been done. There can't be any energy policies in any of the other western industrial countries without the US taking the lead. In sheer consumption, you crowd the market." The gentleman from the French Foreign Ministry expressed similar sentiments.

All three were pointing to a most unpleasant truth: the Nixon-Ford administration failed to meet the challenge set by the "October Revolution" of 1973 in oil prices, which after all is the major *new* problem to have entered international politics in the last eight years. These two administrations squandered the last 39 months. Thus the Carter administration almost must start anew. The energy dilemma threatens not only our national security, but also the chances for a real economic recovery in the United States and the rest of the industrial world. The new administration's single greatest challenge is to move from a rhetoric of energy conservation to the real thing.

OPEC itself is having internal political problems. The cartel always has depended for its coherence on its members' perception that common interests outweigh conflicting interests. This still is true after the Qatar price meeting in mid-December—but less true. An across-the-board increase of around 10 percent was the anticipated result. The actual outcome was a surprise even to OPEC members. Eleven of the oil-producers agreed to raise prices by 10 percent on January 1 and by another five percent on July 1. But two countries, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, OPEC's key member, opted instead for a five percent increase.

The OPEC members are not play-acting; their political conflicts are real and are increasing. There may be an emergency meeting soon that will work out a

compromise pricing arrangement. If not, it would be reasonable to expect a marked increase in tensions and instability in the Persian Gulf area.

Yet there is a paradox. The political problems may be greater inside OPEC, but its economic position is stronger than at any time since 1974, because the demand for its product is increasing rapidly.

The troubles OPEC causes the rest of us are widely recognized. The most obvious is inflation. After the precipitous downturn in the international economy in 1974, it came to be recognized that OPEC also has a depressionary impact. Its high prices represent a huge "tax" on the rest of the world—a huge withdrawal of purchasing power that only haphazardly finds its way back into the national economies from which it was withdrawn.

The oil cartel has placed great strains on the world monetary system. Saudi Arabia's foreign reserves are the largest in the world. This makes one of the linchpins of the world economy a nation of perhaps four million people, perhaps six million (no one really knows), with a backward social and political system trying to cope with the rush of modernization brought by the avalanche of wealth. To date, the wobbly international monetary system has been able to deal with the strains, but there are no grounds for optimism. Paul Volcker, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, recently observed, "Unsustainable tensions are building up."

The non-OPEC developing nations have been devastated by OPEC's price hikes. Little has been done to help these poor countries. The OPEC tax has wiped out their ability to repay their international loans, introducing further weakness into the monetary system. The entire effort to deal with the oil-induced deficits by rescheduling loans and extending new loans has come to be known as "the rearranging of the deck chairs on the *Titanic*."

The oil producers now have pounced on a very weak recovery and, with their price hike, will help to wrestle it to the ground again. They justify their latest price rise on the basis of world inflation. But they are the prime cause of this inflation!

Over the last 39 months all this has become clearly understood. What has not been so clearly understood is what to do about it.

The basic response of the Nixon-Ford administration was Project Independence—an attractive slogan but not a sensible national policy.

The first problem with Project Independence was its heavy emphasis upon nuclear power. Indeed, the "October Revolution" probably saved nuclear power from atrophy, at least for the short term. The planning for Project Independence came mostly from the pro-nuclear bureaucracy. But nuclear energy today looks more and more like a dead end, or at best a very narrow alley. The lead time for nuclear energy is very long; the capital investment required is very great. Even with the great increase in energy costs, there is still real doubt

about whether it can ever be economic—or whether the costs of building a plant will just go on increasing. Doubts have increased, instead of decreased, about safety—the safety of workers, the safety of those who live nearby, the safety of future generations who will inherit the nuclear wastes.

The second basic problem involved the whole notion of “independence.” Why should we want to be independent? Independent from whom? We are a superpower after all, intimately involved with the rest of the world. Why should we want to increase our consumption of our own natural resources? The primary goal should be different—to be *less* dependent on OPEC oil and to help our allies to be less dependent. The goal of complete independence leads to distortions and misplaced effort.

The appropriate approach to the basic energy problem—and it has been clear for two years to those not mesmerized by the ever-receding dream of nuclear energy—is a massive effort toward energy conservation. This is the most direct way to meet the challenge that OPEC has set for the industrialized world. It makes unnecessary invasion scenarios and bellicose waving of the big stick. To date, the opportunity has been missed.

OPEC’s strength is directly related to world demand. If demand is strong, and it is producing near to its total capability, then its bargaining power is very strong, and its incentives to raise price is powerful. If, on the other hand, demand is weak, then the OPEC nations have many oil wells idle—lots of “spare capacity.” Its bargaining power then decreases. As the pie shrinks rather than grows, each of its members tries to hold on to a piece as large as its old piece; suspicions mount, and they start cheating on each other. Or they might try to deal out production shares—so many million barrels to you, so many million barrels to you. But there are 13 countries involved, and there would be 13 different ideas about what’s fair. Soon their squabbling and jealousy could get out of control. Once again, the cartel would be in serious trouble. At least, it would not be in a position to raise prices.

Therefore, the goal should be to put pressure on the OPEC price by *not* buying as much of its oil as possible. No nation can have so much impact on the world oil market as the United States. We use one-third of the world’s energy, including one-third of the oil. We have given very little attention to the cost of energy in our national habits. Factories and homes were designed ignoring this consideration. No country has so much fat to cut to such good effect. And virtually nothing has been done.

In its report at the end of 1976, the International Energy Agency for its 18 member countries compared the ratio of energy consumption to gross domestic product for 1973 and 1975. In this comparison, adjusting for the worldwide recession, Belgium was shown to have become 10 percent more efficient in the

consumption of energy during the two years following the oil price boost. But for the United States there was absolutely no change in the ratio—no greater conservation or efficiency. The point is dramatic: that the United States had *not* conserved any energy at all. We have spoken against OPEC. We have proclaimed many goals and timetables. But we have not taken the key steps to free ourselves and the rest of the world from the OPEC imperium.

The matter does not stop there. We have actually been picking up the slack in OPEC’s output. And we are now consuming almost 20 percent of OPEC’s oil. Imports from the Arab members of OPEC alone totalled 46 percent of the total US imports of oil in the first nine months of 1976.

There is one further set of figures to keep in mind. OPEC production is returning to pre-embargo levels. In November 1976 it was 33.2 million barrels a day, a new all-time high. In 1973, output averaged 31 million barrels a day. In 1975, because of the recession and cutbacks in demand, the cartel produced only 27.2 million barrels a day. The recession—and not US bluster or OPEC consideration for the fragile economies of the West—is the real reason that prices were held somewhat in check. If production increases continue, Saudi Arabia may not have much spare capacity left by 1980. It is the Saudis’ formidable spare capacity that has given them a major say in pricing, because they always can threaten to open the valves and flood the market with oil at a lower price. If Saudi Arabia is producing at full capacity, the way will be open for the real hawks to set the price. Oil may soon, under such circumstances, cost \$25 a barrel.

It does no good to blame the companies for this impasse. In fact, the “October Revolution” reduced the power of the international oil companies, even if it increased their short-term inventory profits. Unfortunately, a good deal of effort has been expended in trying to prove that the oil companies are the villain of the whole piece—when the real villain is quite clear to see, OPEC. The Congress and the new administration must understand this. The oil companies can be useful to us.

The departing administration’s thinking about energy conservation was distorted by its religious belief in the sanctity of prices and the “market system.” The Republicans’ overriding faith was that allowing prices to rise (never decline) to their “natural” level “automatically” would solve the problem of allocation and restrain demand. Any interference was declared inefficient and disruptive. There are certain indications that some in the Carter administration may be caught up in the same spell.

There are at least four problems with exclusive reliance on price to encourage conservation. (1) There is no natural or market price for oil—and thus none for any other forms of energy. The current price is nothing

but an administered price, with no relation to the 18 cents a barrel production costs in the Persian Gulf, or to supply and demand. Rather it is the outcome of a political bargaining process within OPEC. (2) The people who urge reliance on the price mechanism don't seem to understand how it works. Muddled thinking is reflected in the remark of outgoing Treasury Secretary William Simon. "Basically, what we're attempting is to raise the price [of oil] so that we can lower prices in the future." (3) Prices can take a long time to work their way through the system, and can be terribly disruptive along the way. Classical price theory assumes that consumers are well informed and have the flexibility to act on the information they get. (4) Reliance on the price mechanism is an indiscriminate way of handling a specific problem. It works toward two contradictory goals. Higher prices are meant to encourage both energy conservation and increased energy production within the United States. But, if the scarcity scenarios are to be believed, it would seem prudent *not* to encourage early production of US reserves, but rather to "bank" them.

A 10-cent tax on a gallon of gas will not lead to any less driving in the short term. A 50-cent tax would, but it would also penalize the less well off, and would be politically impossible—as it should be. Instead we should get right to the point and go much further beyond the 1985 mandatory efficiency levels for automobile engines. Incentives should be provided for efficient engines. That means taxes based on horsepower or auto weight or engine inefficiency. Those "signals" are now missing, and we can see the result. Immediately after the embargo, impressed by lines at the gas station, consumers sought more efficient cars. But as memories dimmed, there was no longer much interest. General Motors had expected to sell 300,000 of its new Chevettes—which get 40 miles per gallon in highway driving—in the first year. Instead, only 150,000 were sold. Meanwhile, the auto industry's sales effort has shifted back to the larger cars, and Ford is proudly announcing that its models are as big as a Cadillac.

In the last year, as people begin to recognize the problems with nuclear power, they also have begun taking to heart the simple notion that "it's cheaper to save a barrel of oil than to produce a new one." And an equally important idea also is beginning to sink in—that energy conservation can be seriously pursued without disrupting our way of life or threatening our standard of living.

In the last few months, in particular, more people have begun to understand that you can "decouple" economic growth and energy consumption. This is a very important change. A recent article in *Science* pointed out that Sweden has about the same per-capita income as the United States, but uses only about 55 to 65 percent as much energy as does the US.

A few weeks ago, P. I. Walter, managing director of

British Petroleum, declared that Europe should reduce its growth rate in energy to *zero* by the end of the century. Our oil companies are not there yet, but some executives may soon see that their long-term corporate prospects depend upon a healthy economic environment.

Conservation has a triple value. It puts pressure on OPEC to halt its debilitating series of price hikes. It enables us to buy time so that we do not have to rush into nuclear power, but rather can explore other paths such as coal, solar and wind power. And, if oil is a limited resource, then it is only prudent to slow down our use of it.

In appointing James Schlesinger as energy czar, President-elect Carter said, "His number-one priority will be to conserve energy." This high-level commitment is overdue. There are certain doubts about Schlesinger's own outlook. He was chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, an organization that had a powerful commitment in another direction. Will he be able to work free of the way of thinking in the nuclear energy bureaucracies? Will he also be able to avoid the trap into which the Ford administration fell—looking for the big technological fix and hoping that the price mechanism can make the adjustment easy?

The most important task in getting energy conservation beyond the talking state is to create a perception of urgency. Today, the country has fallen back into complacency about energy. The matter is made worse by the strong psychological barriers in our society against anything called "conservation." No doubt, the very word has unattractive connotations—suggesting "cutting back," scarcity, rationing, unemployment—enough to scare not only consumers, but also corporations and labor unions.

Therefore, I propose that serious attention be given to phasing out the phrase "energy conservation" and replacing it with the term "energy efficiency"—which is what is really involved, and which also sounds, frankly, more American.

Energy conservation is not dramatic. In fact it is really a catch-all phrase for 50,000 little and medium-sized efforts—from fine-tuning the boiler in the basement, to increasing miles-per-gallon in the car, to converting waste heat into factory heating. Energy conservation, at least for now, does command about as much glamor as waste disposal. Yet conservation is the secret to solving the energy crisis. It lacks the drama of the Manhattan Project, of sending a man to the moon, or even of the War on Poverty. But our national fate, and that of our allies, may well depend on it.

Daniel Yergin

Mr. Yergin is author of *Shattered Peace: the Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State*, to be published in May.

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Quidnuncs

It seems odd that so useful a word should be unfamiliar to most Americans, considering our intense concern nowadays with the matter of privacy. It comes from the Latin *quid nunc*—what now?—and is defined in Webster's as "one who seeks to know all the latest news or gossip." There is a widespread belief that our own era is on the way to becoming the Quidnuncs' Golden Age.

Curiosity is privacy's natural enemy. Yet, unfortunately for our cultural peace of mind, the average person is endowed simultaneously with a large measure of the former and a strong desire to preserve the latter. E. L. Godkin, a well-known nineteenth-century journalist, expressed it like this:

As soon in the progress of civilization as men left the tent, or wigwam, or tribal dwelling, and retreated into private houses, a desire on the part of their neighbors to know what was going on in the private houses sprung up rapidly and has flourished ever since the world over.

As an editor, writing in 1890, Godkin was concerned with the threat to privacy that he perceived in the appearance of "a particular class of newspapers [that] has converted curiosity into what economists call an effectual demand, and gossip into a marketable commodity." Godkin's pessimism about privacy's chances of surviving the new onslaught helped to inspire a young lawyer named Louis Brandeis to write for the *Harvard Law Review* a famous paper first defining privacy as the "right to be let alone" and arguing that ample defense for it could be found in our common law.

"The common law has always recognized a man's house as his castle, impregnable, often, even to its own officers engaged in the execution of its commands," Brandeis wrote. "Shall the courts thus close the front entrance to constituted authority, and open wide the back door to idle or prurient curiosity?"

As it turned out, the answer was, "yes." In the next half-century, courts increasingly decided conflicts between privacy and freedom of the press in the press's favor, recognizing that the Constitution, in providing for a free press, necessarily left questions of responsible self-restraint to be decided entirely by the press itself; that any restraint other than the self-imposed variety is, in fact, an antonym of freedom.

In this respect, the pessimistic journalist proved a better prophet than the optimistic lawyer. "In truth, there is only one remedy for the violations of the right to privacy within the reach of the American public, and that is but an imperfect one," Godkin wrote. "It is to be found in attaching social discredit to invasions of it. . . . At present this check can hardly be said to exist."

It is just possible that something has now appeared that is helping to create such checks—and from an entirely unexpected source. As unlikely, in fact, as the Ordnance Department of the United States Army, which during World War II commissioned scientists at the University of Pennsylvania to develop equipment for calculating trajectory tables. The result, in 1946, was ENIAC, the world's first electronic computer. It was soon clear, of course, that electronic computers can keep track of a good deal more than artillery shells, and civilization was launched into a new adventure.

A substantial number of people have come to believe that computers may now be keeping track of entirely too much. Themselves, for example. So long as threats to privacy came chiefly from the press, they were of personal concern to the relatively few people who found their names in print or, later on, the even fewer who became involved with television. The computer is changing this.

Almost everyone now suspects that details of his or her personal affairs are recorded in some computer's memory bank—and the thought is disquieting. Suddenly, for the first time since the rise of the penny press and

the gossip columnist, privacy has become everybody's business. More people now have, as a counterweight to their natural curiosity, a new sense of urgency about protecting their own privacy. They have begun to demand that the meaning of privacy be more precisely defined, and that their rights to it be both respected by others and enforced by the laws.

This insistence is based on more than a simple objection to "strangers poking around in my personal affairs." Such fears might be easily assuaged by pointing out that the software of a computer program provides infinitely more protection for everybody's records than the manila folders in steel filing cabinets to which we've long been accustomed. If the real concern were secrecy, then the electronic computer with its tangle of sophisticated software might be perceived as a powerful new weapon in secrecy's defense. But there is more to the problem.

A clue to the larger question may lie in one especially interesting aspect of the contemporary debate: the insistence on disclosure. Through such legislation as the Freedom of Information Act, the Truth in Lending Act, and the Privacy Act of 1974, the people are demanding to know what the files and the memory banks say about them. They have begun to assert this right not only with respect to government agencies, but also to schools, banks, credit bureaus, personnel departments, insurance companies, and almost every other institution. It is as though we are indeed all members of a great global village and, like villagers from time immemorial, are annoyed by what we suspect the village gossip is saying about us. We are asking around to see if our suspicions can be confirmed. If they are, we will decide what to do next.

Traditionally, what often happened next was that the town gossip got punched in the nose, dunked in the pond, or tarred and feathered. It is hard to imagine what the modern equivalent may prove to be, but it seems safe to predict that some of our quidnuncs are in for a rough time. People who go around demanding to know "what now?" better be prepared to justify their questions, and to specify clearly what they intend to do with the answers.

This will be equally true at the front entrance — which proved to be less tightly closed to "constituted authority" than Brandeis originally believed. When he later came to argue, as Mr. Justice Brandeis in 1928, that "the right to be let alone" should inhibit government wiretappers, the majority of his Supreme Court colleagues disagreed. In 1967, however, the Court changed its mind, concluding that "the underpinnings of [the 1928 decision] have been so eroded . . . that the 'trespass' doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling" and Brandeis's viewpoint finally prevailed.

There will be similar erosions. At the risk of special pleading, we might even be so bold as to point to a likely one: the recent Supreme Court decision (*U.S. vs. Miller*) concerning the government's authority to examine your bank records. "The lack of any legitimate expectation of privacy concerning the information kept in bank records was assumed by Congress. . . ." the Court concluded, among other things. If such an assumption was ever justified, we suspect that it will not be much longer.

The American people have always viewed government omnipotence as an intolerable threat to individual freedom. They have repeatedly placed limits on their own government's use of its inherent power. If they now decide that an omniscient government is just as dangerous, public officials may discover that they are no longer allowed to know everything they are capable of finding out.

It is a little early to tell, but the quidnuncs may not have us yet.



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Defining the National Interest—Again Old Superstitions, New Realities

by Hans J. Morgenthau

Every four years, we welcome a new administration with great expectations for a new American foreign policy. We know of course that in the past a new administration has confirmed rather than altered the foreign policy of its predecessor and that in consequence American foreign policy since the end of World War II appears to the retrospective observer as a monument to consistency, in error and in truth, rather than as a progression toward truth, drawing lessons from the errors of the past. We know also that continuity in the ranking personnel of the foreign policy establishment is likely to spell continuity in policy since the new men responsible for foreign policy are likely to bring the same defects of intellectual judgment and moral character to bear upon the new problems of foreign policy as they did upon the old.

When John Foster Dulles took over in 1953, he promised friend and foe alike a new foreign policy, only to offer us Dean Acheson's in new rhetorical garb. When in 1961 Dean Rusk succeeded Dulles and Christian Herter, he supported the foreign policies his predecessors pursued or would have pursued, such as military intervention in Vietnam, if President Eisenhower's caution had not stood in their way. Lyndon Johnson as President embarked upon the very same foreign policies which candidate Johnson had opposed and which were in logical succession to those of his immediate predecessor. Similarly, Richard Nixon gained the presidency in 1969 on the promise of changing American policy in Indochina from war to peace but pursued as President a policy which, at least in its immediate manifestations, continued and escalated the policy of his predecessor. This consistency of American foreign policy over the long stretches of history is due to two factors: one resulting from a general quality of foreign policy, the other peculiar to the United States.

A rational foreign policy seeking the security of the nation in relation to other nations and the protection and promotion of its interests abroad is bipartisan by its very nature. The national interest which provided the reasoning for a rational foreign policy is not defined by the whim of a man or the partisanship of party but

imposes itself as an objective datum upon all men applying their rational faculties to the conduct of foreign policy. Thus the national interest in the preservation and, if need be, the restoration of the continental balance of power has survived four centuries of radical changes in the composition and outlook of the British ruling class, as the national interest of Russia in the control of the Western accesses to its empire has survived the most radical domestic changes. Similarly, the American national interest in the tenets of the Monroe Doctrine and in the European and Asian balance of power has guided the foreign policy of the United States during the two centuries of the nation's existence.

More particularly, in view of those permanent interests, American foreign policy since 1945 has inevitably pursued the containment of the Soviet Union and of China, and has to that end supported the nations of Western Europe, Japan and South Korea as well as anti-Communist governments and movements throughout the world. These ends and means have remained unchanged for a quarter of a century. What has changed is the rhetoric through which American foreign policy has been rationalized and justified. What have also changed are the tactics of implementing the basic tenets of American foreign policy in certain regions, such as Southeast Asia. What have not changed are the basic tenets themselves.

That consistency of American foreign policy, reflecting the permanence of the interests which American foreign policy is supposed to serve, is accentuated by the identity of high officials responsible for the conduct of American foreign policy. Many observers have noted the paradox that the new foreign policies on which the new administration is said to be embarking are to be executed by a group of men who are identified with the disastrous policies of the past, especially those in Vietnam. Common sense dictates that a group of physicians who have given the wrong diagnosis, suggested the wrong therapy, and covered their mistakes with the wrong prognosis will not be employed again to take care of the patient's medical problems. Why does a President-elect in preparation for the presidency pursue a course of action which he would find irrational if he pursued it in his private affairs?

The answer lies in a characteristic of American politics which is rarely mentioned although it explains

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much which at first glance defies rational explanation. We are referring to the enormous staying power of the conservative element in American society. The concentrations of private power which have actually governed America since the Civil War have withstood all attempts to control, let alone dissolve them. They have survived all such attempts from Populism to the Great Society. They have adjusted legal forms and procedures to political pressures and have coopted their one-time opponents, such as the labor unions. Democratic and Republican administrations have followed each other, and so have activist and passive, reformist and conservative Presidents, but the concentrations of private power have preserved their hold upon the levers of political decision. So it is but consistent for an incoming administration to staff the command posts of foreign and military policy with the same personnel that served its immediate predecessors. By the same token, the odds are against men who 10 years ago failed the moral and intellectual tests of statesmanship now advocating wise new foreign policies against a reluctant White House and a hostile public opinion.

While it is therefore futile to expect the new team responsible for foreign and military policies wisely and audaciously to break new ground, or to speculate what they will or will not do, it is in order to define and analyze certain fundamental issues which have been neglected or mistreated in the past. While it is vain to expect drastic changes in foreign policy because a new administration has taken over, it may not be *a priori* hopeless to change slowly and at first imperceptibly the ways we think about foreign policy. Changes in foreign policy must follow changes in the modes of thinking we bring to bear upon the fundamental issues of foreign policy. Four such issues call for our attention: first, our political and military modes of thought and action must be brought into harmony with the political and military realities of the age. Second, we must exchange the demonological interpretation of political reality, a reality peopled by evil persons, for understanding the depersonalized objective issues. Third, we must stop substituting pleasant but illusory verbalizations for a threatening reality. Last, we must cease, especially in our relations with the Third World, to act on the belief that a seemingly obstreperous reality will yield to good intentions and the expenditure of large amounts of money.

It is no exaggeration to say that the very structure of international relations, as reflected in political institutions, diplomatic procedures and legal arrangements, is utterly at variance with, and in large measure irrelevant to, the reality of international politics. While the former assumes the "sovereign equality" of all nations, the latter is dominated by an extreme inequality of nations, two of which are called superpowers because they hold in their hands the unprecedented power of total destruction, and many of which are called "ministates" because their power is

minuscule even compared with that of the traditional nation-states. It is this contrast and incompatibility between the reality of international politics and the concepts, institutions and procedures designed to make intelligible and control the former which has caused, at least below the great-power level, the unmanageability of international relations bordering on anarchy. International terrorism and the different reactions of governments to it, the involvement of foreign governments in the Lebanese civil war, the military operations of the United States in Southeast Asia, the military interventions of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, cannot be explained or justified by reference to traditional concepts, institutions and procedures. Nor can the claimed moral responsibility of the industrialized nations for the economic welfare of the Third World. The same holds true for the obligation of the oil-producing nations to supply the industrial nations with their main source of energy at tolerable cost.

All these situations have one common characteristic: the fact of interdependence requires a political order which takes that fact into account, while in reality the legal and institutional superstructure, harking back to the 19th century, assumes the existence of a multiplicity of self-sufficient, impenetrable sovereign nation-states. These residues of an obsolescent legal and institutional order not only stand in the way of a rational transformation of international relations in the light of the inequality of power and the interdependence of interests, but they also render precarious, if not impossible, major rational policies within the defective framework of such a system.

The prime specific example is nuclear energy. Military strategy has been dominated throughout history by certain concepts, such as competitive armaments, attack and defense, victory and defeat, which derive of necessity from the nature of things military. While these concepts retain their validity for conventional war, they have lost their meaning for nuclear strategy. In contrast to the conventional arms race, the nuclear competition can reach an optimum—the ability to inflict unacceptable damage in a second strike. Once defense against strategic nuclear attack is impossible, avoidance of nuclear war through deterrence is the only rational response to the nuclear threat; that the destructiveness of nuclear war

COMING: Henry Fairlie's
Epistle
of a Gentile
to Saul Bellow

obliterates the distinction between victory and defeat.

It testifies to the persistence of conventional concepts that, in spite of their obvious obsolescence, they have not lost their hold upon the thinking and policies of governments. The nuclear arms race, long since having overtaken the optimum, has become a wasteful futility, aping the competition for conventional arms. Neither superpower has given up the search, however disguised, for a nuclear weapon that would promise to give a new meaning to the traditional distinction between victory and defeat. More particularly, the United States has continuously searched for a variant of, or substitute for, strategic nuclear war, in the form of counterforce strategy and tactical nuclear war, which would avoid indiscriminate total destruction and thereby restore the traditional distinction between victory and defeat. The lingering-on of these ideas, hallowed by their legitimate use during all of recorded history before 1945, which have become misconceptions when applied to nuclear strategy, has not only led us astray in the competition for ever more and better nuclear weapons, but has also caused us to underrate the strategic importance of conventional weapons.

American military policy, by overemphasizing, to the detriment of conventional weapons, nuclear preparedness in the surreptitious expectation of a winnable and not unacceptably destructive nuclear war, has reversed the true order of things: it wastes scarce human and material resources upon already excessive nuclear weapon systems, and accepts as permanent an inferiority in conventional weapons, which not only makes conventional war more likely and its outcome doubtful, but also increases the likelihood of escalation from conventional to nuclear war, provided the stakes are high enough for the prospective loser not to accept defeat in a conventional war.

As William Graham Sumner put it: "The amount of superstition is not much changed, but it now attaches to politics, not to religion." Superstition in politics tends to reduce variegated phenomena, difficult to understand and apparently impossible to master, to a simple, personalized factor. Warmongers of Wall Street, the Jewish conspiracy of the Elders of Zion, and the wirepullers of world communism are held responsible for the world's major evils. While the "spectre of communism" has influenced, to the point of obsession, the thinking of friend and foe alike, it was the coincidence, since 1917, of adherence to the Communist doctrine with the power of a state in the form of Russian Bolshevism that has created a continuing problem for American foreign policy.

What is the ultimate purpose of Soviet foreign policy? Is it the security and expansion of the Russian state, or is it the transformation of the world in the image of Soviet communism? The answer to these questions is not of mere academic interest, but

determines the kind of foreign policy the United States ought to pursue *vis-a-vis* the Soviet Union and other Communist nations and movements. American policy, in its rhetoric and from time to time in its practice, has been satisfied with a blanket opposition to communism, a stance that requires no more than the identification of a government or a political movement as Communist to make it an enemy of the United States. The Communist identification is the only mental operation required, and opposition is the only legitimate practical conclusion.

The corollary of this indiscriminate opposition to communism is the indiscriminate support of governments and movements that profess and practice anti-communism. American policies in Asia and Latin America have derived from this simplistic position. The Vietnam war and our inability to come to terms with mainland China find here their rationale. So do the theory and practice of counter-insurgency, including large-scale assassinations under the Phoenix program in Vietnam and the assassinations of individual statesmen.

Our relations with Communist governments and movements must be determined in view of all the factors that bear upon interests and power and of which communism, itself of different weight in different countries according to interests and power, constitutes but one among many. Once we pursue consistently this differentiated approach to communism, we will also be relieved of the compulsion, which is a mirror image of the blanket opposition to Communist governments and movements on ideological grounds, to support indiscriminately all governments which invoke ideological anti-communism as their reason of state.

The demonological approach to foreign policy strengthens another pathological tendency, which is the refusal to acknowledge in thought, and cope effectively with, a threatening reality. The demonological approach has shifted our attention and concern toward the adherents of communism—individuals at home and abroad, political movements, foreign governments—and away from the real threat: the power of states, Communist or not. An example of the same intellectual error is the contemporary emphasis upon *détente* as an alternative American policy toward the Soviet Union, presumably less hostile and more conducive to mutually advantageous cooperation than the policies that preceded it.

To recommend or reject a particular foreign policy carries the implication that the policy-maker has a choice between the policy recommended or rejected and some other kinds of policy. If no such choice exists, the recommendation or rejection may have its uses for purposes of propaganda, domestic and international, but it offers no genuine alternative. To do justice to *détente* as a recommended or rejected American policy one would have to raise the question of an alternative

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foreign policy, better or worse than *détente*. The answer to that question is bound to be that no such rational alternative exists.

The two nuclear superpowers, capable of destroying each other utterly in a matter of hours, have no rational choice but to pursue a policy of *détente*, that is, of decreasing and, if possible, eliminating tensions. It is exactly this kind of foreign policy the two superpowers have pursued since the end of the World War II. They were settled peacefully because both sides approached the outstanding issues in the spirit of *détente*, that is, of decreasing and eliminating tensions which otherwise might have led to a self-destructive nuclear war. Thus Secretary of State Kissinger is right when he has repeatedly defined *détente* as the policy to avoid nuclear war. The concept of *détente* is not susceptible to rational debate. Rather it serves the ideological function of justifying in moral terms whatever policy happens to be pursued. The concept of *détente* has a positive moral connotation. It is impossible to oppose *détente* in favor of bigger and better tensions.

Mr. Carter deems it "likely in the near future that issues of war and peace will be more a function of economic and social problems than of the military security problems which have dominated international relations in the world since World War II." This statement is but a particular expression of the widely held view that the most important issue facing the foreign policy of the United States and the one most likely to cause war is not the East-West confrontation with the Soviet Union, but the North-South relationship between the few industrialized, rich nations, and the great mass of the underdeveloped and mainly agricultural poor ones.

This view assumes that the highly developed and rich nations of the world are responsible, both in terms of cause and effect and in moral terms, for the plight of the third world. The developed, rich nations, so the argument runs, owe their development and wealth primarily to the colonial exploitation of the nations of the third world; hence, they are morally obligated to compensate the nations of the third world for what the latter have been unjustly deprived. That moral obligation emanating from the specific evils of colonialism is reinforced by the general moral principle of equality which frowns upon the extreme inequality among nations and imposes upon the advantaged the moral obligation to share their advantages with the disadvantaged.

Regardless of the merits of this moral argument, the United States has a politico-military interest in the third world which is a special manifestation of its general interest in the maintenance of a world-wide balance of power under present world conditions. In the practice of American foreign policy, that interest has taken on the aspects of opposition to the expansion of communism in the third world. That opposition assumes that while individual Communist

governments may have no direct influence upon the world balance of power, they have a psychological impact presaging further inevitable Communist gains. These psychological expectations become self-fulfilling prophecies; each gain, however insignificant in itself, psychologically prepares for further gains, and so forth. To that psychological preparation for gradual Communist expansion corresponds that expansion itself, which is assumed to go forward insignificant step by insignificant step until the sum total of such steps will amount to a significant change of the world balance of power in favor of communism.

Two flaws qualify, if not invalidate, this argument. On the one hand, it assumes within communism a uniform aggressive hostility to American interests and, on the other, it assumes within the third world a uniform receptivity to aggressive anti-American communism. That is to say, it assumes the monolithic dominance of this particular variety of communism among its promoters and recipients in the third world. At the same time, it assumes the ability of the United States to stop the spread of this kind of communism throughout the third world. These assumptions are obviously open to serious doubt; if one were to take them without qualification at face value, one would come very close to the demonological approach which we have discussed above.

The polycentric character of communism, that is, the determination of its philosophy and policies by considerations of differing national interests rather than of dogmatic consistency, is by now well established. The real issue that confronts American foreign policy is not whether a certain government professes and practices communism, but to what extent a government's foreign policy supports the foreign policies of the Soviet Union or of other governments hostile to the United States. If one applies this criterion, one realizes that Communist philosophy and policies are by no means coterminous with Soviet influence. Anti-Communist military dictatorships support Soviet foreign policies, and governments who proclaim their "socialism" and practice what they at least think are Socialist domestic policies pursue foreign policies which are at least not necessarily hostile to the interests of the United States. The receptivity of the nations of the third world to competing foreign ideologies has been very much exaggerated by the three main contestants—the United States, the Soviet Union and China. The main motivating force in the third world is not Western ideologies, of which Marxism is one, but indigenous nationalism, and most nations of the third world prefer to be miserable in their own way to being happy in the American, Soviet or Chinese way.

It follows from the great diversity of interests pursued by the nations of the third world and the great disparity of power they are able to bring to bear upon

those interests that the North-South confrontation, as an alternative to the East-West confrontation, refers to nothing real. In the East-West confrontation, the United States and the Soviet Union confront each other as the two superpowers, supported by their respective allies and capable of destroying each other. What the United States and the other industrial nations confront in the North-South confrontation is not another power bloc of at least approximately equal strength, which could be dealt with on the level of power, but near-anarchy uncontrollable from within or without. When the United States enters the third world, it confronts primarily not a particular country or group of countries of the third world, but the Soviet Union, and the countries of the third world participate in the confrontation only as the associates of one or the other superpower and as the object of their ambitions. What

distinguishes the North-South from the East-West confrontation is not the identity of the principals but the geographic space in which they meet and the object over which they confront each other.

It is, then, a fundamental error to think about the nations of the third world in terms of economic development, supported by the United States and international organizations and frustrated by the indigenous handicaps of culture and politics. It is pleasant to imagine that the United States can escape world politics by exchanging the East-West confrontation for a North-South one. For better or worse, there is no escape from the most dangerous confrontation the United States has ever experienced. It is the mission of the new administration to face that confrontation with wisdom and fortitude rather than spending itself in futile attempts to evade it.

Heading Toward Apartheid

The Cities' Secret

by Irving Howe

Every four years, I suspect, many Americans share a fantasy: if only I could gain the new President's ear, if only I could tell him this or show him that. My own fantasy right now is modest: I would like to take Mr. Carter for a walk—it would last a mere half hour—through the area of Detroit roughly between the downtown streets and Wayne State University, so that he might grasp what the “crisis of the cities” really signifies. He could hardly know much about this in Plains, Georgia; but if he is to be a President who does something to help the millions of people living in our shamed cities, he must know something about it.

Over the past two years I've visited Detroit several times. My mind is haunted by what I saw there: whole blocks looking as if they had been bombed in the war, buildings rotting or destroyed, a devastation of once-busy streets, the abandonment of even the pretext of care. During one visit I was in the downtown area on a Saturday afternoon: utterly eerie, large buildings and

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stores, but no one on the streets. A deserted city: chilling, frightening. During another visit I was near Wayne State University: streets not quite abandoned, but an astonishing sense of emptiness, forlornness.

If you travel across Bruckner Boulevard in New York City and glance at the South Bronx, you can see something similar: buildings gutted, windows boarded-up. I don't know Newark or Gary, but I am told they're not very different. Other places, too. This is American civilization, 1977: not the whole it, since there are cities like Atlanta and Houston that are flourishing, but a good part of it—yesterday's industrial centers and working-class areas, where the Irish and Jews and Slavs used to live.

The literature on the “crisis of the cities” is vast by now. Surely the readers of this magazine have a sense of how deeply that crisis cuts into our lives. Still, let me cite just two paragraphs, from two excellent synoptic studies, one by Henry B. Schechter in the November 1976 *Federationist* (AFL-CIO) and the other by David Muchnik, in the Winter 1976 *Dissent*. Schechter has brought together a mass of statistics about urban

conditions—42.4 percent unemployment among black teenagers in the cities!—and these lead him to conclude:

The US population is dominated by a large concentration of those born between 1954 and 1964, when there were more than four million births in each year. During the next 10 years, large numbers of them—already having experienced extraordinarily high unemployment as teen-agers—will be entering their adult years. Without a commitment by the federal government to make full employment a priority . . . today's unemployed teen-agers will simply become tomorrow's unemployed adults. . . .

Muchnic, offering a more elaborate analysis, writes:

In northern and eastern states [the urban policy of the federal government] reinforces metropolitan segregation. . . . It accepts racial and economic inequalities as natural, inevitable and just . . . It provides financial support, administrative discretion and political legitimacy to present municipal structure and practice, enabling many localities to continue their denial of equal residential, educational and occupational opportunities by invoking the heretofore neutral value of localism.

What is happening in the United States today, at least in major Northern cities, is a *resegregation*, or a fierce reinforcement of existing segregation, along lines much worse than those of 20 years ago. Then, whites and blacks lived in adjacent neighborhoods, sometimes encountering or jostling one another. Now, in a significant number of cities, the trend is toward a version of *apartheid*, with the rotting core cities abandoned to the blacks, where they can elect officials and have "power" over nothing worth having, while the whites move out.

It's customary to end that last sentence, "move out to the suburbs," but that isn't entirely accurate anymore. In the areas adjacent to Detroit there have arisen new white cities, not just suburbs. These new cities contain growing industries, commercial centers, educational facilities. The people who live in them have little need, or desire, to go to Detroit at all.

In South Africa the whites keep the cities and force the blacks into outlying areas. We reverse the process.

It seems beyond question that all this is partly the result of a deliberate federal policy—a policy limiting investment in metropolitan social needs and shifting development priorities to the South and Southwest. But if we are to be stringent with ourselves, we must also recognize that it is also the result of something much more alarming: the shared, tacit decision on the part of vast numbers of middle- and working-class whites. Many of these people leave the cities as soon as they can. Their reasons include better schools, private homes, a bit of grass and air, more space. But such amiable motives don't tell the whole story.

An enormous, and disastrous, shift of feeling has

taken place among whites in America. If in earlier decades they held racist attitudes, if they felt contempt and sometimes hatred for blacks, if they shared all the wretched stereotypes about black slothfulness, today all these feelings, while no doubt still present, have given way to a much stronger one: fear. I simplify a good deal and leave aside the moment during the early '60s when it seemed there were major possibilities for a new concord of feeling. Still, if you ask white people why they have left Detroit for an outlying town—ordinary people who may not be free of prejudice but are not virulent racists, liberals who try to live by some code of decency, intellectuals who feel shame at having fled—the common answer is, "we're afraid." And everyone understands what they're afraid of.

Some months ago, speaking at Wayne State, I shared the platform with a distinguished and by no means extremist black intellectual. He excoriated the government's urban policy which had led to the kind of situation I've sketched here; especially bitter was his attack on Pat Moynihan, whom he saw as the exemplar of liberal intellectuals in retreat. I was in agreement with almost everything this man said. But I also found myself noticing that in his entire review of the urban situation he did not once employ the word "crime." I can understand that for a black leader this must raise the spectre of false issues, reactionary diversions, red herrings; but what is the use, so late in the day, in pretending the problem is not there?

For the past seven or eight years it has been hard for even the most concerned whites to have a clear sense of what is happening within the black community. One is not certain who, if anyone, constitutes its political and moral leadership; one is not certain what the inner states of opinion, feeling and morale may be. There seems to be a certain drawing inward, a pulling back to rethink goals and strategies. That makes sense, but one price for it is that seldom during the past several decades has there been less communication between whites and blacks—I mean those who sincerely care about equality and integration.

Let me say something that malicious people can misconstrue, but which needs to be said nevertheless. We are not at all sure what the problem of crime in the streets really signifies, whether it can indeed be said to constitute a single problem, but it is something that must publicly and candidly be confronted by the leadership of the black community.

That blacks themselves are the greatest, or among the greatest, victims of street crime; that the demoralization and pathology which afflicts a deprived segment of the blacks is largely to be understood as a result of despair following upon the unfulfilled expectations of the '60s; that anyone else of whatever color suffering the conditions of black youth today might well respond with far greater desperation; that the issue of crime lends itself to the worst sorts of racist demagoguery—all true. And it needs to be repeated over

and over again.

But it is not enough. I think that if the leaders of the black community were to speak openly about the issue of crime, first of all to their own people and then to the country at large, they would be doing a service. They should not, of course, succumb to popular stereotypes; they must go beyond surface sensationalism; but they need also to recognize that there is an element of reality to the outcry about crime in the streets. Precisely what that element of reality is, ought to be defined with great care. Is it merely the irrational fears of elderly white people? I suspect not; but even if that is what it is, it constitutes a social fact of great importance.

That people who have suffered and been exploited and misused and lied to, that such people, whatever their race or color, develop among themselves symptoms of demoralization and pathology, is no surprise; nor should it be taken as an insult when this is publicly acknowledged. An unemployment rate of 42 percent among black youth signifies the formation of a *lumpenproletariat*, with the problems of morale and discipline that entails. And for the black leadership that is a terrible burden.

But it is also and ultimately a burden for the country as a whole. No matter how much moral and practical exhortation black leaders might engage in among black youths, there is very little that they can do unaided to

remedy the desperate social circumstances of which the unemployment figure is only a sign. Unemployment among black youth is a problem that only the society at large—which in practice means the federal government—can begin to cope with. And the black leaders have a perfect right, indeed obligation, to say: "Yes, we must try to speak candidly about the problem of crime, we must try to reach our young people, but what matters most is giving them some social hope, some possibility for achievement. And that means, first of all, jobs."

What can the Carter administration do? A few simple things. These would not bring whites and blacks together overnight, but they would at least improve the situation of the cities. A program of federal-sponsored employment for black youth, linked with job training. A program of generous loans to small businesses run by blacks. A program of municipal rehabilitation that would require that black workers get a fair share of jobs. All these are standard items in the liberal agenda.

By themselves, these measures aren't likely to reverse the trend toward resegregation in our cities. But they might ease fears. They might enable the start of new connections—neighborhoods, projects, perhaps as models of a harmony and trust that may yet keep us from the shame of *apartheid*. Somewhere, we must start again.

A Professor's Stump Speech That Worked

The Liberals' Dilemma

by Daniel P. Moynihan

In a transport, possibly, of Bicentennial excess, I ran in five elections during 1976. Each was contested; some were close. I ran, first, from the Bronx, to be a delegate to the Democratic National Convention. Then I ran for a place on the Platform Committee. My next "campaign" was for membership on the drafting committee for the platform. Thence to the senatorial primary in New York, and finally to the Senate election itself.

In the end I won the Senate seat by 585,961 votes. Except for Robert Kennedy in 1964, I was the first Democrat to win a New York Senate race since 1950.

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Kennedy ran more than one million votes behind Lyndon Johnson in New York in 1964. Since I ran 300,000 votes *ahead* of Jimmy Carter, columnist John Roche, *The New Republic* and other disparate voices have suggested that my victory had more than merely statewide consequences.

If my success in wooing the voters of New York has a wider significance, what I said during those last two campaigns may be of some interest. What I wrote during that time was widely and accurately reported. But for the candidate as well as for the voters, the real campaign, the authentic experience, is almost wholly embodied in the stump speech. Morning and night, day after day, in—yes, just as the formula has it—in union

halls in Tonawanda, in senior citizens centers in the Flatlands, by swimming pools in East Hampton, in drawing rooms high over Fifth Avenue, in basement halls in the South Bronx, in cafés in the Southern Tier, in taverns in the North Country, down to the last homecoming rally at Pindars Corners, this is what I said. The voters found it convincing.

The dilemma for liberals in New York, I said, is that we faced unprecedented government problems which however had come about under the auspices of impeccably liberal governments in New York City and in New York State. Not merely liberal, but most often patrician liberal. There had been a great coalescing of progressive forces, and government was truly given a free hand to do all that it could do. And all that it did was to go bust. New York City was in default. Its powers of self-government, intact since 1626 except for a brief spell under General Howe, had been taken away from it, and given to persons unknown to us and certainly not chosen by us. Some, impervious to evidence, blamed this on Washington where a thermidor or worse was said to have set in. But such an evasion would not survive scrutiny of the federal budget which had grown enormously, and largely for purposes of solving problems New York was finding insoluble.

None of this, I said, was helping the reputation of liberalism. Indeed, during the Presidential primary when Mo Udall came to New York he disowned the label. This led Scoop Jackson to remark that he might not be a liberal, but he was the only candidate willing to call himself one. Jimmy Carter had won the primaries by speaking continuously of "the horrible, bloated, confused bureaucracy" in Washington. So it wouldn't do us too much good to blame tightwads in Washington. And there was no point getting nasty blaming ourselves. What we needed to do, I said, was to sort out our situation and to be as honest about it as we dared.

It was the Bicentennial, I continued, not just of the American Revolution, but also of Gibbon's *Decline and Fall*, and I cited the theme of the later chapters: "the leakage of reality." Something like that had been happening to public discourse in New York, and we must resist it—but not to the point of imprudence, because there are some realities that are simply too painful to confront.

I then described our situation in terms of three interconnected and reinforcing crises: a crisis of government, a crisis of the economy, and a crisis of social organization.

The essential of the government crisis was that New York City could no longer maintain its present level of operations. This situation threatened the state, and other jurisdictions already sufficiently shaky. Raising taxes to meet rising costs, as we had done in the past, would lead to the loss of taxpayers and reduced income. This the subway syndrome: higher fares, fewer riders,

less revenue, greater deficit. In part this crisis derived from the honorable tradition of New Yorkers making a decent provision for one another. In part it derived from folly. We have become a people who know the value of everything and the price of nothing. This posture presents itself as highly moral; but Reinhold Niebuhr, if alive, would soon enough reveal the coercion involved in all that preachiness. "If we can send a man to the moon. . . ." In any event, it was a crisis very much of our own making. If we decide to pay twice what Texans pay for the same thing, we must expect to suffer twice the tax.

The decline of government is inexorably associated with the crisis of the economy. The economy of the Northeast is stagnant. In New York City itself there has been a crashing decline. Since 1969, 640,000 private-sector jobs have been lost—enough to sustain a metropolitan area of two million persons. The Hudson Valley is asleep, the Mohawk Valley is dying. Buffalo has lost more than one-fifth of its population in the past 20 years. New York State is losing population. We have only two percent of the nation's housing starts. An executive in Manhattan would increase his real income by almost a quarter merely by moving to Austin, most of the difference being in reduced taxes. But such an executive, firm or industry might want to move away, because the decline of government services in New York City is making our area a less attractive place to live; and the rise of social disorganization is making it a positively dangerous place. Even loyalists like George Kennan are declaring the city "no longer fit for civilized living."

The crisis of social organization is the easiest to describe, but the hardest to analyse. And even though it is easy to describe, few in public life care to do so, because it is now so far advanced that merely to raise the problem is to suggest how little it is likely to respond to public policy. I call it Weaver's Paradox, from a memorandum Paul Weaver wrote in 1968 on New York City. The social fabric of New York, he wrote, is coming to pieces. "A large segment of the population is becoming incompetent and destructive. Growing parasitism, both legal and illegal, is the result; so, also, is violence."

This parasitism (I argued) is to be found at every level of society, and not least in the hoard of New Yorkers who live well looking after the poor. Feeding the sparrows by feeding the horses. But Weaver's point, and mine, is that no one senses the threat to freedom caused by this growing dependence.

Are we then witnessing the ultimate, destructive working out of . . . liberal thought? The viability of liberal thought rested on the ability of the country which adopted it to be largely self-regulating, self-maintaining, and self-improving. As long as the typical individual was formed and directed in socially useful ways by more or less autonomous operations of private subsystems of authority, a government

which permitted great freedom and engaged largely in the negative and peripheral activity of the umpire was possible. It was also possible for citizen and statesman to live with a rhetoric which denied the existence, functions, and basis of those private subsystems. The thoroughly liberal society, in short, cannot know what makes it work. Now, in parts of New York City, those subsystems are absolutely breaking down. At the same time, the rhetoric is getting an ever stronger and more blinding grip on "informed" opinion as well as on partisan opinion. The rhetoric leads to policies which actually hasten the dissolution of the subsystems.

I quoted Pigou: "Environments. . . as well as people have children." We therefore must expect our present situation to persist at least into the 21st century.

But this generational problem aside, the decline of the economy itself will increase dependency. Dependency of women and children probably will grow because of the shift in the job market away from male-defined jobs. Of 11.2 million new jobs created in this country over the past eight years, eight million were white collar, 2.5 million service and 1.5 million blue collar. The number of farm jobs actually declined. Of the eight million white collar jobs, 72 percent went to women. Women received 59 percent of new professional and technical jobs and 50 percent of new managerial and administrative jobs. Only among the blue-collar occupations—barely a tenth of the new jobs—did men get most of the new jobs.

The growth of government is beginning to divide the population. This is most readily seen in an upstate, rural county such as the one I have called home since the early Kennedy years, when the transformation began. The farmers there had been pretty much in the mud in those days, and pretty much still are. But a whole new class of public-sector employees has entered the scene, and it appears we are well on our way to becoming a society of public affluence and private squalor—until the crisis of government arrives and the future becomes more problematic.

That was my stump speech. Does it seem bearish? Despairing? Illiberal? It did not to my audiences. It seemed true. They told me so. I ran as a liberal willing to be critical of what liberals had done. If we did not do this, I contended, our liberalism would go soft, as Lionel Trilling warned a generation ago. I never yielded much on this. I even got close to belligerent when, in the primary debates, it was suggested that the budgetary crisis could be resolved by cutting \$30 billion from defense appropriations. (Presumably the savings would be turned over to New York.) It would be the final corruption of our tradition, I said, to tilt the balance of world power in favor of the totalitarians in order to continue to pay for the subsidies we had voted one another.

This sort of talk caused convulsions in some West

Side circles. But there was nothing illiberal about it except in the perspective of liberalism that has indeed gone soft. In the general election some perspective was restored when my opponent called for my defeat so that liberalism would never again show its "ugly head" in New York. Conservatives know.

I genuinely was concerned to identify the excessive moralizing of our politics, and to resist it. Everywhere I quoted Renata Adler: "Sanity. . . is the most profound moral option of our time."

I also tried to argue against the apocalyptic voices that have begun to be heard in circles once so overconfident. Murphy's law applies only in the short term, I said. I invited attention to the large complex of empty buildings on Wards Island in the East River that anyone using the Triborough Bridge will have seen, if not noticed. These were built in the 1950s to warehouse the mentally ill from Manhattan. At that time the rising resident population of New York State's mental hospitals—doubled in the previous quarter century, likely to quadruple in the next—was our most pressing social problem. But there seemed no answer except to build more hospitals, and then more, until half the state's population would be confined in them and the other half working in them. Then in 1955 Gov. Harriman authorized the large-scale use of the psychotropic drugs developed under Gov. Dewey. The next year and then every year for the rest of the decade the population of the mental hospitals went down. The new buildings never were occupied. What seemed at mid-century the most pressing crisis of state government—mental illness—today is nearly forgotten.

When there was time I went on a bit about what was at stake in sorting out our situation and becoming tough-minded about it. To begin with, our reputation is at stake. The reputation of New York, of an intelligent liberalism, Republican as much as Democratic. If it came to be judged in the nation that such politics lead to ruin, how will we be judged? Judgment apart, it is time we recognize, even if no one else will, what New York means. Trying to describe what Venice meant to the Mediterranean world of the 15th or 16th century, the French historian Fernand Braudel writes: "Venice dominated the 'Interior Sea' as New York dominates the western world today." And if New York should collapse. . . what then of the West? What then of the Constitution? Of all the features of the American federal system, one of the most important (I would say) is one not at all provided for, but which evolved directly from the constitutional preoccupation with the separation of power. This is the separation between New York and Washington. Hamilton and Jefferson struck the agreement over madeira on a tavern in Broad Street. The political capital would move to Washington. For all the other purposes the first city of the nation would be New York. Those other purposes have been well served by New York, and none more faithfully

than in preventing the behemothian amalgam of government, finance, business, industry and culture which the Founders most feared. It would not take much for Wall Street to move to Connecticut Avenue; for NBC and Time, Inc. to follow; for Broadway to give way to the Kennedy Center; for *The Washington Post* to become the national paper. In the long sequence of generations of New Yorkers, I would conclude (to audiences mostly first-generation like myself), the honor has fallen to us to defend the City against a collapse that would bring down so much else with it.

Program? Not much in the stump speech. I had drafted much of the urban portions of the Democratic platform and asked that my word be taken that it was all there. The one exception was welfare reform, which people genuinely wanted to hear about. (The fiscal condition of our cities has reached the point that if welfare meant a program to put arsenic in children's milk, most municipal officials would settle for full federal funding.) The platform called for "an income floor both for the working poor and the poor not in the labor market. It must treat stable and broken families equally. It must incorporate a simple schedule of work incentives. . . ." Jimmy Carter endorsed this plan in his campaign. In my own, I emphasized the urgency of a single national welfare standard. The disparity between our level of support and those of states in the sunbelt was becoming fatal to our enterprise.

Clearly, I said, it was past time we made a legitimate claim on the rest of the nation for our share of federal expenditures. Neal R. Peirce has estimated a \$10 billion "balance of payments" deficit between the mid-Atlantic states and the sunbelt. If we paid so little attention to

our own interests, could we complain that others paid less? It has been a century since a New York Democrat was last on the Senate Finance Committee, half a century since any New Yorker served there. In each instance the tenure was a single term.

Apart from the total amount of Federal aid, there is the question of the mix. New York gets soft money; "they" get hard money. We get twice our share of welfare but one-quarter our share of the Corps of Engineers civil construction budget. Social services for us, infrastructure for "them." Muskogee, Oklahoma is a seaport. The Erie Canal (now the Barge Canal) is about the size it was when it was dug by Irishmen and mules a century and a half ago. So also is the population of some of the counties along the way.

We do not need more government in America, I said. We do need more national standards which is something federalism can produce, and would be different from more government. We already have a huge amount of government, and the real task is making it work. We have no incentive systems, nor even serious measures of efficiency. Franklin D. Roosevelt, as governor, hit upon the idea of "public yardstick," in this case a State Power Authority as a means by which to keep the private utilities honest, a concept later incorporated in the TVA. It is time we had "private yardsticks" to keep public operations honest as well.

For the rest, I said, there was one central issue, which was jobs. Jobs. Jobs. Jobs. Not government jobs, not jobs to make government bigger, but rather jobs to make government, for us, once more solvent, and once more our own.

Or the Swampy Middle Ground

July in January?

by Michael Harrington

Jimmy Carter has a program which could make his the most progressive presidency of the 20th century. He outlined it at Madison Square Garden in New York on July 15, 1976, when he accepted the Democratic

nomination for the presidency.

I worked and voted for Mr. Carter without any illusions, and many of my suspicions have been more than confirmed by the transition. I am not talking only about the appalling appointment of Griffin Bell as Attorney General. Carter's main concern has been winning the support of what he himself has called that

Michael Harrington is the author of Socialism and The Other America.

To Begin Again...

The Inauguration of President Jimmy Carter and Vice-President Walter Mondale marks an opportunity to begin again the task of addressing the nation's pressing needs.

On this occasion, we in the American Federation of Teachers would like to call attention to the most pressing need of all: the expansion and renewal of our human resources through education.

Last summer, then-Senator Mondale told our members:

The investments that we as a nation make in the education of our children will determine profoundly the kind of country that we will have not just in the next decade but the next century as well. And for that reason we want a government that places the education of our children as the number one priority.

We couldn't agree more.

Now the rhetoric must become reality.



AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO
"Education for Democracy, Democracy in Education"

Albert Shanker
President

Robert G. Porter
Secretary-Treasurer

"political and economic elite who have shaped decisions and never had to account for mistakes," the members of the corporate establishment who "when unemployment prevails . . . never stand in line looking for a job." On New Years Day on CBS, a Wall Street financier said that the market had rallied in December when investors realized that Carter is really a conservative.

Of course, Carter is merely being realistic. Robert Lekachman stated the crucial truth some time ago: "If a government is resolved to operate through the mechanisms of private capitalism, that government should refrain from upsetting the delicate state of confidence of businessmen, large and small. On the business state of confidence depends the marginal efficiency of capital, the level of investment, the direction of change of national income and employment." In short, if a President is bent on accepting the limits of the system as it is, he should behave as Mr. Carter did between the election and the inauguration.

And yet, I permit myself to hope that Mr. Carter still might act upon the populist vision of his acceptance speech. It is not that I have "faith" in him—my theological tradition insists upon good works. Rather, there are other economic, social—and political—factors that ought to force the President to be as good as he said he was going to be. Unless he changes from the politics-as-usual of the transition, he cannot possibly fulfill his minimal campaign pledges, much less the soaring promises of Madison Square Garden. Time is running out on utopian pragmatism, that quintessential American creed which holds that a benign providence located the solution to all problems in the middle of the road. Acting on that mystical theory, Mr. Carter rushed to the center ground as he prepared to assume power. It has turned into a swamp. Unless he finds some new place to stand, he will be sunk before 1980.

In searching for new ground, Mr. Carter might read his own July speech. It is not adequate to the basic problems of these times. It still pays homage, for example, to the myth that there exists something called "free enterprise." Yet, it is so much better than anything that we have heard from Mr. Carter since election day—or from almost any major politician in recent years—that we should overcome delicacy and remember it on the occasion of his inaugural. Let us study it, not as a biblical text, but as a convenient framework in which to organize some thoughts and hopes about the next four years.

In July, Mr. Carter addressed himself to the low esteem in which Washington is held. The trust of the people, he said, depends on how fairly government deals with those who depend on it. And he then immediately added, in a celebrated phrase, that, "It's time for a complete overhaul of our income tax system. I feel it's a disgrace to the human race. All my life I've heard promises about tax reform, but it never quite happened. With your help, we are finally going to make

it happen, and you can depend on it!"

I hope we can. That is not simply because the Internal Revenue Code, which discriminates in favor of the unearned income of the rich and against the hard-earned income of the ordinary citizen, is a symbol of the double standard in Washington. More than that, I believe that serious tax reform, which would take billions in subsidies away from the affluent, is a precondition for fulfilling Carter's most important single promise: "I believe that anyone who is able to work ought to work, and have a chance to work," he told us in July. And he added, "Now any system of economics is bankrupt if it sees value or virtue in unemployment. We simply cannot check inflation by keeping people out of work."

The problem is, the man Carter appointed chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors believes in the doctrine that was so rightly scorned at Madison Square Garden. That is not to say that Charles Schultze is some kind of moral monster who sees "value or virtue" in the chronic idleness which is imposed on millions of Americans. He is a decent and civilized chap. It does mean that Schultze—and the "Brookings" tendency in American liberalism in general—has decided that it is unfortunate but necessary to tolerate levels of unemployment that would have been deemed impossibly high during the Kennedy-Johnson years. As the argument is developed by Schultze and others in a book which he co-edited, the structure of the American labor market makes Kennedy's goal of a three percent rate of unemployment—or even his four percent interim target—unattainable and undesirable.

As the unemployment rate comes down to around five-and-a-half percent, we are told, there is a tight labor market for adult males even though women and youth (and I would add, minorities) are in oversupply. So Schultze bases his calculations on an assumption of five percent unemployment—roughly two million more people out on the streets than John Kennedy would have accepted. The problem, as he and his colleagues see it, is that bringing the unemployment rate much below five-and-a-half percent will set off profound inflationary tendencies as business bids up the wages of those adult males and passes the cost on to the consumer.

I think this grim argument makes a lot of sense. What is wrong with it is not so much its depiction of trends as the policies it deduces from analyzing them. In effect, Schultze and company are saying that those women and youths (and minorities) will be our front line defense in the battle against inflation. Despite his sincerity and decent intent, the President's chief economic adviser wants to check inflation by keeping people out of work. Moreover Schultze has said that he sees practically no funds available for new social programs during the next five years. Presumably the public pathologies created by the new "normal" unemployment will have to cure themselves. That is to

say, they will be ignored.

This is where Mr. Carter's excellent remarks on tax reform come in. If the President would fulfill that promise, he could free money which could be used both to meet social needs and in the process to create new jobs. A well informed senator told me last spring that it would be child's play to cut \$11 billion in privileges out of the Internal Revenue Code, and I take that as a modest opening proposition. Exactly how should those savings be spent? By the time this article appears, Mr. Carter will have declared himself on his desired mix of tax cuts and direct job-generating programs. It is one of the positive gains of the election that there will be some kind of mix, that the component which Gerald Ford would have vetoed is now on the agenda.

We have it on the authority of the Congressional Budget Office that tax cuts are the least effective and most expensive way to create work. Public service employment is the fastest and cheapest way to proceed; accelerated public works projects are somewhere in the middle but still clearly superior to tax cuts. In addition, we know that permanent tax cuts can eat up "fiscal dividends" from prosperity even faster than the Department of Defense. So the savings that come from serious tax reform should be spent and not returned to taxpayers—in order to deal with social problems and unemployment in the most efficient possible manner.

One obvious candidate for such a major investment was mentioned by Mr. Carter in his July speech. He said, "It's time for a nationwide comprehensive health program for all of our people." We have known for some time that the health indices of the nation are falling in comparison to those of Europe, even while the percentage of GNP spent on health has been rising in the same comparison. An excellent recent article by Nancy Hicks in *The New York Times* cited expert evidence to show that the private medical health insurance system is as wasteful as Medicaid. As Dr. Milton Parks of the New York City Health Commission put it, "It is a mistake to think that the abuses in Medicaid are confined to the public sector. The only difference is that you can see what is going on in Medicaid because the infusion of public money opens the program up to scrutiny." That is an excellent argument for opening up the entire wasteful, inflationary system to public scrutiny, organization and funding.

There are two major bills which Mr. Carter could adopt as his own. Rep. Dellums' proposal is the most imaginative and far-reaching, and it is certainly a model of where we will have to come out even if its immediate political prospects are not good. The Kennedy-Corman bill has been worked over with great care, and there is national political support for it. For some reason, which does credit to his instincts and values though not his arithmetic, Schultze himself has said that national health could be an exception to his grim and seemingly inexorable calculus of no new government social

initiatives. Moreover, in pushing for national health, Mr. Carter could appear in the advantageous public posture of doing something drastic about inflation.

All of these things, however, clearly will require national economic and social planning. The platform on which Mr. Carter ran endorsed the Humphrey-Hawkins proposals in this area, although the candidate did not play up that fact during the election. One reason for Carter's reticence was that Schultze had convinced a large part of the liberal wing of the Democratic party that Humphrey-Hawkins was inflationary, meaning that full employment is inflationary. This is not surprising since Carter had been the last of the major candidates to make the obligatory *pro forma* endorsement of the Humphrey-Hawkins bill.

Since the election, the only comment on full employment issuing from the Carter camp came from Michael Blumenthal, who will be Secretary of the Treasury. He said that he could not endorse a scheme that was as specific as Humphrey-Hawkins. This description of the bill is hilarious, in view of its moderate and minimal character, but it is sad as an indication of attitudes within the new administration. The plain truth is this: unless there is a genuine commitment to full employment, there will not be a revitalization of the rotting cities of the Northeast and industrial Midwest, nor equal justice for minorities or women, nor any other major progressive achievement. If the corporate priorities that created the present crisis continue to guide government policy—if five percent unemployment is an acceptable ultimate goal, with just under seven percent an interim target—then there is no hope of either the prosperity or the political unity that are necessary ingredients for any serious changes in this society.

One more thing. Without full employment, there is also no possibility of doing even a modicum of justice toward the Third World. There are half a billion hungry people on this planet, and the gap between their desperation and our unhappy affluence probably will grow between now and the end of the century. We have a moral responsibility toward those human beings which is not absolved by the occasionally outrageous behavior of their leaders. Carter—and Andrew Young—should look at Wassily Leontief's magnificent report prepared for the UN, *The Future of the World Economy*. But they should understand that the United States cannot possibly act with the modest decency Leontief recommends if it is suffering from chronic unemployment.

"Will you see me when we get back to the city?" asks the young woman to her summer lover at the end of a vacation romance in the Catskills. Will you act in January as you said you would in July, Mr. Carter? It is not just a matter of keeping a promise. It has to do with becoming a great President. If you listen to your own words in Madison Square Garden, you just might become one.

Stanley Kauffmann on films

Acting President

To help celebrate a new President, let's look at an earlier one—who never really existed. Hollywood has done some biographical films about Presidents—Jackson, Lincoln, Johnson (Andrew), Wilson, FDR, JFK—but there have also been a considerable number with fictional presidential protagonists. I've just had another look at one of the latter, in honor of the inauguration, and found some surprises.

The Phantom President was made in 1932 and stars George M. Cohan. He was one of our last "folk theater" stars: a song-and-dance man, a composer of hit songs, an actor who wrote plays for himself to direct and star in, and he did all these things with complete reliance on reception by a kind of family from coast to coast. I saw Cohan in some of those plays he concocted for himself: *Pigeons and People*, *Dear Old Darling*, *Fulton of Oak Falls*, and a revival of *Seven Keys to Baldpate*. In 1933 he was in the premiere of O'Neill's *Ah, Wilderness!*, the first time he had appeared in another writer's play, but it was in his own shows that you saw him tailoring pieces of theatrical fabric to fit, so that his public could have him as it wanted him.

He hated films. He once said that, as between Hollywood and Atlanta, he'd take Leavenworth. He appeared in only two sound films. The second one, *Gambling*, was made in 1934 from an old play of his. I've never seen it, but if it's anything like his first talkie, it was arranged to let him give as much of a stage performance as possible.

The Phantom President opened in October 1932, a month before FDR was elected for the first time. The picture must have been planned no later than the beginning of that year, probably earlier. In December 1931 *Of Thee I Sing*, book by George S. Kaufman and Morrie Ryskind, songs by George and Ira Gershwin, had opened to smash success on Broadway, a satirical musical about a

man who gets elected President on a platform of Love. Possibly stimulated by this Broadway success, Paramount decided to make a comparable film. A script was written by Walter De Leon and Harlan Thompson from a novel by George F. Worts; Norman Taurog was assigned to direct; songs were written by (no less) Richard Rodgers and Lorenz Hart; and Cohan was signed—not necessarily in that order.

I loved it in 1932, which is why I dug it out recently. Today it seems slow, stagy and thin. But it's the story idea that is staggering now, particularly when we remember that it was made while Hoover was in the White House, the Great Depression was cold-panicking the US and the world, the Bonus Army had marched on Washington, and, so far as there was any real national hope, it was pinned on the forthcoming election of a new, as yet unknown President.

T. K. Blair (Cohan), a successful banker type, is selected by a group of politicians as the best presidential candidate for their party. The party is unnamed: all we know is that they want to get "that Stevenson bunch" (!) out of the White House. But Blair is a frigid sourpuss who apparently has never run for any kind of public office. Nobody can like him. When he tries to feed an apple to a horse, the horse runs away. The politicians give up on him. Blair is qualified for the presidency but a sure electoral loser.

Then the politicians accidentally come across a medicine-show spieler, Doc Varney, a song-and-dance man who is a dead ringer for Blair. Not surprising, since Doc is also played by Cohan. Doc is a charmer. The politicians get the idea of hiring Doc to campaign as Blair and win the election; then Blair can step in and run the country.

It happens, except that there's a switch at the end: Doc, without having planned it, stays on the job and takes office, to be guided by the politicians. Partly he's persuaded by a girl (Claudette Colbert, at her dryly enchanting best). She had turned down Blair's marriage proposal at the beginning but has been overwhelmed by "his" increased appeal, and when she learns about the impersonation, she won't let Doc go. (Cohan, who was 54 when he made the film, is credible both as lover and President.) The picture ends with Blair marooned up in some arctic waste, a fate he had plotted for Doc, and with Doc riding down Pennsylvania Avenue to his inauguration with his girl at his side.

Some incidental interesting points. One of the politicians is a woman, Sen. Thurston, who, though dressed in severe schoolmarm style, is there to pass on the candidate's sex appeal. Jimmy Durante, who plays Cohan's medicine-show sidekick, had already been in films for two years after long nightclub experience but had not yet mastered film-comedy timing. At the convention there is a delegation of blacks, in cutaways and cravats, and a delegation of Hawaiians, with guitars. The dance that Cohan does at the medicine show—in blackface, by the way—shows exactly where James Cagney got his style. Cagney was a very much better dancer, but Cohan's headshaking strut was clearly Cagney's model. (And, of course, Cagney later played Cohan in *Yankee Doodle Dandy*, which opened in May 1942, just six months before Cohan died. Both men, besides their common ethnic background, were neat and slim and small, though Cohan's manner, with his sidewise mouth, was much more oblique and insinuating than Cagney's frontal approach.)

But what's most fascinating is the film's gimmick, something we think of as a relatively recent idea: the Selling of the President. Before FDR became a national radio star and the century's best presidential performer, before TV, before Nixon's grubby jowls could be said to have cost him votes, before hardsell, one-minute campaign spots, a film studio felt sure enough of public belief in election-as-show-biz to make a picture on that subject. And in the leading role they cast a man whose vaudeville flag-waving was one of his trademarks; thus they underscored the idea of patriotism, however sincere, as "performable." Rodgers and Hart even gave Cohan a song for the picture called "Maybe Someone Ought to Wave the Flag." And the whole film is conceived as a "show." The opening is a number in which a group/chorus visit the Capitol and the portraits of four Presidents sing a quartet; through the picture there are musical patter numbers.

Flimsy though the film is, it makes—or reveals—one strong point. The two men, played by the same actor, *together* make the ideal President. If the script could have done it believably, the perfect ending would have been for both men to live in the White House, one for political competence, the other for public appearances. A further astonishment about this picture is that it virtually predicts the President we got later that year, the one President of the century

who comes closest to the Cohan ideal. FDR, as everyone knows, had neither a towering intellect nor a flawless character, but in practical terms he came close to perfection: he was seriously committed to great concerns, and he knew how to take the stage. When he broadcast or appeared in a newsreel, we relaxed—the way we relax with Cohan. FDR's ability as a performer rested on our confidence in his presidential actions, but his performing helped us even when his ideas didn't.

No President since FDR has filled the Cohan double role. Truman, though current retrospection suggests otherwise, rattled around in public; I once attended a press conference of his, and it confirmed my impression that his public pepper was an attempt to cover up his nervousness. Eisenhower's dignified wartime persona was soon obscured by peacetime stupidity. Kennedy had sex appeal and charisma but, in his brief tenure, not nearly the political power and accomplishment to make us feel, when he was "on," that we were seeing a giant at play. The other Presidents since FDR aren't even discussable under this aspect.

But now we're getting a President who has a chance—at least a chance—to be the first real star since FDR. He has a valid, time-tested theatrical style: underplaying. (There's an old theater story about the dynamic star who is furious at one of his supporting actors: "That so-and-so keeps coming *under* me.") Remember the first line of Carter's acceptance speech at the Democratic convention, remember the tone of the whole speech: "After the hullabaloo, here's little quiet ole me." If Carter has only some of the executive success that all of us wish him, then his underplaying style will be substantiated—to make him a star.

It's what we've always wanted: the two Cohans, the competent statesman and the personality kid. The campaign managers know it: it wasn't accidental that no serious issues were discussed seriously in the last election, that appearances and debates were used chiefly as a means to display personality. The more appealing personality won; now for the details of government. *The Phantom President* foresaw more than it knew.

Postscript. Five years later, in 1937, Cohan played—appropriately—FDR in a Broadway musical called *I'd Rather Be Right*, book by George S. Kaufman and Moss Hart, songs by (again) Rodgers and Hart. But that's another story.



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Books Considered

A Scientist In the White House by George Kistiakowsky

(Harvard Univ. Press; \$15)

I hope that President-elect Carter received George Kistiakowsky's new book in his Christmas stocking. It could provide him with a superb short course in the complex issues involving technology in government—especially military technology—that are waiting to confront him. With a new administration, there is always the possibility of a reordering of national priorities, and the effort of the various governmental constituencies—Defense, Health, Education and Welfare, especially—to improve their lot in the process, is in full swing. The voices are more strident this year than in recent transitions, perhaps because pressure groups, governmental and private, are more articulate about their concerns, or perhaps because Carter and his group are viewed as “innocents” who need sound advice and are susceptible to persuasion.

To President-elect Carter's great credit, the issues of Soviet military gains, once again being raised so vociferously, did not dominate the campaign. As the challenger, he could have exploited the issues to his benefit; perhaps he gave up an opportunity. Once in office, though, Carter will be thankful he was so restrained. Those urging expensive programs upon him won't be able to quote him as the authority for their requests. Beyond that, he has avoided the danger of having to eat his words when he really gets to know the facts, an embarrassment President Kennedy had to accept when he discovered there was no “missile gap.”

Kistiakowsky's book illustrates vividly the vital role that the Special Assistant for Science and Technology and the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) played in helping President Eisenhower sort out the many conflicting proposals that constantly bombarded him, proposals which involved scientific or technological problems, directly or implicitly, in both domestic and international areas.

The American President ordinarily has three full-time jobs. He heads the Executive Branch of the government, he

is the Chief of State, required to spend a considerable fraction of his time on ceremonial functions, and he is the leader of his political party. It is inevitable that much of the ongoing business of government that requires White House attention is reviewed, organized and digested for the President by his staff members who, as Kistiakowsky shows, become central figures in most decisions. The science advisory mechanism was just one of a group of Executive Office institutional arrangements that assisted the President in his work. Among the other groups that had important roles during Kistiakowsky's term were the Bureau of the Budget (now the Office of Management and Budget), the Council of Economic Advisers and the National Security Council.

The siege mentality that White House inhabitants, President and staff, inevitably acquire enhances the President's dependence upon the staff. It becomes “us” versus the “outside world,” for practically everyone wants something from the President. Within the government, the typical official is always fighting for what seems to him essential resources for his agency.

The reader of Kistiakowsky's book will be shown that most major governmental policy decisions, particularly in the defense field, are put off until budget time, when they can be deferred no longer, and then made hastily in the context of needed budget decisions. At those moments, it's a rare cabinet officer who appears to be on the President's side, and the intensity of the budget process exaggerates the sense of siege among the President's men.

This book might also serve to alert our new President and his aides to the nearly unimaginable intrigue that seems invariably to develop in support of contending positions. I doubt that anything in President-elect Carter's experience as governor or as contender for the presidency has prepared him for the seat in the eye of the particular hurricane that he is about to occupy.

The issues that were the basis for the many bitter, confusing and recurring struggles recorded in the diary remain major issues for today. In preserving and presenting the notes he kept of his one and one-half year term as Special Assistant for Science and Technology to President Eisenhower—from mid-1959

to the end of the Eisenhower period—Kistiakowsky has thus provided a document which has an importance beyond the detailed and graphic view of the role of the Science Advisor.

This book suffers from an overemphasis on personalities, process and conflict. Kistiakowsky's descriptions of meetings and intrigue as well as his characterizations of individuals are fascinating, but I regret that the author did not provide greater substantive detail on many of the issues recorded, such as the U-2 incident. Perhaps this balance was forced by the sensitive nature of the technical information involved but, considering Kistiakowsky's knowledge, it represents a great loss.

A diary carries with it no obligation for reflection or integration but the reader will often be left wondering why there were such wide differences concerning technical-military issues. More detail would have helped in this regard. The introduction by Charles S. Maier does provide an otherwise missing context for the book by reviewing the development of the science advisory system and some of the major technical and political issues that led to its creation.

The establishment of the science advisory mechanism provided President Eisenhower with a group of technical experts whose primary allegiance was to him, a fact that he greatly appreciated and frequently mentioned. It kept the rest of the government from overpowering the President with unintelligible and sometimes misleading data, and thus allowed him to identify and rectify activities in trouble and to avoid marginal or worthless projects. Among President Nixon's many destructive acts was the abolition of the position of Science Advisor and the Science Advisory Committee so that the President is once again without an independent source of technical-military advice. The situation is back to where it was in the mid-1950s and one must at least wonder if the heightened concern about relative Soviet military strength doesn't arise because the President has lost his independent source of technical information. Without an independent review there is also the danger that a large share of the public and even the Congress, grown accustomed to exaggerated estimates of Soviet and Chinese military accomplishments, will refuse to believe disclosures of information about what could be real shifts in military power.

The Science Advisor and the Science

Advisory Committee were feared and resented by some elements of the military establishment because of their efforts to screen out marginal projects (B-70, Nike Zeus, nuclear powered aircraft, etc.). The fact that they often supported military programs, and sometimes even helped solve their serious technical problems, was overlooked in this reaction. Because of its role in their support of the President's disarmament efforts, the White House science group came to be regarded as anti-defense, an attitude that can be detected in some of the disagreements Kistiakowsky reports. This attitude grew stronger during my years as Science Advisor, primarily because we succeeded in abolishing many of those marginal weapons projects and because of the continuing battle we waged on behalf of President Kennedy to limit nuclear testing.

The new President and the public alike should pay particular attention to the difficulty and opposition President Eisenhower encountered in his determined campaign to check the arms race and to substitute what he considered to be safe arms control agreements. This story should not only help Carter understand the complex and vital problems he will face in this area—B-1 bomber, new strategic strategy, changes in arms limitation policy, high accuracy missiles, tactical nuclear weapons, etc.—but also provide the public with a background that will make more intelligible the national security debates that are certain to take place in the months and years ahead.

Furthermore, many of the other major dilemmas that will confront the Carter administration—chemicals in the environment, health care and civilian technology, to cite a few—were just emerging as national problems during the period covered by this diary. It is both instructive and reassuring to observe how fast the national awareness of these problems has developed. Contrary to general belief, the United States has made enormous strides in learning to manage many of these vital matters. The Thanksgiving "cranberry ban," which caused Kistiakowsky so much anguish, was only a precursor of things to come; it did not immediately provoke the government to mobilize a general effort to bring the chemical poisoning of the earth under control. That had to await Rachel Carson's call and congressional action. The agricultural chemicals issue shows that predictable constituency and agency alignments can

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
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develop over civilian as well as defense matters.

I have been criticized sometimes for turning the advisory mechanism too much toward societal problems and away from the single-minded national security orientation of Killian and Kistiakowsky. The fact was that there was no choice because the so-called civilian technology problems relating to health, the environment, energy and the economy came on President Kennedy fast and heavy, and he asked for help. In retrospect it seems clear we should have done even more on many of these areas, though from the vantage point of the early 1960s that was not so obvious.

Nonetheless, the most important contributions of the Science Advisors and PSAC to the national welfare was in the security field, in helping to bring order to the three-faceted military evolution impelled by the transitions from high explosives to nuclear weapons, from aircraft to intercontinental missiles, and from human control to computers, as well as in assisting Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy in

their efforts to achieve a limit to nuclear weapons testing and other aspects of the international arms competition. Even Eisenhower with his great military experience was frustrated by the governmental power arrayed against him until he appointed Dr. James R. Killian as the first presidential Science Advisor and tapped the willing talents of the scientific and engineering communities in his behalf.

Dr. Killian was appointed in 1957 after Sputnik and the first Soviet ICBM tests convinced the nation that it had allowed a serious technical-military inferiority to develop *vis-à-vis* the USSR. The engineers and scientists, myself included, that Killian recruited were primarily military-technical experts and their initial energies were spent clarifying and accelerating existing military and space programs and the supporting research and educational activities. Only after he was satisfied that these tasks were going well did President Eisenhower ask the group for assistance on the technical aspects of his arms limitation efforts.

I recall vividly President Eisenhower's plea in the later 1950s for help from the President's Science Advisory Committee with "my efforts to halt this mad thing [arms race]—you can't have that war—there aren't enough bulldozers to clean the bodies off the streets if it happens—why don't you help me try to stop it instead of working on weapons like the rest of them? No one in the government will help me. Neither the AEC or the DOD will help me, they just want more. . . ." With this challenge, members of the PSAC began to study arms limitation issues—the test ban, comprehensive arms agreements, monitoring systems, etc. By the time Kistiakowsky replaced Killian as Special Assistant for Science and Technology, the PSAC members, through their panels, were providing the President with a good measure of the support he wanted.

PSAC panels developed technical expertise to support the President's efforts to bring about a nuclear test ban and to achieve limitations on strategic and conventional weapons systems. The PSAC efforts gave the government, for the first time, an objective group of "experts" in the arms control field and disarmament agency, which was established by President Kennedy but whose origins are visible in the Kistiakowsky book.

The Science Advisor, aided by the President's Science Advisory Com-

mittee studies, assisted the President in making decisions regarding the acquisition of new weapons systems. In this role the Science Advisor—as the Kistiakowsky diary makes clear—frequently found himself less than enthusiastic about new weapons systems that had powerful supporters in the DOD, Congress and industry. PSAC studies, for example, concluded that two expensive and favorite new weapons systems of the defense establishment, the Nike Zeus anti-ballistic missile system and the B-70 bomber, were technically unsound and therefore very poor investments. Because of the special nature of the relationship between the President and his Science Advisor, wherein the views and goals of the President took precedence over any biases of the advisor, the impression was created among persons in the Defense Department that PSAC members, advisor and all, were congenital opponents of efforts to maintain an adequate national defense. While the broadened perspective of the White House perhaps made PSAC members conscious of the futility of the open-ended arms race and the fiscal impossibility of responding to all of DOD's demands, they certainly did not regard themselves as opponents of an adequate national security effort.

Many of the villains of the Kistiakowsky drama, specifically Edward Teller and his associates, continued to influence policy in a major way in the Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and Ford administrations, particularly in the latter two. The present sorry state of the efforts President Eisenhower initiated to moderate the Cold War and to check the arms race can be attributed, at least in part, to their efforts and those of like-minded people in the Congress. The partial test ban agreement in 1963 could have been a comprehensive ban if the President had not been convinced by his "friends" in the Senate that they could prevent the ratification of a comprehensive treaty. The AEC and DOD personnel played a major role in the fight against a comprehensive test ban as well as many other arms limitation measures. The anti-White House factions, described by Kistiakowsky, continued to be active during my term. During the Nixon period, they began to have a dominant voice within White House circles because of Nixon's long-time associations with members of the group. When Nixon abolished the President's Science Advisory Committee and the post of President's Special Assistant for Science and

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
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— Jerry Wurf, President
American Federation of State,
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American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, 1625 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 Jerry Wurf, President William Lucy, Secretary-Treasurer.

Technology, he was eliminating the one well informed check upon the defense establishment that existed.

Though several committees of Congress have, in recent years, made substantial efforts to evaluate DOD weapons systems proposals, they have not had adequate technical support. With the elimination of the White House advisory system, the President and the nation were once again totally dependent upon the DOD for information upon which to base defense policy decisions. This situation was further reinforced during the Ford administration. In fact, in supporting the establishment of the new Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) President Ford expressed the view that it should serve primarily in nonmilitary areas.

A Scientist in the White House will get a varied reception. Many of the actors whose performances are dissected with clinical and brutal frankness will no doubt object to this exposure of what were presumed to be private and privileged discussions. (If it is any comfort, those of us privileged to share Kistiakowsky's confidence during the period covered by his diary know that in editing he has considerably muted the original entries.) Some will regard his interpretations of their views and objectives as distorted. Indeed, I have different recollections of some of our discussions; for example, the conversations that occurred when I began to work with Jack Kennedy before the 1960 campaign. But then, I don't have a diary entry recording the exact words. I doubt too, that Killian and Edwin Land ever vied for position in the manner Kistiakowsky describes to make a presentation to President Eisenhower. It's not the style of either of them. They were and are extremely close friends and they both had previously made many presentations to the President. Clearly, Kistiakowsky misread some playful interchange between the two, communicated in their personal language. In general, though, those events that I experienced firsthand are presented accurately and concisely. Kistiakowsky has provided the best and most complete insight yet available into the process of injecting scientific advice into the highest levels of government.

I hope that this book will be read widely for the insight it provides into recent history, for the unique picture it provides of the complexity of governing a technology-based democracy, and most of all for the guidance it might provide for the nation's future efforts to

assure itself the continued development and wisest use of science and technology.

Jerome B. Wiesner

Jerome B. Wiesner, Science Advisor to John F. Kennedy, is president of MIT.

Winners and Losers by Gloria Emerson

(Random House; \$10.95)

Ever since she got back from Vietnam, where she covered the war for *The New York Times*, Gloria Emerson has been a soul in torment. Flitting around the country like an accusing wraith, she calls on everyone to repent the American involvement, scolds all who would try to forget the disaster, pours scorn on those who contend that our intervention was less a moral crime than the thunderously stupid military blunder of throwing half a million ground troops into an unwinnable war.

To determine Vietnam's impact on Americans, Miss Emerson spent three years interviewing people in 24 states. She talked to Hawks, Doves, Moms, Dads, Widows, blinded veterans, Ex-POWs, amputees, paraplegics, draft dodgers, deserters, demonstrators, patriots and politicians. She visited small towns, campuses, women's clubs, parlors of the bereaved, suburban cocktail parties, veterans' reunions. She even penetrated the Naval War College.

She was disgusted with what she found: hardly any impact at all, she says. Most of the people she confronted seemed shamelessly compacent, displaying no bitterness or self-loathing.

Lillian Hellman had told her: "We have no national memory. Maybe it's a good thing. Maybe it's a mark of a young and vigorous people." Gloria wouldn't believe it. It was incredible to her that Americans could so soon forget the photos of Vietnamese children charred by napalm; the TV shots of Vietnamese soldiers clinging to the skids of helicopters during the rout, then losing their grip and plunging down into the jungle; the final ghastly scene of the Saigon mob banging on the gates of the Embassy, pleading with Marines for a chance to

escape with the American ambassador and his dog.

Emerson's report, *Winners and Losers*, is hailed by Random House as "a classic anti-war book to rank with *All Quiet on the Western Front*—a powerful, eloquent, riveting statement about what war does to human lives." The book falls short of that. It might have been riveting if the author had relied less on the testimony of others and told us more about her own bouts with fear, misery and boredom. She saw with her own eyes as much action as some of the soldiers she quotes. She had guts. She ran her share of risks.

One risk was downright stupid: she got herself involved with student radicals in Saigon. They took her on a mission to fire-bomb American soldiers on a downtown street. Fortunately for Gloria the mission was abortive.

Emerson dismisses this odd caper in seven paragraphs. Her motive, she says, was to get a story. But surely she must have considered the grave consequences to herself had the American and South Vietnamese authorities learned of her involvement in the incident. We can only guess what was going on in her mind. This would seem an appropriate time for Emerson to analyze the war's impact on herself. Instead, she tries to put the whole nation on the couch.

In her travels across this country she meets heavy resistance. At the first mention of Vietnam people clam up or talk in clichés. Nobody ventures a riveting statement. People are sick and tired of Vietnam. Emerson is angered by their apathy. After one particularly frustrating interview with a Michigan veteran who thought the war good for the economy—"there are more jobs 'cause more guys didn't come back"—Gloria is despondent. She confides:

"This is how it so often went for me: people could not talk for long about Vietnam any more than they could talk about the weather and the reasons for it. Asking them how they felt about the war, I have heard stories about termites, the evils of welfare, diets that did not work, poor bus service, abortion, the horrible costs of feeding cattle and teenagers, busing, crime, useless back operations, whether hair dyes cause cancer, how hard it is to pick tobacco by hand, the danger of eating certain fish, crime, the trouble with a car called Capri, busing, why Coca-Cola costs more than beer, ugly marriages, crime, and even how liquid vitamin E and butter can be rubbed on the arm of an addict to get rid of needle tracks.

Sometimes I do not sleep well at all, wondering what it is that I am finding out and why some people insisted that after Vietnam nothing would ever be the same again."

In Illinois she found a buck sergeant called Cyclops, notable chiefly because he had sent his mother the skull of a Vietnamese for Christmas. Gloria urged Cyclops to bury the skull in the backyard, but Cyclops wouldn't listen. You had to stop Communists somewhere, Cyclops said. So he kept the skull by his bed, with a decal reading "The Grateful Dead" pasted on the forehead.

Emerson analyzed Cyclops' complaint: he hadn't arrived at a distinct or coherent point of view. "Vietnam was something that happened to him, it was not happening any more, he did not want to keep going over it. What he could not say, but what he felt, was there was nothing clear or sensible to say about the war. It was too weird, too strange, it did not neatly fit into an explanation."

Not every American Gloria encountered was as primitive as Cyclops. Albert Lee Reynolds, an Oklahoman who had been a civilian engineer in Vietnam, proved sensitive and intelligent although a bit preachy. Mr. Reynolds was very antiwar and was making speeches against it. Striking just the right note for Gloria, Mr. Reynolds said: "America should be doing penitence. She won't, of course, with her arrogance and her ignorance and her Cadillacs and Bombers, but America should be crawling over those rough stones on her Red, White and Blue knees to do penance. We have abused and maimed and slaughtered our young."

Back in Manhattan, Gloria ran into an old boyfriend. He had once worked for the CIA, and Gloria taxed him for not wallowing in guilt. He had been in Vietnam in the mid-1950s helping Col. Ed Lansdale, the superspook who maneuvered Ngo Dinh Diem into power. Gloria's friend would admit to nothing more sinister than trying to teach Vietnamese soldiers how to be nice to peasants and win their hearts and minds. Gloria seemed to want a major war crimes confession; her friend said he was sorry only that the program failed. She kept nattering about guilt until the poor fellow fled first to his couch, then to the TV where he tuned in the Monday night football game, hoping Emerson would be exorcised by Howard Cosell.

One shouldn't mock Emerson. Her summons to nationwide repentance,

however unrealistic, is urgent and tremulously sincere. She wants everybody down on his knees right now, before there is another war. Don't be lulled, she says, by Jimmy Carter's reassurances that the masses of Americans were blameless of Vietnam, that they were simply misled by leaders who accelerated and prolonged the war. The war wouldn't have gone on for 14 years without wide support, she argues.

Emerson goes to a seminar at the Naval War College, Newport, RI, where she laments "a lack of truthfulness and honor among the career military in Vietnam, of a tendency in them to cheat." She cites the case of a brigadier general who was awarded a Silver Star on the basis of a phony citation for valor, calling it an example of "how the nation's most esteemed medals are handed out like salted peanuts to field-grade officers."

Reading her plea for candor, we are assailed again by the image of Emerson and the fire-bomb students who wanted to kill Americans. The students were not Communists, she says, but that's not important. What matters is that she knew they were out to burn American

military vehicles and the American soldiers driving them. Could she then claim to be an innocent bystander? Seeing her there with her notebook, wouldn't the students attack more vigorously, if only to prove their manhood? It could be argued that her mere presence was incendiary.

Here's her account: "I went out with a team of four Vietnamese on a fire-bombing mission to write a story. The students went on two motorcycles to a busy downtown street where Americans often drove by in jeeps. We waited nearly twenty minutes. I remember praying that no American would pass by us, warning myself over and over again to stay out of it and not to interfere, not to remember the crusts and the smell of burned men I had already seen in hospitals. The plan was for one Vietnamese to run in front of the vehicle, waving his arms, so the driver would stop. Then another student would hurl the plastic bag of gas inside the vehicle. The third Vietnamese would toss in the lit matches. After fifteen minutes, perhaps longer, an American Army half-truck was spotted. As it came closer, you could see the faces of the GI,

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who must have been whistling. He looked sleepy. This was that second when I could have screamed, yelled, rushed forward to warn him, given the plan away. But the sixteen-year-old student moved too fast for me. He threw, but he aimed badly and the plastic bag of gas hit the windshield. The GI veered, shouted 'you fucking idiot,' and drove away from us so fast that people on the street knew something had happened. 'Bad shot' said the law student who held the matches. The four Vietnamese were not pleased with their failure. They needed more practice, the sixteen-year-old said. It must have been a few seconds before my legs would work again, before I had a voice that sounded like my own."

There is a question of ethics involved here. In the muddle and confusion of an undeclared war, just how far should an American correspondent go in his search for truth? Obviously a lot depends on his ability to get full and honest information from his own country's enormous public relations mills. In Vietnam the information put out by American military and civilian agencies was usually too optimistic, often misleading and sometimes totally false. This made reporters all the more eager for information from the other side. A few correspondents, led by Harrison Salisbury, were lucky enough to be invited to Hanoi for a chance to see for themselves the results of the American bombing of North Vietnam. Their dispatches were a necessary corrective to the claims put out by Washington. There was no public outcry against these correspondents; on the contrary they were widely commended.

Somewhere a line must be drawn. It would seem that an American reporter's willing attendance on a raid programmed to kill other Americans would be grounds for banishment from the war zone. No army could tolerate it. Emerson's involvement compromised any trust the American command had reposed in her.

Well, she won't do it again; it's her first war and she was overwrought. We will send her to the chaplain and pass on to the merits of her book.

Emerson writes very effectively of the agony of the Vietnamese peasants battered and uprooted by the war. To most correspondents these people were nothing more than shadows on the landscape; Gloria brings them to life. She draws disturbing pictures of the South Vietnamese army in defeat. She witnessed the insane confusion at Lam

San during the collapse of the South Vietnamese drive into Laos. She tells how the wounded on their stretchers lay so close to the landing pad that the prop wash of the helicopters belted them with dirt and blew away their bandages "like stained and tangled streamers."

Hating all officers, she was especially disgusted at finding several medical officers in a big tent asleep or drinking Scotch while the desperately ill lay unattended outside awaiting evacuation.

A final note of irritation. Emerson writes with unqualified sympathy of the handful of Americans who, while in North Vietnam prison camps, made tapes and wrote statements reviling American imperialists in return for special treatment. She spent three days talking to Andrew Young, who said he had wept in his prison cell when he heard of the death of Ho Chi Minh, who insisted that Americans were the most brutal people in the world and who was grateful to the prison commandant who has so kindly corrected his grammar so the antiwar statements would read better. Another ex-POW, knowing she had talked to Young, phoned Gloria to suggest she interview other returned prisoners who were also against the war but had refused to denounce their country. Gloria declined. She wasn't buying any crap about honor, discipline, the flag and Mom's blueberry pie. And she didn't need the full picture.

Emerson is so depressed by the unawareness of guilt and the shortage of shame that she fails to notice a few small improvements. We didn't intervene in Portugal. We stayed out of Lebanon. We didn't rush troops to Angola even when Castro shipped 10,000 Cubans there. Marines haven't landed in Panama, as of this hour. And our new President has promised to grant amnesty to the draft evaders. Hawk voices are muted, except for Barry Goldwater's.

Let us rejoice also over the demise of some dreary slogans associated with the Vietnam conflict. For the next imbroglio a whole new set of incantations are needed. Our leaders no longer can tell us to get out there and fight to keep the dominoes from falling. Nobody will profess to see the light at the end of the tunnel. There will be no more crusades to win the hearts and minds of people and save them from aggression. One term—"waste"—is not easily shelved. GIs in Vietnam used it as a synonym for kill. When a man was killed he was wasted. A chillingly appropriate term

for the 46,229 Americans who fell in action in the Indochina War.

Homer Bigart

Homer Bigart, former foreign correspondent for *The New York Times*, has won two Pulitzer Prizes for journalism.

The Man Who Lost China by Brian Crozier (with the collaboration of Eric Chou)

Scribner's; \$12.95)

Among the smaller legacies Jimmy Carter will soon discover as he explores the debris of the Oval Office is something called the "GRC," also known as the Government of the Republic of China. It was bequeathed to him as a problem not only by Presidents Nixon and Ford, but more centrally by a man who died in April 1975, while South Vietnam was collapsing, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

Chiang was 87 when he died; and for nearly 48 of those years he had held predominant power in Nationalist China—22 on the mainland, 26 in "temporary" exile on the island of Taiwan. Political longevity made him remarkable. So did his influence, for years, on American foreign policy and domestic politics. So, now, does his legacy: the thorny Taiwan issue that still prevents normal diplomatic relations between the US and the real China.

Such a man deserves a non-hagiographic biography. And the effort by Brian Crozier, a veteran British journalist, looks promising at the outset—especially with that teasing title, *The Man Who Lost China*. How many careers have been ruined, even lives snuffed out, thanks to that nastiest of charges, in more than one country!

Losing China, you see, was no mean feat—not some needle in a haystack, but instead a great big country, with more people than anyone can ever count. So to be accused in Russia of losing China, as many were under Stalin in the '30s, resulted in execution or long imprisonment. The same accusation in the US, after Mao Tse-tung's victory, produced

the maiming or banishment of our finest China expertise both inside and outside government.

So to suggest, as Crozier's title does, that perhaps a *Chinese* lost China is at least a small step forward. But the lingo is still misleading for a fundamental reason: to "lose" a nation, you really must have *had* it in the first place. And neither foreign advisers—whether Soviet or American—nor Chinese Nationalists, nor Chiang Kai-shek, ever "had" China sufficiently to lose it.

That, indeed, is one perhaps inadvertent message of this tedious and muddled book. As the author jogs uncertainly through the dark alleys of Chinese political and military history in the first half of this century, he does tell us of the severe external limitations on Chiang's power: untamed warlords, Kuomintang factions, Western privileges, Japanese invaders and Communist rebels—to name only a few. Indeed, at its high point of control in the promising Nanking years (ca. 1936) Chiang's government actually held direct sway only in the lower Yangtze River valley—about five of 22 provinces; the rest (excluding Manchuria) were governed through highly unstable alliances.

The book presents other difficulties. One has learned—notably from Barbara Tuchman on Stilwell—that biography can provide the foreground for a rich tapestry of historical narrative. But Crozier and his collaborator have reversed the process. They have written a chaotic, slipshod history of the (also chaotic) post-1911 Chinese revolution, and after 1927 a history of its Kuomintang wing—with a mysterious one-dimensional figure named Chiang Kai-shek coming on and off stage to provide some slight continuity. In the first sentence of his first chapter Crozier terms Chiang "inscrutable." He might as well have stopped there, for after 399 pages our insight into the man is still not much greater.

I should add that as someone who has tried to fathom Chiang, I sympathize with the problem. A rigid ascetic in the midst of rampant corruption; a Confucian convert to Methodism who apparently practiced both; an admirer simultaneously of European fascism and the YMCA's social gospel; a man who seemed to trust no one except, occasionally, members of his family; a non-charismatic orator and nonreflective writer; a military mind addicted to medieval tactics. How to penetrate or capture such a person—particularly, as

in Crozier's case, when Chiang's language and culture are totally alien?

The author's solution is to rely heavily on one Eric Chou, a Chinese journalist who lived through the Kuomintang era. Chou flits in and out of the narrative as the authority for far too many assertions and remembered quotations ("according to Eric Chou," "according to Eric Chou's sources," etc.). Otherwise Crozier simply borrows sizeable gobbets, here and there, now and then, from several other writers on 20th-century China.


His borrowings seem quite random but reflect spotty judgment. For instance, he attributes to Edgar Snow, yet again, the description of the Yen'an Communists as simply "agrarian reformers." The term actually originated with the British leftist-turned-rightist Freda Utey. And Snow himself never lost his original clear perception of them as dedicated Marxist-Leninists (as Kenneth Shewmaker has so carefully shown).

Crozier's greatest lapses seem to relate to Chiang's greatest problem: American policy in China. On this subject he has rehashed the stale, discredited charges against the US Foreign Service officers who became the McCarthy-McCarran victims in the early 1950s—those Americans then accused of "losing China." He has apparently not read the State Department's slowly released special volumes on China, 1941-49, nor the dispatches of the officers themselves—all of which tend to document and exonerate their judgment at the time: that the Communists would certainly win unless we jarred the KMT into reform; and that we should assist the Communists, *in our long-term national interest*, in order both to pressure the KMT and to keep our hand in the game if indeed the Communists should prevail.

Crozier's view of Chiang is so confused, so ambivalent, so wildly self-contradictory, as to suggest that two authors of totally opposing viewpoints were writing under the same name. Half the time Chiang's flaws and errors make him patently incompetent for the job of running China. The rest of the time he is a hero of very grand proportions—but betrayed by Communist agents, fellow travelers, bad luck and FDR. As a result, both the book's title and the book's subject remain, at the end, an enigma. Also, I am sorry to say, the book's purpose.

Crozier's effort aside, Chiang's legacy to President Carter is nonetheless important and vexing: an alternative claimant to the Peking throne (now actually Chiang's son, Ching-kuo) ruling a Chinese province and US protectorate, the island of Taiwan. Thirty-five years after Pearl Harbor thrust us into alliance with the KMT, the Generalissimo's shrewd maneuverings have kept us ensnared in the unfinished Chinese civil war—still recognizing the GRC as "China," unable to further our 1972 rapprochement with Peking's real China.

Is there any way out of this web of history? There may well be—if Carter's people have the brains and ingenuity. The formula is relatively simple, though



admittedly unorthodox. The new administration should work gradually toward the derecognition of Taiwan and the recognition of Peking; and since derecognition will terminate our defense treaty with the Nationalists, we should substitute for that treaty a unilateral declaration of our intent to prevent the use of force in the Taiwan Straits region. The upshot would ideally be what is called the "Japanese solution," plus a tacit commitment to Taiwan's defense.

Whether this process takes six months or four years will depend on a number of variables—including the views of policymakers in Tokyo, Peking and Taipei, for all three parties should be consulted by Washington throughout the negotiations. But the solution remains feasible.

And what of the longer future for Chiang's island legacy—where aging refugee Chinese still yearn for return, while native Taiwanese chafe against KMT rule but also increasingly prosper? Virtually all Chinese—seared by a century of foreign attempts at China's dismemberment—believe that there can be but one "China." Yet millions of Chinese live outside that one China—in Hong Kong, Macao, Singapore, Southeast Asia and elsewhere, as well as on Taiwan. And since Chinese ingenuity—and indeed, self-interest—has found ways to accommodate to the existence of those other peninsular and overseas populations, there is no reason to believe that accommodation between Taiwan and the mainland cannot eventually be achieved on the basis of "mutual benefit."

The Hong Kong formula—the essence of mutual benefit—is one persuasive model. Its key, of course, is commerce: trade and investment. All that that requires, in the case of Taiwan, is time, dialogue and peace. Mr. Carter's people have a rare real chance to supply all three ingredients.

James Thomson

James Thomson, Nieman Foundation curator, teaches Asian Studies at Harvard and wrote *While China Faced West* (Harvard).

Coming

Malcolm Cowley on
Faulkner's Letters

Arrivals and Departures A Journalist's Memoirs by Richard H. Rovere

(Macmillan; \$10.95)

It is no accident that we have come more and more to depend on the occasional observers of Washington, those who write no more often than every week, every fortnight or every month for our genuine insights.

Only the John Osbornes, the TRBs, the Elizabeth Drews, the Richard Rovers have the time for reflection, which enables their intellect, reporting skills, experience and intuition to cut through the fog and nonsense and tell us sensibly what it's all about.

Nor is it, I think, any accident that we are dealing here not with towering personalities, not with household names, not with familiar faces from TV nor winners of the great awards and prizes.

Richard Rovere has been writing his occasional "Letters from Washington" for almost 30 years for *The New Yorker*. No one in that period has been read with more respect by serious students of our national affairs. His name, his reputation are engraved in the minds of every knowledgeable Washington figure. Yet, to the general public and even that charmed circle that constitutes the readership of *The New Yorker* the person behind the name "Richard Rovere" is as mysterious as that of "Aleksandrov," the *nom de plume* that *Pravda* attaches to especially important articles known to reflect the views of the Politburo.

Indeed, the question might well be raised by the little old lady in Dubuque: Does Richard Rovere actually exist? Well, happily he does and at long last he has come out of the closet and in *Arrivals and Departures* reveals himself as that attractive, iconoclastic, mildly eccentric and altogether human figure which those of us who have been reading him for half a lifetime knew that he must be.

Perhaps even more so. Who amongst us, for example, sitting at the Century Club next to the slouching chipmunk of a man that is Rovere today, listening to his spare remarks and watching his downcast eyes behind the spectacles would imagine that here is a man who could have totally confounded the late Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy. Here is a man who to the classic question: Are you now or have you ever been a member of the

Communist party? could only answer in all truth: I don't know.

As to why Richard Rovere could give no other answer, I leave you to the story as he tells it. It is the best answer I have ever heard to that notorious question and one which instantly pricks the bubble of McCarthy's sadistic buffoonery.

A pity that Richard Rovere was never summoned to the witness stand. A pity that his hilarious story has had to wait these long years to surface. A pity, indeed, that the real Richard Rovere is only now coming to light for it is not only as a "goldbricking Communist," as he calls himself, that Rovere now issues but as that *rara avis*, a born-in-the-woods New Yorker—and indeed, in other roles that we little suspected. Granted his actual birth occurred in Boss Hague's magnificent fiefdom of Jersey City, Rovere's family was back in Manhattan within a few weeks and in his whole life Rovere has not lived far from it.

Even in covering Washington Rovere never actually *lived* there. *The New Yorker's* editor, the late Harold Ross, who dreamed up the assignment in 1948, was uncertain there was anything in Washington worthy of *The New Yorker's* attention.

"Nobody's yet persuaded me," Rovere remembers Ross saying, "that there is anything for us down there. But there may be. They tell me it's becoming an international city now. That may make a difference."

So Rovere who had just settled his family in Dutchess county, about 100 miles north of New York City, started dropping in on Washington, a few days at a time, testing the waters and seeing what he might discover that was worthy of *The New Yorker's* attention. He never did move to Washington and later on Ross was very proud of that. He let it be known that he thought this was how to cover Washington. Rovere is not so sure that Ross intended things to work out this way but over the years Rovere has clearly proved that distance lends not only enchantment but perspective.

Not long after Rovere began to drop in on Washington Sen. McCarthy swished into national view like a destabilized Roman candle. Rovere was one of the first to get onto him, something more than a year before the Wheeling, West Virginia, speech. Rovere took the senator's measure in a long-forgotten hearing that concerned American soldiers accused by McCarthy of mistreating a Nazi SS group that was alleged to have massacred 150 soldiers



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and 100 Belgians at a town named Malmédy. Nothing McCarthy did after that was much of a surprise to Rovere or his readers. And when the epoch was over Rovere summed it up in a book called *Senator Joe McCarthy*, which is seminal for anyone trying to understand the hysteria of those times.

Rovere, incidentally, puts the lie to long ago rumors that Harold Ross didn't want McCarthy discussed on *The New Yorker's* pages for fear of offending advertisers. While it was true that Ross did not wish to commit the magazine to a partisan political viewpoint and while he was uneasy when Rovere told him that McCarthyism involved a moral rather than a political issue he agreed that Rovere was free to commit the magazine as far as anything he wrote could commit it against McCarthyism. Rovere publishes a note which he received from Ross after a column discussing McCarthy's "big lie" technique. "Mr. Rovere," Ross wrote, "the latest Washington Letter seems to me just wonderful. I hope it will be useful, but as you indicate, the untruths probably won't be overtaken." The date of the note was April 14, 1951.

Rovere is not one to be taken quickly with admiration for a politician. John F. Kennedy interested him and within limits Rovere was attracted to him. He talked to him alone for the first time one Saturday during the 1960 campaign, a Saturday that Kennedy spent in and around Philadelphia (not the last Saturday of the campaign, as Rovere recalls it. That Saturday, as this reporter remembers so well, was spent in New York and Westchester County, winding up with a midnight bus trip up the Naugatuck valley from Bridgeport, Kennedy supporters in pyjamas and nightgowns all the way along the dirty industrial valley, and a 3 am appearance from the balcony of the Roger Smith Hotel in Waterbury that would have delighted Honey Fitz, Jack's old-fashioned Boston political forebear).

Rovere is and always has been that best kind of political observer, the man who never lets his heart overcome his mind. He loves politics and politicians. They have for him that irresistible attraction that they must have for any good political analyst, including Rovere's hero and mentor, Walter Lippmann. But Rovere never forgets the con, possibly because as he charmingly describes he grew up as one of the best con men ever to persuade his parents that the low grades that his prep school teachers awarded him were either

mistakes or not really so bad, relatively, as the stark 37 in English and 24 in Bible studies looked. This kind of con Rovere calls song-and-dance. No once is likely to be taken very far down the Rose Garden path without understanding what the charming Lyndon Johnson (John F. Kennedy, Harry Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower or Richard Nixon) is really up to.

Rovere has kept us straight on five Presidents so far. There will be a sixth named Carter in Washington in January. Rovere, still on his itinerant assignment to Washington, will be on hand now and then to see how much Mr. Carter is relying on the song-and-dance. If Ross were alive he'd agree that, on balance, there's been enough in Washington to justify Rovere dropping in there occasionally.

Harrison Salisbury

Harrison Salisbury's most recent book is *Travels Around America* (Walker).

Roosevelt and Churchill, 1939-1941:

The Partnership That Saved the West by Joseph P. Lash

(Norton; \$12.95)

Inspired national leadership has seldom made so dramatic a difference as in World War II. With the future of the world hanging in the balance, Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of a beleaguered Britain, and Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States, boldly and dramatically marshalled power to tip that balance against Hitler and the Axis. Their initiative and energy during the frightful 18 months between the fall of France and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor may well have been decisive.

The relationship between Roosevelt and Churchill has been endlessly written about and frequently romanticized. There is much of the theater in it, and it is likely to be provender for future historical drama and quite

possibly of renewed romanticization. A generation has gone by since Robert Sherwood in *Roosevelt and Hopkins* gave the public its first intimate view of the association, and nearly as long since Churchill added further detail and his personal judgments in his classical history of World War II. Now for a new generation, Joseph Lash has written a fascinating narrative account, drawing upon published memoirs, diaries, monographs and documents, together with some fresh materials from the Public Record Office in London and the Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, New York. It has a vividness reminiscent of *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, but is far fuller and more sophisticated. There is less romance and more investigation of the tensions between the two leaders and their subordinates. The route to full alliance between the two English speaking peoples was arduous and far from certain.

The narrative begins with Lash's eyewitness account of the consummation of the Grand Alliance, as Roosevelt and Churchill at the White House on January 1, 1942 signed the Declaration of United Nations. At lunch that day, Lash, awestruck, sat next to the Prime Minister, and listened to the discourse cascading forth on matters both trivial and cosmic. At dinner that evening: "The Allied Declaration of Unity and Purpose had been finished, we were told, and Mrs. Roosevelt asked whether it could be read to everyone. The president started to demur, but the prime minister said yes and Hopkins went upstairs to get the document. Churchill was enthusiastic over Roosevelt's suggestion that it should be called 'Declaration of the United Nations.' He had remembered a line from Byron's *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage*, which he proceeded to recite, and then he read the declaration."

For several particularly lively pages, Lash sketches the interchanges between Roosevelt and Churchill. One can only wish that Lash, an outstanding diarist, had been privy to further encounters between the two. It was, alas, a single occasion, but Lash uses it to set the theme of his book; it marked the consummation of Churchill's efforts to involve Roosevelt and the United States completely in the war against Hitler.

Not until Lash has sketched in full the early background of both his protagonists and is well into his narration of what Churchill called "the gathering storm," does the drama again heighten. In these long, sometimes



Harris and Ewing

rather tedious, preliminaries, Lash writes competently but without much new insight concerning Churchill, who was conservative on domestic and imperial matters, and boldly tried to lead Britain to meet the Nazi threat. He is quite adequate concerning the early Roosevelt and most perceptive on Roosevelt from 1937 on. The Roosevelt that emerges is of more notable stature than the one glimpsed in Lash's *Eleanor and Franklin*. But that was Eleanor Roosevelt's book, and in this one her role is quite minor.

Roosevelt, beneath his complexity and secretiveness, worked doggedly toward certain specific goals over a span of years. He engaged in much backing and filling in recognition of the hazards of public opinion and congressional opposition. Perhaps he was over-cautious, but the closeness of several congressional votes in 1941 would indicate otherwise. Consistently what he had sought before the outbreak of war in 1939 were various collective security arrangements without direct American intervention. His fundamental concern was nationalistic, to bolster Britain (and France) in order to protect the United States. Hence by the spring of 1939 he was suggesting to his friend Sir Arthur Willert various ways that he thought the Navy could help the British (and was helping the French to procure airplanes).

After war broke out in the fall of 1939, Roosevelt clung to the same basic goal—security without, if at all possible, direct American intervention. During the so-

called "phoney war" in December 1940, he told the British ambassador, Lord Lothian, he did not think America yet realized in the least the risks it was running or what would happen if Britain and France were to lose the war. In the spring of 1940, when the British were being routed by the Nazis in Norway, Roosevelt, worried, sent indirect word to the British that he wished they would speed things up, that "the only way to meet the product of an almost perfect machine is to build an equally perfect machine." To Roosevelt that meant ships, ships, ships, and planes, planes, planes. It was also what led him in the fall of 1939 to inaugurate his correspondence with Churchill, the "former naval person" once more in charge of the admiralty.

Churchill, becoming prime minister during the *blitzkrieg* of the spring of 1940, realized fully how vital to British survival it was to cooperate with Roosevelt and seek more and more aid and commitment. Roosevelt, acting always in keeping with what he regarded as national interests, and wary of the public and Congress, drove hard bargains. Indeed he pressured the British so hard that when, at the end of 1940, he proposed lend-lease, Churchill did not at first grasp the magnificence of the offer. And at all levels below Churchill and Roosevelt there was a continued wariness and difficulty in joint enterprises.

It is understandable that the British under siege felt that they were serving

as the first line of American defense and were fearful that isolationism would continue to prevail in the United States. As late as March 1941, Robert Vansittart in the Foreign Office grouched, "Many here have an uneasy feeling that, if we study America, she may in her turn yet rat on us . . . my country is, for the second time, doing America's fighting for her and . . . my country has more right than wrong on her side." Those in the Foreign Office counselling patience won out, and Churchill gradually obtained greater and greater commitments from Roosevelt.

Slowly Roosevelt modified his position from one of avoiding any direct American intervention into one of increased naval intervention, and only finally toward full intervention. By August 1941 when Roosevelt met with Churchill at Argentia, Newfoundland, he was determined to enter the war (Churchill reported to the British cabinet), but "clearly he was skating on pretty thin ice in his relations with Congress . . . The President had said that he would wage war but not declare it, and that he would become more and more provocative. If the Germans did not like it, they could attack American forces."

The Navy did become more provocative, but the Germans did not declare war. Rather, war came in the Pacific, although Roosevelt would have liked to defer or avoid it there. Hitler then declared war on the United States, and the full American participation

began.

Therein lies much of the significance of the book in 1977. It appears at a time when, in the aftermath of the Vietnam and Watergate scandals, the "imperial presidency" appears abhorrent. Lash is particularly instructive in delineating some of its roots, from wire-tapping to the circumvention of Congress. He also demonstrates how in a time of peril effective leadership was vital to the survival of one and perhaps both of the English-speaking nations. He will lead readers to ponder more precisely the dilemma that has always faced the nation. How can the presidency be strong enough to protect against an external threat to liberties without itself becoming a threat from within?

Frank Freidel

Frank Freidel is working on the fifth volume of his biography of FDR.

Ethics and Profits by Leonard Silk and David Vogel

(Simon and Schuster; \$8.95)

The Economists by Leonard Silk

(Basic Books; \$10.95)

Alongside the material affluence that most Americans enjoy, popular philosophers tell us, there is a sense of dissatisfaction afoot that is not easily diagnosed. Various, thinkers find its roots in moral incertitudes, racial antagonisms, marital instability, generational tensions, rampant street crime, or the amorphous terrors of a world drifting in a sea of hidden nuclear disaster. Also mentioned is the possibility that the roots of popular discontent

are in part economic.

It is in this last context that Leonard Silk's two books (one with collaborator David Vogel) are of special interest. In *Ethics and Profits: The Crisis of Confidence in American Business*, he investigates the state of the prevailing business mentality and finds it low and muddled. In *The Economists* he investigates the state of economic science and finds it torn and befuddled. The captains of industry feel stripped of their command and jostled in directions they would rather resist. The intellectual architects of industrial policy—or so economists often judge themselves—can't agree on directions. In the economic aspects of their lives, the public is left with the shattered remnants of the established values of yesteryear, and with no reliable standards to guide the present and the future.

Businessmen, though this fact is often overlooked, are a significant part of the public. In the individualistic tradition of the past, they were expected to mind the store and mind the profits. At their romantic best, as glorified by Joseph Schumpeter, they were counted on to exploit opportunities for gain daringly, push ceaselessly for expansion, innovate technologically, and boldly assume the responsibility and risks of the immense investments that lifted the United States to the world's industrial pinnacle. Their behavior was the paragon to which ordinary people, on a much humbler scale, aspired. But those business leaders who would behave so now, and many attempt it, do so with an inescapable sense of guilt.

The great changeover in national attitudes occurred in the New Deal, languished in the 1950s, then gained momentum in the 1960s and 1970s. The quest for individual gain, and production itself, was seen to levy human costs, earlier ignored, that tended to grow cumulatively. A flow of legislation, starting with the protection of women and children in industry, minimum wages, workman's compensation and such, spread into the maze of present regulations aimed at stopping pollution, conserving resources, protecting consumers, and preserving the environment. The constant target of public criticism was business behavior, seen in its best light as socially irresponsible, and at its worst as arrogantly immoral or criminal.

Granted that business is alive and well, and that it still packs a political clout unmatched by any other sector of the population. Still, its human ex-

ponents are chagrined, unable to adapt gracefully to their new position, and even uncertain what their new position is expected to be. Their firms still run on profits. Competitors still jostle for markets. How "ethical," where ethics bears a cost, is an individual firm expected to be? It is this befuddlement and uncertainty that Silk and Vogel document at great length in *Ethics and Profits*. They record the testimony of business leaders as given in eight three-day meetings each attended by from 35 to 55 corporation executives. In it, it appears, the businessmen look upon government as a personal enemy, and also—as they see it—the misguided enemy of progress.

It is not an entirely unsympathetic picture. Specific regulations for industry have burgeoned, arising unexpectedly in nearly every productive sector, and overseen by commissions, agencies and bureaus that multiply daily, along with their reams of forms and reporting requirements. Yet no clear and general guidelines have been established for business conduct, to replace the untrammelled pursuit of private gain. Instead of a firm coordinated code, industry is faced with a series of disconnected efforts, hastily concocted, to correct abuses (just after the kepone has been spilt or the porpoises slaughtered), that are seen as arbitrary, capricious and often harrassing and discriminatory.

Probably, in this era of transition, such psychological and administrative dislocations are inevitable. But one might expect that a new and coherent philosophy of national economic management would be in the making—at least in the social blueprints that professional economists presumably devise. That is not quite the picture that appears in Silk's other work, *The Economists*. Here he recounts the lives and thoughts of five leading economists—Paul Samuelson, Milton Friedman, Kenneth Boulding, Wassily Leontief and John Kenneth Galbraith. They are fairly representative in outlook, though of course far above the average of their profession in renown. Three—Samuelson, Friedman and Leontief—are Nobel prize winners, and at least one of the others is an outstanding candidate in the nearby future. But no two of them agree on basic policies, and each pursues a distinctive line of analysis deemed more important than the others.

Samuelson, whose interests are most

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representative of the profession at large, is the unquestioned master of neoclassical and Keynesian model building. His contributions have been exclusively in theoretical techniques, most often with little or no application in policy. Friedman is the well known exponent of "libertarianism," preoccupied most of his life with the relationship between the supply of money and the level of business activity. Boulding is a gifted mystic who sees economic progress as dependent upon the perfectibility of man. Leontief has been almost exclusively engaged in elaborating the complicated quantitative matrix of a nation's inputs of materials, capital and labor, and its outputs, which he believes may some day be a technical aid to planners. Only Galbraith has dealt with the range of concrete economic problems that currently face society with a view to devising policies to meet them. Yet, though the public has been impressed—as judged by his many readers—most of his colleagues consider Galbraith outside the mainstream of *their* interests. As a group, the profession's leaders seem to be diverging, rather than coalescing on an economic philosophy for the new era through which the world is rapidly progressing.

Leonard Silk is a member of *The New York Times* editorial board and his extraordinary journalistic skill is abundantly evident in both books. Especially is this true of *The Economists*, which is bright and excellent reading. The tone is generous and sympathetic throughout, a characteristic that bears an inevitable cost. What is lacking is critical analysis, the stubborn probing of competitive theories or approaches to reach conclusions, however tentative. For example, Samuelson retains faith in conventional fiscal and monetary management, Keynesian fashion, for combatting inflation and unemployment. Friedman vigorously opposes such deliberate measures, as he sees it, on the record of their failures. His advice is to let the free market manage itself, while government concentrates only on keeping its fumbling hands off. Galbraith sponsors active government planning that goes far beyond the original Keynesian prescription. The reader can't help wondering who's right and why, in the writer's opinion at least. One can note only that Samuelson, for sheer brilliance, wins Silk's unstinting admiration.

Melville J. Ulmer

Power, Inc. by Morton Mintz and Jerry S. Cohen

(Viking; \$15)

Anyone who has worked in Congress knows that the emergence of controversial issues like gun control and no-fault auto insurance generates thousands of letters from constituents to their representatives on Capitol Hill. This may seem perfectly legitimate, since legislators are supposed to be responsive to public opinion. The problem is that thousands of pieces of constituent mail often reflect nothing more than a campaign by a large lobbying group like the National Rifle Association or the Trial Lawyers' Association; and in many cases, it is not uncommon to find that the wording of the letters is identical and that even the signatures bear a great similarity. The result is that a "responsive" legislator may wind up being accountable to organized private interests rather than to the unorganized public interests.

This is only one of many problems of accountability which Morton Mintz and Jerry Cohen confront in their book, *Power, Inc.* "Unaccountability pervades American life," they write, "—not merely the presidency, not merely the rest of government, but all public and private institutions that exert substantial power over us and, inevitably, over future generations." To make the scope of this unaccountability clear, they set out to provide an encyclopedia of abuse. Their resulting narrative is so broad and so well researched that, after reading the book, you begin to wonder whether there is any justice in the world.

Much of their work is a deeper probe into areas that have already been well publicized, such as government spying on law-abiding citizens and American oil companies colluding with foreign governments to limit supply in the United States. In other areas, their book gives emphasis to matters that have received too little public attention.

Henry Durham, for example, was a Lockheed employee in Marietta, Georgia. When Congress was considering a \$250 million loan guarantee to bail Lockheed out of bankruptcy, Durham tried to tell Lockheed executives and then Congress itself of his shocking discoveries: Lockheed officials had used falsified records and other fraudulent devices, in some cases with

The History of the German Resistance, 1933-1945 by Peter Hoffmann

Reviewing the original German edition of this book, *The [London] Times Literary Supplement* stated that "With this monumental work . . . Peter Hoffmann may fairly claim that the theme of the German opposition to Hitler is finally exhausted. Every lode has been worked out, every scrap of ore mined. . . . It is a work of which an historian in any field might justly be proud, and which deserves the greatest praise for the way in which meticulous study of the available documentary sources—the number of which, in the circumstances, never fails to surprise—has been combined with the gathering of statements from contemporaries and surviving participants in the events to form a well-ordered, highly readable and at times gripping narrative, and to contrive to avoid the trap of tedium into which so much detail can so easily fall. It will be the essential, and surely final, handbook for every student of the subject.

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the acquiescence of the United States Air Force, to mislead stockholders, the public, and even Congress. Durham's only "reward" for his efforts was fear. "I began to receive serious threats on my life and the lives of my wife and children," he later explained. "The telephone rang day and night. Anonymous callers not only threatened to kill me but viciously threatened to disfigure my daughter."

Abuses like this not only affect the pocketbooks of taxpayers; sometimes it is literally a matter of life and death for consumers. Cohen and Mintz recount an especially troublesome practice used by drug companies in their effort to secure federal approval to market questionable products. These companies ghost articles for doctors who have them published in professional journals even though the doctors have no independent means of checking the accuracy of the supporting research. Not surprisingly, the articles relate the value of the product, ignore hazardous side effects, and, in general, give the government a false sense of security.

By touching so many bases, Cohen and Mintz give credence to their claim that abuse in public and private spheres is far more widespread and dangerous than we sometimes realize. The breadth of their work is a shortcoming as well as a strength, however. By trying to cover so much they barely scratch the surface in some areas. Only nine pages are devoted to congressional lobbying and only ten pages to a combined discussion of banks, unions and hospitals. For these and some other topics, interested and well informed readers may walk away frustrated, feeling they have learned nothing new.

What is totally new is the authors' proposed constitutional amendment to help eliminate the abuses they describe. In essence, the amendment would give every person the right to sue *anyone*—the government, a private corporation, or another individual—who "is causing substantial harm to the safety or happiness of a consequential number of people." The appeal of the amendment is obvious: under its broad sweep, people could have some redress against not only a government that spies but also against oil companies that bribe and drug companies that defraud.

The simplicity of the proposed amendment is deceptive. To begin with, it places the burden on individuals to right the wrongs of society and then sends them off to court—a strange remedy in light of the authors' earlier criticism of

courts as too passive, too slow and too narrow-minded to play more than a limited role in correcting the nation's ills.

Moreover, the amendment is far too vague. It took blacks almost a century to convince federal courts that "equal protection of the laws" under another constitutional amendment included racial integration of schools and other public facilities. Must the outraged citizen wait another hundred years for the meaning of the authors' proposed amendment to take hold? "Fundamental justice" and "fundamental fairness"—Mintz and Cohen's definition of "happiness" under the amendment—may be clear to them in the abstract, but reality has a strange way of twisting meanings. In the famous *Reserve Mining* case, a company was charged with polluting Lake Superior with industrial waste; the company said that compliance with the complainants' demands would force the large company to shut down. In this instance, whose "happiness" is more important—that of the worker who faces unemployment or that of the consumer who faces an uncertain health danger? Answers to social questions like these should be formulated in the political arena, not the courtroom.

Cohen and Mintz have nonetheless made a valuable contribution. One hopes that the political debate they have amplified will be picked up in the new administration. Power is something most Presidents understand.

Lewis J. Paper

*Lewis J. Paper is author of **The Promise and the Performance: The Leadership of John F. Kennedy** (Crown).*

The Ethnic Southerners by George Brown Tindall

(LSU Press; \$11.95)

The Natural Superiority of Southern Politicians: A Revisionist History by David Leon Chandler

(Doubleday; \$10)

When Jimmy Carter, having vanquished contenders overt and covert alike, gained the Democratic nomination last summer, it became time to rediscover

the New South again. From all major networks, newspapers and news magazines, journalists came winging into Atlanta, motored into the back country for a look at the peanut works at Plains, and then fanned out through Dixie like census takers or encyclopedia salesmen.

Those of us who had secured modest reputations as interpreters of the post-Confederate peasantry during the decades without light often found ourselves being interviewed. "What," asked the reporter from one national newsweekly of George Tindall and myself one September afternoon, "is the Southern spirit?"

Neither of us was sure any such thing existed—when phrased in those terms at least—so the interview proceeded along other lines, and soon afterward the reporter departed for Columbia, SC, and a visit with Big Jim Dickey, who I hope was able to instruct him more satisfactorily. Afterward Tindall and myself debated whether we ought not to send a bill to the news magazine for consulting services, but we decided against it. After all, if a reporter went down to Uganda and interviewed a tribal medicine man, would a consulting fee be in order? In the eyes of the news magazines it was probably considered much the same kind of activity.

I mention all this because Tindall was engaged at the time in correcting galley proof for his new book. *The Ethnic Southerners*, the contents of which constitute in part at least a warning against what the news magazine in question, as well as most of the metropolitan Northeastern press, was then engaged in doing: the swift encapsulation of the attitudes and ambitions of a complex American region within any simple formulation, whether as New South, Old South, Changing South, Unchanging South, Jimmy Carter's South, or whatever.

As the acknowledged master among historians of the contemporary South, Tindall has reason to know how naïve it is to propose to wrap up the secrets of the South and its people in little packages for popular consumption. But for every person who will read Tindall's informed judgments, a thousand or so will form their opinions from the hoked-up diet of cliché and truism being mass-produced to commemorate the accession of Carter to the White House. Which is too bad.

The Ethnic Southerners is a selection of essays composed over the course of numerous years of studying and

meditating on the South, and a controlling *motif* runs through the various pieces in the volume: the persistence of Southern identity amid change, together with the difficulty of ascertaining what is involved in that identity. The title essay points up the problem: "The belief that the South is forever disappearing," Tindall notes, "has a long and honored tradition." Yet the regional identity has continued to flourish, not merely despite but even within the new patterns.

Nowadays scholars have become considerably less certain that there is a single American social and cultural mainstream, and have focussed upon the existence, within the nation, of important divergent cultural groups—subcultures perhaps—which have not been incorporated into a "homogenized American culture." In Tindall's words, "It is not the South that has vanished but the mainstream, like one of those desert rivers that run out into the sand, consumed by the heat." And just as we have witnessed the rising recognition of an ethnic black culture within the Union, American and not African yet pervasively different enough to confer a palpable identity upon its members despite all efforts to eradicate or deny it, so there would seem to be something appropriately described as the "ethnic Southerner"—a member of a subculture within the larger American identity, distinctly marked by a society, bearing within his own personality a communal identity that represents a living past.

For all their long *apartheid*, black and white Southerners alike bear this identity, and to assume that social and economic change will remove it may be a dubious hypothesis. As Tindall says, "We learn from modern psychology that to change is not necessarily to lose one's identity; to change, sometimes, is to find it."

In one of the most lucid essays in this collection, "Mythology: A New Frontier in Southern History," Tindall enumerates the various and often paradoxical myths that have evolved out of the South's attempts to understand itself, and the nation's attempts to understand the South. Such mythmaking may offer important keys to the Southern identity, he suggests, but he notes that historians have tended to fasten upon one or the other explanation and pursue it with a single-mindedness that only intensifies the mythmaking process.

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Strategy: A Historical Perspective," takes up the abortive Southern strategy of the Nixon regime to show how often and futilely have similar attempts been made by the Republican party. In the apparent debacle of the most recent effort to split the supposedly "conservative" South permanently away from the Democratic party, Tindall recognizes yet another misreading of the South, and quotes the words of a South Carolinian: "There ain't that many Republicans in South Carolina, just a lot of mad Democrats."

Most of the essays in Tindall's volume center upon the failure of the region and its ways to yield their secrets to facile analysis and easy schematization. The South is constantly depicted as being on the verge of transforming itself or being transformed; as Tindall remarks, "somebody will always be staging a symposium on the changing South." And again, "another consistent theme has been the vanishing South, forever moving forward toward the mainstream of American life but somehow never getting there." Clearly he is not at all convinced that the South as we have known it is about to vanish, not does he seem to want it to; if the present-day South, freed at last from the shackles of racial segregation, appears to have the

chance to offer reconciliation to a divided nation, Tindall is of the opinion that the task can best be performed through the development of a better South, not by attempts to be something else. But he is not naïvely optimistic about the chances: "Let us not forget," he concludes, "that if experience is any guide, the South will blow it."

I would hope that long after the advent of President Carter has become history, those persons desiring to engage in the past-time of South-watching will read these witty, sagacious essays before trying their own conclusions. The South that Tindall sketches for us is not a place of capsule categorizations or stagey oversimplifying: it is the genuine article.

Unfortunately what more often gets written about Southern politics and politicians is the sort of thing exemplified in David Leon Chandler's *The Natural Superiority of Southern Politicians*. This new tome, written in the prose style of a hardware catalogue, not only stays entirely on the surface of a complex subject, but manages to scarify it here and there with misstatements, errors of fact and hasty generalizations. Here is a book purporting to give the "revisionist" word on Southern political history, and which yet has nothing to

say about Ellis Arnall, Cole L. Blease, Pitchfork Ben Tillman, Tom Martin, Billy Mahone, L. Q. C. Lamar, Robert Barnwell Rhett, Josephus Daniels, Henry W. Grady, John B. Gordon, Ed Crump, Bishop Cannon and Cotton Ed Smith, to name a baker's dozen. Oh well. There's revisionism for you.

Louis D. Rubin, Jr.

Louis D. Rubin, Jr., is University Distinguished Professor of English at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

Racial Equality in America by John Hope Franklin

(University of Chicago Press; \$7.95)

John Hope Franklin is an uncommon historian who has consistently corrected in eloquent language the misrecording of this country's rich heritage. Now we have his incisive treatment of Jefferson's position on black slavery and the egalitarian concept in this country, set forth in *Racial Equality In America*, the

1976 Jefferson Lectures sponsored by the National Endowment for the Humanities.

In the first lecture, which he calls *Dream Deferred*, Franklin points out that "each generation of Americans, from the very first handful in the 17th Century, to the hundreds of millions in the 20th Century, has sought to create a social order in which equality and justice, as they understood it, would prevail." Tensions and conflicts were inevitable, he writes, but in most cases the participants demonstrated a remarkable capacity to resolve such differences. Nevertheless, at the start of the nation, "bonds and mutual respect were lacking in the relationships of Europeans and Africans in the new world."

Franklin observes that when armed conflict between England and the colonies became inevitable, the colonists were not prepared for the consequences of the strong positions they had taken. The existence of slavery, he adds, especially among some of the most ardent patriots, compromised any arguments they dared to make regarding their own freedom from oppression. Even though the arguments of the opponents were unassailable, the most articulate voices raised in behalf of the colonies' freedom (presumably) deemed it would jeopardize the unity of the colonies to publicly speak out against slavery.

At the same time, if anyone among the colonists could have coped with the question, it was Thomas Jefferson, a large slaveholder, who also had a deep appreciation of the meaning of freedom. The author cites the early unsuccessful efforts by Jefferson in 1769 to change the Virginia law of manumission, as evidence of his reservation about slavery. Jefferson's first draft of the Declaration of Independence also attempted to bring the anti-slavery cause into the movement for independence, but the Continental Congress voted to eliminate that portion from the Declaration. Franklin notes that as the most important document of the Revolution and one of the most important statements on the rights of man ever published, "it seems unfortunate that the Declaration of Independence, in its final form, said nothing at all about the widespread practice of trading in human flesh and holding human beings in perpetual bondage. For the emphasis on natural equality and human liberty, the American Revolution was not really

egalitarian."

Franklin explains that although Jefferson insisted that he was strongly anti-slavery, he never reached the point of freeing his own slaves nor using his enormous prestige to oppose slavery unequivocally in word or deed. Franklin also notes that there is no evidence that he cheered the gradual emancipation of slaves to the North. To the contrary, Jefferson's views on the inequality of the races can be clearly seen when he wrote, "in memory they [Negroes] are equal to whites; in reason, much inferior. . . ." In this instance, I cannot completely agree with Franklin. I believe that Jefferson, in spite of the fact that he made no move to free his slaves, must have been uneasy in his conviction of the inferiority of black people and the consequent superiority of whites, for he wrote his correspondent Gregoire in 1809, "no person living wishes more sincerely than I do to see a complete refutation of the doubts I have myself entertained and expressed on the grade of understanding allotted to them [Negroes] by nature and to find that in this respect, that they are on a par with ourselves. My doubts were the result of personal observation in the limited sphere of my own state where the opportunities for the development of their genius were not favorable and those of experiencing it still less so." Jefferson must have had a nagging feeling that perhaps he was consigning to a role in the darkness of the world this race that did not deserve it.

The author observes that the view of the inferiority of blacks that was held by most colonists did not relate merely to slaves, but to all black people, including those who were free. Franklin has made a valid observation to the extent that such a view became a part of the warp and woof of our developing society and provided the bases for the attitudes, codes and behavior governing relations between our racial groups to this day.

The author's incisive analysis, the clarity of descriptions that are so effectively set forth in this first lecture, *Dream Deferred*, are less evident in the second and final lectures as he discusses the progression of events in the 19th and 20th centuries. He endeavors to cover subject matter far too vast for the limited time available for these lectures. As a result, his choice of events to illustrate the broadening and development of the concept of racial inequality are too numerous and off the point in many instances.

The author's thesis is that movement toward racial equality was aborted

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during the 19th century. The institution of slavery occupied most of the nation's attention and energies. Concern about inequality diminished and emancipation became the overriding objective.

The third Lecture—*Equality Indivisible*—turns to the 20th century where Franklin observes that “almost from the beginning of their national history, Americans have been relentless, at times ruthless, in their pursuit of equality.” He adds that as one views the problems of racial equality over the last two centuries, it becomes clear that a prime concern of the policymakers was to create distinctions between those who were regarded as equals and those who were not—to divide equality. To do so, he says, would not only become one of the major preoccupations of Americans in the 20th century, but a major policy problem at every level of American society and government. The story, he continues, as well as the problem of racial equality in 20th-century America, is essentially the story of the struggle to divide privilege or rights whose *indivisibility* would become more and more apparent.

Accordingly, Franklin states, “more than anything else—Americans of every race, creed, economic rank and social position need to recognize that equality

is indeed indivisible. For the entire life of this nation an effort has been made to divide equality—and it has not worked.”

In his preface to the lectures, Franklin states that he has tried to adhere to the historian's role of only describing and analyzing racial equality in its historical setting. By the very nature of the examples he has used, he—however unwittingly—has suggested some guidelines for the future. Because the subject of racial equality is a deep and abiding concern for him, his commitment and belief in the future can be seen clearly by the reader. In the final analysis, there is no reason why this should not be so, since it does not distort his historical perspective.

We share this hope and belief for the future, as did Medgar Evers, a native Mississippian who served as a field director of the NAACP. I carry with me the vivid memory of the funeral of this young man who was slain by an assassin's bullet in the dark of the night. On that June day in 1963, thousands stood together and we sang—as one—his favorite spiritual, which later became the anthem of the civil rights movement: *We Shall Overcome*.

Roy Wilkins

Roy Wilkins is executive director of the NAACP.

*Delusive Fortune hears th' incessant call,
They mount, they shine, evaporate, and
fall.*

*On ev'ry stage the foes of peace attend,
Hate dogs their flight, and insult mocks
their end.*

*Love ends with hope, the sinking
statesman's door*

Pours in the morning worshiper no more.

There is even a couplet for the Commander in Chief: “How nations sink, by darling schemes oppress'd/When vengeance listens to the fool's request.”

2) Too much is written about education, so the best pieces tend to get buried. Thomas Henry Huxley's essay, “A Liberal Education and Where to Find It” is worth keeping close by, particularly for the idea that “education is the instruction of the intellect in the laws of Nature... not merely things and their forces, but men and their ways; and the fashioning of the affections and of the will into an earnest and loving desire to move in harmony with those laws.” Some people at HEW may think that Huxley advocates religious training because he cites “morality as the guide of conduct”; in fact he prescribes a liberal education at least as progressive (and a good deal more specific) than most modern plans.

3) When the press gets on the President's nerves, he might pick up John Milton's essay “Areopagitica.” Two of Carter's notable predecessors, rarely linked, were down on the press regularly—Nixon and Jefferson, one of whom probably would not have been helped by Milton in any case. Nevertheless, it's a comfort to be reminded that there are real, solid reasons for protecting word-dealers—not just because books “contain a potency of life in them to be as active as that soul was whose progeny they are,” but for the well-being of the general: “What wisdom can there be to choose, what continence to forbear without the knowledge of evil?”

4) *Their Eyes Were Watching God* is Zora Neale Hurston's novel about a black woman's determination and the discovery of beauty. A good read when the ERA is being discussed, and even better in quieter moments.

5) *Huckleberry Finn* is still the best American book on black-white relations, in case anyone considers that a problem

The Back of the Book

Words With the President

How much and what Jimmy Carter reads used to be a topic of the campaign, in the long run perhaps the most important. Now, understandably, it has given way to tax rebates, cabinet appointments, inaugural preparations, and more urgent matters. Carter will have a lot less time for reading after January 20, but he'll find some time if he wants to, and his reading material, no matter how small, will probably mean more for the outside pressures it holds at bay. Whatever he reads should bear some connections to his work, yet should be good for general reasons as well. Here, then, is a list of a few valuables which Carter might want to

dust off in his new House library, or to bring from home.

1) No President should be too far from “The Vanity of Human Wishes,” Samuel Johnson's imitation of the tenth satire of Juvenal. Only the staunch common sense of the poem keeps it from breaking one's heart, “vanity” meaning not a superficial but a deep and abiding emptiness. But there's sound advice here, too, particularly for the honeymoon of a new job:

*Unnumber'd suppliants crowd
Preferment's gate,
Athirst for wealth, and burning to be
great;*

these days and is still willing to "go to hell" for decency.

6) On the subject of war it is hard to do better than Frank O'Connor's "Guests of the Nation," a short story about two sets of hostages, the keepers and the kept. Two Irishmen hold two Englishmen captive, whom they are forced to shoot in retaliation for other executions. The narrator balks: "Weren't we all chums? Didn't we understand him, and didn't he understand us?" An extra copy might go to Belfast.

7) As for death in the abstract, John Donne's meditation XVII loses nothing over the years: "Any man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in Mankind."

8) When the involvement in mankind becomes perplexing, one might turn to Alexander Pope's *Moral Essays*, Epistle I:

*Manners with Fortunes, Humours turn
with Climes,
Tenets with Books, and Principles with
Times.
Search then the Ruling Passion: There,
alone,
The Wild are constant and the Cunning
known.*

When the involvement becomes overbearing there's the fourth book of Wordsworth's *The Prelude*, and its apostrophe to solitude. And when involvement grows irritating, one can always cite Swift: "When a man of Genius appears in the World, you may know him by this infallible Sign, that all the Dunces are in conspiracy against him"—in a mutter, with the door shut.

9) Affairs of State inevitably make passion subject to duty, and at such times it may be helpful to go over that part of Tennyson's *Idylls of the King* on the quest of the Holy Grail. The quest was taken up by Galahad, Lancelot, Gawain, Sir Bors, Percivale, and the other most adventurous knights of the round table; but Arthur stayed back because "the King must guard/That which he rules, and is but as the hind/To whom a space of land is given." An uncomfortable bit of wisdom for national leaders who are chosen as much for their vision as stability.

10) Recent Presidents have been concerned with the young, mostly in fear.

Few autobiographies of childhood are as powerful as Richard Wright's *Black Boy*:

I dreamed of going north and writing books, novels. The North symbolized to me all that I had not felt and seen; it had no relation whatever to what actually existed. Yet, by imagining a place where everything was possible, I kept hope alive in me. But where had I got this notion of doing something that would be recognized by others? I had, of course, read my Horatio Alger stories, my pulp stories, and I knew my Get-Rich-Quick Wallingford series from cover to cover, though I had sense enough not to hope to get rich; even to my naive imagination that possibility was too remote. I knew that I lived in a country in which the aspirations of black people were limited, marked-off. Yet I felt that I had to go somewhere and do something to redeem my being alive.

Wright's later fiction, particularly *Native Son* and *The Outsider* showed what penalties were waiting for black boys up North. But the dreams in *Black Boy* still are every child's dreams, even if the idea of North has shifted and the penalties grown more subtle.

11) The temptation to be adamant in decisions might be effectively averted by two poems: Marianne Moore's "The Mind is an Enchanting Thing" ("it's not a Herod's oath that cannot change") and Richard Wilbur's "Mind." If neither works, a re-reading of Robert Lowell's "Inauguration Day 1953" is enough to chill any President's heart, or to warm it.

12) For those depths of mind we never get to, take Conrad's *Lord Jim*, a yarn and a half.

13) Since Presidents need to laugh more than most, there ought to be at least one collection of Robert Benchley, S. J. Perelman and James Thurber within reach. Benchley and Perelman for pure chuckles; Thurber for something extra. His fable, "The Owl Who Was God," a case of misidentity, is appropriate for leaders.

14) Do not forget *King Lear*, which may be read in addition to, or instead of, all the above.

15) On culture I'd take Matthew Arnold's "Sweetness and Light" from

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Culture and Anarchy. Arnold said that "culture is the study of perfection... which consists in becoming something rather than in having something," thus defining the idea of culture as process, the only definition that makes sense. If one can't get hold of "Sweetness and Light," a venerable American Journal of Politics and the Arts located in Washington (\$21 per year) will do as well. Perhaps a President should read both, to avoid missing something.

Give or take a few books and a hundred arguments, this list is flawless. The total selection is small enough for a single shelf, which is proper: and any one of the choices, including the novels, may be read in one night. The trick, as Carter, who is a practiced reader, recognizes, is *how* to read them—not as

staff memos, God knows, but not as some otherworldly artifacts either. These works are as alive and kicking as any current issue, and as forceful as the mind that takes them seriously.

Roger Rosenblatt

TRB, from Page 2

wind, after the rain, that vibrated the poles. A faint throb of antiwar chants came up as Nixon talked. One mocking homemade sign said, "'Peace is at Hand'—Henry Kissinger, Oct. 26, 1972" in reference, of course, to his comment

just before the election.

Richard Nixon is represented at this 1977 Inaugural, too, by indirection though not in person. He appointed four members of the present Supreme Court and through them he still influences affairs. He picked four remarkably like-minded conservatives, "strict constructionists," he called them. "I am proud of the appointments I have made to the courts," he said in his 1972 acceptance speech, "particularly to the Supreme Court. We must strengthen the peace forces against the criminal forces in America."

"Peace forces" was a code name for conservatives, to undo the work of the liberal Warren court. The Senate rejected two Nixon appointees, of course, Haynsworth and Carswell. The present bitter confirmation controversy over Griffin Bell recalls his support of school segregationist Carswell and brings back the Nixon echo. Just last week the four able and high-minded Nixon justices lined up again together in a split decision. It was a procedural matter in a zoning case with racial implications. Along with Potter Stewart (an Eisenhower appointee) the Nixon justices carried the day.


Every presidential Inaugural has its own mood under the bands and gaiety, and the one today, I think, is uncertainty. It is wonderful to be rid of Watergate and Vietnam, and Jerry Ford helped us to do that. But what about the man we elected? His selection of Bell has raised a row with the blacks, and his skimpy plans for stimulating the economy have upset organized labor. Liberal economist Walter Heller in Senate testimony last week rather scornfully referred to Carter proposals as "being 'realistic' and 'pragmatic' to the point of being downright modest." The United States is not out of the woods yet. Our allies are counting on American recovery to lift them from the slump. Yet we are further from our high-employment goals now than a year ago; the operating rates of manufacturing are barely above a year ago, and industrial production is limping along at rates no higher than those it first reached three years ago. Sens. Humphrey and Javits have introduced a two-billion-dollar bill for programs to reduce youth unemployment. Almost certainly the Democratic Congress will demand greater federal effort

The crowd hushes, the black-robed Chief Justice steps forward, and Jimmy Carter takes the oath. Does that end anything? No, it is just the start.

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
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In Transition

John Adams left town because he couldn't bear to see his successor, Thomas Jefferson, sworn into office. Gerald Ford feels obliged to be cordial. It is one of the rules of Transition, the elaborate ritual that has grown up around the Imperial President-elect. This year it seems more elaborate than ever. "I'm with Transition," says the voice on the other end of the telephone, and suddenly backs straighten, ears cock, hopes rise. Old Washington hands, gray-haired senior partners, former sub-cabinet officers find themselves being cross-examined by 24-year-old MAs in political science who think Jack Valenti was a middleweight boxer. Is all this another illusion created by the misplaced enthusiasms of the post-Teddy White press, a legitimate expression of the post-Watergate morality, or another triumph of style over substance?

Résumés are the calling cards of Transition, and the hapless staff has been buried under an avalanche of them. Résumé-writing is a craft, perhaps even an art, and the Transition people have come to appreciate the tricks of effective résumé writing. It is puzzling to them why so many believe, for example, that a hefty résumé, padded with superfluous information, is the passport to success. One cited every letter to the editor that the applicant had written, including one that appeared in *Public Relations Journal*. Others have boasted that they visited 43 states. Then, in this age of affirmative action, there are the not-so-subtle ploys of those who want to underline the right qualifications. Women with androgynous first names find "Ms" a useful appendage. Black applicants have been known to enclose a photograph with their cover letters. The practice of putting photographs on applications is prohibited in many states.

A good résumé is still currency, however. HUD Secretary-designate Patricia Roberts Harris was dean of the Howard Law School for a matter of weeks, but that important element of her background still finds its way into every description of her qualifications.

Writing about the English monarchy a century ago, Walter Bagehot said: "A

family on the throne is an interesting idea. It brings down the pride of sovereignty to the level of petty life." Today, one might say, to a level below that of petty life. When Richard Nixon in 1969 presented his entire cabinet with their wives on television, a friend remarked that they looked to him like a "Committee of Concerned Citizens for Disneyland." The truth is that banality can reach no lower than public men when they have their wives in tow. Lady Bird Johnson avoided this kind of humiliating imposition, although her daughters did not, and at least this may be said for Jimmy Carter: so far he has made very little offensive use of either his own family or the families of his cabinet members. Rosalynn Carter seems equipped like Mrs. Johnson to conduct herself with dignity in her own activities and in her own right. I hope it lasts, and that she will not end like Betty Ford, who had been dignified all along but at the last was eating crumbs out of the hands of Barbara Walters. Perhaps Republicans like to punish their wives more than Democrats.

In the excellent profile of Henry Kissinger which was produced by Public Television last week, Joseph Kraft observed that, coming to Washington without a constituency, Kissinger had deliberately built his own constituency in and on the press. I recalled the remark when, two days later, one of the second-level men in the new administration emphasized what others have pointed out: that Jimmy Carter has sought—and found—people who do not have constituencies. He may think this makes him safe; it is of course the surest way of cutting himself off from the kind of information he needs most. But the example of Kissinger is there before him as a warning, and before others as a model. Deliberately forming a constituency out of the press is something to which the nature both of Washington and the press today lend themselves. Mr. Carter should realize that it is something a Secretary can do much easier than a President.

The appearance of action, as Harold Macmillan once said, is often as important as action itself. Congress, chasten-

ed but ready to swing into action, has taken this advice to heart, and last week unveiled its latest response to the call for reform. Henceforth, "recesses" shall be known as "district work periods."

The text I would like to send to the French government this week is contained in Catherine the Great's majestic reminder to Diderot that "laws are written on human skin." In a time in which we seem almost to take terrorism for granted, the international law of extradition is, perhaps more than any other, written on human skin. But how to persuade the French? In spite of the succession of civil wars which they like to think of as revolutions, the imperatives of *raison d'état* have never weakened in the French mind. Moreover, a moral insensitivity is bred into the officials who rule France by the intellectual smugness of the three great Ecoles in which they are trained: the Polytechnique, the Ecole Nationale d'Administration and the Ecole Nationale Supérieure. This smugness was once summarized in glowing terms by Georges Pompidou, when he described the character of the Normalien: "If he believes in God it is with the faith of Pascal, if he believes in science it is like Renan, if he believes in honor it is like Corneille, if he believes in love it is like Racine." And so he continued. "If he believes. . . ." It is the *if* that tells all. I forget which Frenchman said that it was infidelity not to leave the bed of one's spouse for the bed of one's lover, but to leave the bed of one's lover to return to the bed of one's spouse. It is a perverse code to carry into one's public morality. But too often that is France's honor.

Before Adams left town, he spent until nine o'clock of the eve of Jefferson's inauguration nominating officials and judges, and sending them to his Secretary of State, John Marshall, to sign and seal. At midnight the incoming Attorney-General, Levi Lincoln, entered Marshall's office with Jefferson's watch in his hand, and found him still signing and sealing the torrent of new commissions. Lincoln pointed to the new President's watch, and said that March 4th had arrived, at which Marshall rose from his desk and left.

Next time you need a prescription drug, who should select it?

You'd be surprised how many people want to get into the act.

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Some pharmacy groups contend that when pharmacists fill your prescription, they should be permitted to substitute their choice of the drug product for the brand specified by your doctor.

Certain consumer activist groups claim that such substitution would save you money.

And some legislators, at both state and federal levels, regularly propose laws to permit pharmacists to interchange brands without the doctor's approval.

The member companies of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association applaud the motives but have serious doubts about the validity of the claims.

We think the money saving argument is fallacious. Some states have had pro-substitution laws for years. Yet, when you look for evidence that consumers have saved money, it doesn't exist.


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There's the important question of whether all brands of a drug are the same.

The fact is that two versions of the same drug, formulated by different companies, using different inert materials and manufacturing procedures, and different quality control measures, can have different effects on patients.

Current drug standards, and their enforcement, don't adequately ensure the equivalency of differing drug formulations. The Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S. Congress has said as much. So have many scientific experts in drug therapy.

Which leads us to conclude that your doctor is in the best position



to select your prescription drugs. Only he has the knowledge of your health history and present condition as well as of the medicines that can help you. Your pharmacist and your doctor, working together, can select the best and most economical therapy. The collaboration goes on every day, and it requires no change in the law to continue and grow.

That's why we think that, while the advice of the pharmacist is an important factor in your doctor's prescribing, the final selection of the specific medication should remain in your doctor's hands.

We hope you agree.

The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association

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